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ABSTRACT
There  has  been  much  publicity  surrounding  “new  economy”  companies,  a  term   embracing
“dot.com”, “high-tech” and “innovative high growth” companies,  amongst  others.  Whilst  such
generic terminology serves to obscure the very real differences between such companies, they  are
generally thought to be an important factor in economic growth despite fears as to their volatility.
In  economic  terms  such  companies  potentially  present  a  number  of  difficulties   relating   to
judgement problems, information asymmetry,  asset  specificity,  imperfectly  competitive  markets
and measurement. Such distinguishing features give rise to a  high  probability  of  market  failure
and may be argued to have played a significant role in the “dot.com  crash”.  In  particular,  it  is
thought  that  the  role  played  by  human  capital  and  the  associated  problem  of  human  asset
specificity,  poses  special  problems.  Such  difficulties  may   provide   a   justification   for   state
intervention  to  regulate  such  companies  and,  in  particular,   their   governance.   This   paper
evaluates the the legal and regulatory framework for  the  governance  of  human  capital  in  new
economy  companies  by  reference  to  the  competing  or   complementary   regulatory   goals   of
efficiency, good governance, innovation and  human  capital.  It  further  illustrates  the  practical
effect of this framework by means of a survey of prospectuses of a sample of  50  companies  listed
on the Techmark index selected from three relevant groupings of  sectors,  which  included  health
related, computer hardware, telecommunications and computing services companies, and  related
annual reports and accounts. It concludes  by  identifying  examples  of  inappropriate  regulation
and making proposals for reform.
INTRODUCTION
The importance of an analysis of “new economy” companies
Michael Jensen, then President of the American Finance Association, spoke prophetically of  what
he later termed a “Third Industrial Revolution” in 1993 in giving its Presidential Address[2]:
“Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have  been  changing
the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable  to  the  changes  experienced  during  the
nineteenth   century   Industrial   Revolution.   As   in   the   nineteenth   century,   we    are
experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity  of
labor, reduced growth rates  of  labor  income,  excess  capacity,  and  the  requirement  for
downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have
failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth  and  the  requirement
for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for  Western  firms  and  political
systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.”
The growth of what have been termed “new economy” companies has been an important factor  in
shaping  the  character  of  this  “Third  Industrial  Revolution”.  “New  economy”  companies  are
associated with the most innovative sectors of the global economy, encompassing fields as diverse
as information technology, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, to list but a few.  The  OECD  has
recently challenged talk of:
 “... the death of the “new economy ...”,
claiming, in contrast, that the[3]:
“ ... knowledge intensity of OECD countries has continued to increase in recent years”.
Gottinger has argued that the  “racing  behaviour”  in  leading  high-technology  industries  creates
cluster  and  network  externalities,  which  pipeline  through  other  sectors  of  the  economy  and
creating competitive advantages elsewhere, endogenising growth in these  economies[4].  Youndt,
Subramaniam  and  Snell  have  observed  that  “  ...  the  notion  that  knowledge  and  brainpower
supercede physical assets  as  the  primary  source  of  competitive  advantage  is  now  commonly
accepted in the management literature ...”[5].
Accordingly, investment in knowledge, taken by the OECD as meaning the sum of  investment  in
R & D, software and higher education, amounted to 7% of GDP in  the  United  States  against  an
OECD average of 4.8% of GDP[6]. Trade in high-technology goods such  as  aircraft,  computers,
pharmaceuticals and scientific instruments can be demonstrated to have increased  from  less  than
20% in the early 1990s to over 25% of total trade in 2000 and 2001[7]. Similarly, there has been a
32% increase between 1991 and 1998 in the growth of patent families in the OECD area[8]. In the
United Kingdom, the market capitalisation  of  the  177  companies  grouped  on  the  TechMARK
index of the London Stock Exchange amounted to £282,606 million as at  March  2004,  of  which
40 companies were included in the TechMARK Mediscience index with a market capitalisation of
£128,990 million[9]. Disappointingly, perhaps, in the light of this, BusinessWeek  identified  only
1 UK company, Vodaphone Group  plc,  as  falling  within  its  Info  Tech  100[10].  Whilst  “new
economy companies”  are  undoubtedly  important,  they  also  present  potential  difficulties.  The
volatility of such companies and, in particular, their share price is well-known  on  account  of  the
publicity surrounding the “dot.com bubble”. PriceWaterhouse found in 2001 that  expectations  of
European dotcom companies included turnover growth in excess of 800%  over  the  following  12
months[11]. Some such companies have failed, including Boo.Com and  Clickmango[12].  Others
have suffered a severe reduction in market value,  including  Thus,  which  entered  the  FTSE-100
with a valuation of £3 billion and fell to £424 million, with even long-established companies  such
a British Telecom, suffering a  fall  in  the  value  of  its  shares  of  two-thirds  of  their  value[13].
Trading in TechMARK shares remains active: the London Stock Exchange statistics for the “most
active UK securities” for March 2004 includes 17 TechMARK companies in its total of 50[14].
The importance of “new economy” companies globally has made them a major priority for policy-
makers. The 1997 Labour Party manifesto argued that[15]:
“ ... the  United  Kingdom  must  be  positively  committed  to  the  global  pursuit  of  new
knowledge, with a strong science base ... leading the world ... We  support  a  collaborative
approach between researchers and business, spreading the use of new technology and good
design, and exploiting our own inventions to boost business in the UK”.
Subsequently, the Department of Trade and Industry issued the wide-ranging  White  Paper,  “The
Knowledge Economy”[16]. The White  Paper  acknowledged  the  importance  of  knowledge  not
only for high-tech industries, such as pharmaceuticals,  but  also  for  its  transformative  effect  on
other sectors, such as the car industry[17].  The  importance  of  “knowledge  assets”  such  as  the
knowledge embodied in patents and staff was also noted[18]. The impact for the policymaker  was
stated to be[19]:
“  ...  to  create  a  framework  which  supports  continued  development  of  scientific  and
technological excellence, greater competition and a culture  of  enterprise  and  innovation,
and which ensures effective protection of  the  environment.  Enterprise  is  more  likely  to
thrive where there is a stable financial and economic backdrop; a supportive  business  and
social environment; good access to markets, technology and finance; and a flexible, highly
educated and skilled labour force. Helping those adversely affected  by  the  adjustment  to
the knowledge driven economy is another role for government”.
The White Paper distinguished the role of the regulator, however, arguing[20]:
“Regulators need to weigh up the costs  with  the  benefits  in  terms  of  incentivising  and
facilitating innovation. Regulation also becomes harder where output is knowledge  driven
and the regulated body increasingly has more information than the regulator. This makes it
more difficult for  the  regulator  to  assess  accurately  the  position  of  the  regulated  and
therefore make policy that is economically efficient.”
The Company Law Review Steering Group adopted a  very  similar  approach  in  identifying  key
trends which should influence the Modern Company Law Review. It argued that[21]:
“The pattern of productive activity, in many sectors of the economy, is shifting to  become
increasingly human resource – and knowledge – based. This is of particular importance for
the UK, which has no future as a  low  wage,  low  productivity  economy,  producing  low
value added products. The traditional model of the company  ...  derives  from  the  railway
age, of a high fixed asset enterprise, run by managers on behalf of a wide body of investors
and dependent on a largely undifferentiated ‘commodity’ labour force ... Assets  structures
are changing, and becoming increasingly ‘soft’, in the sense that a significant proportion of
the value, or capacity, of a business is to be found in  intangibles  ...  But  British  law  fails
satisfactorily to capture such assets, to enable assessment  by  investors  and  others,  or  to
secure accountability of management for stewardship.  Traditional  reporting  requirements
focus on historic experience and tangible assets and not prospective opportunities and risks
and human and intellectual investment.”
The  Higgs  Committee,  which  reported  in  January  2003,  did   much   to   identify   and   make
recommendations in  respect  of  what  were,  in  effect,  the  human  capital  aspects  of  corporate
governance[22]. Particularly significant findings made by it related to the age, gender,  number  of
other  posts  held,  average  time  in  post  and  use  of  nomination   committees[23].   It   included
consideration of the behaviours and personal attributes required of the non-executive  director[24],
the nomination and appointment process and succession planning[25], the  pool  of  non-executive
directors[26],   professional   development[27]   and    performance    evaluation[28].    From    the
perspective of new economy companies,  the  findings  in  relation  to  the  pool  of  non-executive
directors were perhaps rather depressing given the requirement to include them on the board:  they
were  shown  to  be  “  ...  typically  white  males   nearing   retirement   age   with   PLC   director
experience”[29]. But  perhaps  more  worrying  about  the  Review  from  the  perspective  of  new
economy companies was that the Review did little to address the potential differences between the
types of listed companies that may exist and their potentially differing needs.
In January 2003, the Department of Trade and  Industry  commissioned  what  became  the  Tyson
Report which took further how the “gene pool” of non-executive directors might be  widened  and
reported in June 2003[30].  It  did  rather  more  to  recognise  the  diversity  of  listed  companies.
Notably, it identified that successful leadership in the non-commercial  and  charity  sectors  could
be relevant in providing capabilities in technical or scientific  knowledge  in  boardrooms  through
the use of individuals from academic  or  research  organisations[31].  Also  in  January  2003,  the
Department of Trade and Industry set up the Accounting  for  People  Task  Force  to  look  at  the
performance measures currently used and to consider best practice in human capital reporting  and
to establish and champion the business case[32]. The Task Force issued  a  consultation  paper[33]
in May 2003 and its final report in October 2003[34]. Whilst the focus of these documents and the
underlying research was on “ ... the way organisations manage their people  ...”  it  also  contained
recommendations as to leadership and succession planning relevant to corporate governance[35].
New  economy  companies  can  be  seen,   therefore,   to   have   some   important   distinguishing
characteristics and to be a major focus of attention for policymakers. Company law itself does not,
however, in general, discriminate between different companies by  reference  to  their  commercial
nature or purpose[36]. There are some minimal restrictions on the  name  which  a  company  may
adopt, for example, a company  may  not  use  the  words  “Institute”,  “Chemist”  or  “Chemistry”
without the permission of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry[37]. In addition, where the
objects of a company are the promotion of science, and the  company’s  memorandum  or  articles
contain a restriction on the distribution of  profits,  there  is  a  procedure  for  the  company  to  be
exempted from the requirement to adopt the word “limited” as part of the company name[38]. The
Listing  Rules  go  much  further  with  special  Chapters  devoted   to   scientific   research   based
companies[39] and innovative high growth companies[40]  and  the  Bioindustry  Association  has
issued its own Code of Best Practice  for  relevant  companies[41].  Yet,  the  Combined  Code  on
Corporate Governance does not distinguish  between  different  types  of  company  other  than  to
make  minor  concessions  to  smaller  listed  companies.  The  appropriateness  of  the  legal   and
regulatory regimes for the corporate governance of new economy companies  must,  therefore,  be
an important issue for policymakers to address and is the reason for this paper.
Aims and objectives
The aims and objectives of this paper are to:
0. identify the differences in new economy companies and in particular  the  extent  to  which
these relate to human asset specificity;
1. to identify the “ideal” legal and regulatory framework for the governance of new economy
companies;
2. to evaluate the “real-life” regulatory framework in the light of the “ideal”;
3. to analyse the practical effect of the legal and regulatory framework on  a  sample  of  such
companies;
4. to identify examples of inappropriate regulation and make proposals for reform.
The definition of “new economy” companies
Since the early 1980s a large number of different terms have been  adopted  to  support  arguments
that there has been some sort of fundamental  change  taking  place  in  society  and  the  nature  of
organisations in society. The DTI White Paper draws attention to the importance of knowledge  as
the distinguishing feature[42]:
“Authors have tried to describe  aspects  of  the  changes  affecting  modern  economies  in
different ways. Terms such as de-industrialisation, globalisation, the  information  age,  the
digital or weightless economy all capture elements of  what  we  observe.  The  knowledge
driven economy is a more general phenomenon, encompassing the exploitation and use  of
knowledge in all production and service activities, not just  those  sometimes  classified  as
high-tech or knowledge intensive”.
Many authors distinguish “dotcom” companies. However, since this tends  to  be  based  upon  the
name of the company rather than the underlying nature of the company it would seem not to  have
any  particular  analytical  value  to  it[43].  Indeed,  the  well-publicised   “dotcom   bubble”   and
subsequent crash have done much to discredit such companies. Indeed, as Gregory  and  Armitage
observed in 2000, two distinct types of organisation operate in the new economy: “  ...  large,  well
established firms, for which e-commerce is crucial, but not central to their core businesses ...”  and
“ ... the new “ ... dotcoms” run by  founder  entrepreneurs  with  an  idea,  but  little  experience  in
business or elsewhere ...”[44]. The UK Listing Authority has adopted  the  term  “innovative  high
growth  company”[45].  “Innovative”  is  intended  to  encompass  companies  whose  business  in
innovative in nature, whether through the development of new products and /  or  services  or  new
methods of business[46]. The London Stock Exchange  has  grouped  together  a  wide  variety  of
companies under the TechMARK label for marketing purposes, but as  will  be  seen  later  in  this
paper, its definition presents some difficulties. Accordingly,  the  term  “new  economy  company”
has been adopted for this paper because it is the most neutral  and  does  not  possess  any  linkage
either to a particular name or to a particular regulatory regime. It also supports well the  groupings
of sectors of  companies  which  will  be  examined  most  closely,  which  include  health  related,
computer hardware, telecommunications and computing services  companies.  It  should  be  noted
that the  principal  focus  of  this  paper  will,  however,  be  upon  publicly  traded  new  economy
companies and the term should be taken to refer to these throughout.
Approach of this paper
This  paper  commences  by  establishing  the  methodology  for  an   analysis   of   the   regulation
applicable  to  new  economy  companies  and  for  the  survey  of  Techmark  companies.  It  then
proceeds  to  analyse  the  distinctiveness  of  the  companies  in  the  sample  by  reference  to  the
following  broad  groupings   of   sectors   which   include   health   related,   computer   hardware,
telecommunications and computing services  companies.  The  “ideal”  regulatory  system  is  then
identified by a review of the relevant literature on  the  competing  regulatory  goals  of  economic
efficiency, good governance and investor protection, facilitation of innovation and human  capital.
Company strategies for dealing with human asset specificity  are  then  evaluated  by  reference  to
relevant   incentives   and   constraints,   in   particular,   remuneration,   contract,   insurance   and
governance. Conclusions are then drawn as to how regulation might be improved.
METHODOLOGY
Analysis of regulation applicable to new economy companies
The regulation of new economy companies formed the central focus of the research. The approach
adopted to this was the  “doctrinal”  or  “black-letter”  method,  which  is  often  assumed  in  legal
writing, but merits explanation in a multi-disciplinary context. Van Hoecke and  Warrington  have
described  the  task  of  “legal  doctrine”  as  being  to  describe  and  systematise  the  law[47].  Its
methodology involves[48]:
“ ... either implicitly or explicitly,  formulating  hypotheses  as  regards  the  meaning  of  legal
concepts, legal rules, legal principles or legal institutions. These  hypotheses  are  checked  out
on the basis of materials which generally are considered  to  be  authoritative  (e.g.  established
precedents,  supreme  court  decisions,  legislative   materials)   and   by   using   the   classical
interpretation  methods.  Accepting  an  interpretation,  eventually,   is   not   based   on   some
“objective”  certainty  but  on  an  inter-subjective  consensus  within   the   legal   community.
However, the interpretation of (relatively isolated) rules and concepts is also influenced by the
systematicity of a larger whole (a legal institution, a branch of the law or even the whole  legal
system).”
Similarly,  MacGuinness  has  summarised  the   “doctrinal”   or   “black-letter   law   method”   as
follows[49]:
            “It is ... largely deductive in approach: basic rules of law are  stated  as  axioms,  and  from
these axioms,  one  reasons  out  the  result,  testing  the  broad  probability  of  each  particular
outcome against an extensive  data  base  of  previously  decided  cases.  The  non-quantitative
approach of traditional black-letter law analysis results more from the nature of  the  questions
that form the basis of legal study, than from any other factor.  For  the  most  part,  quantitative
analysis is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the rules of  law  that  govern  a  particular
situation, along with their meaning and application to a particular set of facts  -  these  subjects
being the focus of traditional black-letter law analysis.”
The areas of law which the research straddled were company law, contract law  and  tax  law.  Tax
law was considered to the extent necessary to explain the structure of share options  where  it  is  a
particularly important regulatory factor; it was necessary to exclude the fields of  competition  law
and intellectual property law entirely as there were few direct linkages between them and the  core
issues to be covered in this paper and they would  have  increased  its  length  by  an  unacceptable
amount. In  addition,  law  methodology  also  provides,  by  analogy,  a  suitable  method  for  the
analysis of “soft law” comprising regulatory codes of best practice,  which  are  significant  to  the
corporate governance aspects of this paper. However, the limitations of law methodology is that  it
essentially  provides  a  means  of   identification   of   the   relevant   law   and   regulation;   legal
methodology is only of limited value when it comes to evaluating  the  appropriateness  of  law  or
regulation to achieve specific social goals, for example, the encouragement  of  innovation  or  the
achievement   of   economic   efficiency.   For   those   goals   alternative   methodologies   require
consideration.
In theory, the principles for the evaluation of the law are left to the related field  of  jurisprudence.
However, as Copp has observed “ ... in contrast  to  the  richness  of  the  materials  claimed  to  be
offered, jurisprudence  offers  more  the  pursuit  of  a  “needle  in  a  haystack”  for  the  academic
evaluation of any particular area of law.  Certainly,  formal  jurisprudential  references  are  absent
from  many  important  documents   which   seek   to   justify   or   critique   law   reform   ...”[50].
Accordingly, a core section of  this  paper  below  will  seek  to  establish  suitable  models  for  an
“ideal” regulatory framework for the governance of new economy companies.
Survey of Techmark companies
The aims and objectives of this research – to evaluate the  efficiency  of  the  legal  and  regulatory
framework  for  the  governance  of  human  capital  in  new  economy   companies   and   identify
examples of inappropriate law - might, in principle, have been conducted  purely  as  a  theoretical
exercise. However, this would have been undesirable for a number of reasons. As  a  consequence,
a survey was conducted  of  relevant  company  listing  particulars  and  prospectuses  and  also  of
annual  reports  and  accounts.  This  section  will  explain   and   justify   the   selection   of   these
documents.  The  approach  adopted  to  the   analysis   of   numerate   and   narrative   information
respectively will, for simplicity, be addressed in this paper in relation to the appropriate issue.
Survey of company listing particulars and prospectuses
The survey of Techmark companies was based on a detailed examination of listing particulars and
prospectuses prepared by the companies, generally in relation to  raising  capital  on  a  market  for
publicly traded shares. The characteristics which made listing particulars of especial value for  the
purpose of this research were that listing  particulars  are  required  to  contain  detailed  additional
information on the management of a company, some of which may  not  be  easily  available  from
other sources[51]. Furthermore,  the  verification  process  which  such  documentation  undergoes
combined with the daunting sanctions  for  misleading  information[52],  render  it  of  particularly
high quality. Information which was particularly valuable for the purposes of  this  paper  was  the
identification of investor risk factors, which enabled some measure of the  significance  of  human
capital to the companies to be ascertained,  as  well  as  more  detailed  information  as  to  director
expertise, integrity and contractual arrangements than would ordinarily be available.
A sample of prospectuses or  listing  particulars  of  50  Techmark  companies  was  selected.  The
sample was selected based upon capital raising transactions  which  took  place  within  the  period
from  1st  April  1998  to  31st  March  2003,  based  on  an  initial  sample  taken  in  2002  and  a
subsequent sample in 2004. For this purpose the date of the transaction was taken as the date upon
which unconditional dealings in the relevant shares  on  a  fully-paid  basis  was  expected  to  take
place, failing which the most analogous alternative was taken. The dates of the transactions within
the sample are set out in Table 1.
|Table 1:  Transaction Dates: Number of  |       |
|Transactions                            |       |
|per Year, 1998-2003, by     |           |       |
|Sector                      |           |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |
|Year   |HR         |CH/T   |CS         |All    |
|1998   |2          |1      |0          |3      |
|1999   |3          |3      |1          |7      |
|2000   |5          |7      |14         |26     |
|2001   |3          |3      |3          |9      |
|2002   |1          |1      |2          |4      |
|2003   |1          |0      |0          |1      |
|       |           |       |           |       |
There were a number of reasons for adopting such a 5 year period: (1)  to  ensure  that  the  sample
was not overly affected by time-specific issues, such as  risk  factors  deriving  from  Y2K;  (2)  to
avoid the sample being  distorted  by  the  boom  prior  to  and  including  the  year  2000  and  the
subsequent decline in activity;  (3)  to  reflect  the  nature  of  the  transactions  which  formed  the
subject of the survey, namely one-off high value transactions, unlikely to take place in  relation  to
any particular company in any given year;  (4)  to  exclude  companies  where  the  documentation
might be stale in terms of changing regulatory requirements, and (5) to  maximise  the  number  of
companies which might satisfy the conditions of Chapters 20 or 25 Listing Rules, where very  full
disclosure would have been required. The markets on which the company’s shares were traded,  or
to be traded, are set out in Table 2 below.
|Table 2: Market, by |       |
|Sector              |       |
|       |           |       |
|Sector |           |Market |
|       |OL         |AIM    |
|       |           |       |
|HR     |12         |3      |
|CH/T   |15         |0      |
|CS     |19         |1      |
|All    |46         |4      |
|       |           |       |
The UK Listing Authority has  for  some  time  made  provision  for  modifications  to  the  listing
regime to allow for the listing of companies where listing is seen  as  desirable.  At  present,  these
apply to:  overseas  companies[53];  property  companies[54];  mineral  companies[55];  scientific
research based companies[56]; investment entities[57]; public sector issuers[58];  innovative  high
growth  companies[59];  venture  capital  trusts[60];  strategic  investment  companies[61].  Those
which were of  specific  interest  to  this  paper  were  those  relating  to  scientific  research  based
companies and innovative high growth companies, and their specific provisions will be  evaluated
later in this paper. The proportion of the sample relating to such companies is  set  out  in  Table  3
below.
|       |           |       |
|Table 3: Listing Chapter, by|
|Sector                      |
|       |           |       |
|Sector |Chapter    |Chapter|
|       |20         |25     |
|       |           |       |
|HR     |5          |0      |
|CH/T   |0          |0      |
|CS     |0          |8      |
|All    |5          |8      |
|       |           |       |
A number of means of obtaining prospectuses and listing particulars for  analysis  was  considered
and/ or attempted. The most  obvious  possibility  was  to  seek  to  obtain  them  from  Companies
House, where such documents must be filed  by  law.  However,  the  disadvantage  of  this  would
have been  the  difficulty  in  identifying  in  advance  whether  there  would  have  been  any  such
documentation and, if so, whether it  fell  within  the  time-limits  established.  Furthermore,  there
would have been a cost of either £3 per document or £9 per  microfiche  and  it  would  have  been
wasteful to incur such costs with a high potential for wasted data. A further possibility was to seek
to obtain such documents from companies direct but initial attempts indicated that  this  would  be
likely to produce a patchy response at best and remain subject to the difficulties already identified.
The method adopted for identifying and selecting the prospectuses  or  listing  particulars  was  the
use of the Thompson Analytica “ONE Banker” database.
Using the Thompson Analytica database, it was possible to select “filings” and thereby  identify  a
list of  documents  filed  with  Thompson  and  then   to  scroll  to  the  appropriate  documentation
readily identifiable as filing type “PROSP” and take  a  sample  based  on  filing  dates  within  the
appropriate  period.  Whilst  the  sampling  was  randomly  derived,  where  certain   inappropriate
documents were encountered, for example, a German language prospectus, a replacement  random
sample was taken instead. The types of documents utilised in the sample are set out in Table 4.
|Table 4: Transaction Documents Used, by |       |
|Sector                                  |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |
|Sector |           |Transaction        |       |
|       |           |documents          |       |
|       |P          |LP     |ELD        |Missing|
|       |           |       |           |       |
|HR     |11         |4      |0          |0      |
|CH/T   |9          |3      |1          |2      |
|CS     |6          |12     |1          |1      |
|All    |26         |19     |2          |3      |
|       |           |       |           |       |
Key to Table 4: transaction documents
P          Prospectus
LP        Listing particulars
ELD     Exempt listing document
The  overwhelming  majority  of  the  documents  analysed  consisted  of  prospectuses  or   listing
particulars. A small number consisted of exempt listing documents  prepared  in  accordance  with
Listing Rule, 5.23A. In accordance with that, the UK Listing Authority has  the  power  to  exempt
issuers from  the  obligation  to  publish  listing  particulars  where,  broadly  speaking,  equivalent
information has been published within 12 months of admission, or the securities have  been  listed
in another EC member state for 3 years or more and the issuer has complied with all  requirements
for information and admission, or where the issuer’s shares have  been  traded  on  the  Alternative
Investment Market for at least two years and equivalent information is available to investors  prior
to admission[62]. Accordingly, Exempt Listing Documents were considered to  be  acceptable  for
inclusion in the sample because equivalent information should have been available.
A particular problem was  encountered  in  relation  to  a  group  of  4  companies  associated  with
telecommunications  where  the  documents  contained  strong  prohibition  on  disclosure  or  use;
whilst it was arguable that the documents were in the public domain and therefore  the  restrictions
need not be observed, it was decided that as a matter of research ethics  the  restrictions  would  be
observed.
No distinction was drawn between the variety of means by which  such  capital  might  have  been
raised, for example, by  way  of  placing,  introduction  or  rights  issue,  since  the  reason  for  the
selection of the documentation was the quality of information disclosed rather than the transaction
type. Indeed, it was seen as an advantage to take a random sample of various transaction  types  as
this made it more likely that a representative sample of moments in the corporate life-cycle  would
be presented. The types of transaction represented in the sample are set out in Table 5.
|Table 5: Transaction Types: Number of Transaction Types by Sector  |
|         |             |         |             |         |         |
|Sector   |             |         |Transaction types      |         |
|         |A            |P        |O            |I        |RI       |
|         |             |         |             |         |         |
|HR       |6            |13       |11           |1        |0        |
|CH/T     |8            |7        |8            |4        |2        |
|CS       |16           |9        |6            |4        |2        |
|All      |30           |29       |25           |9        |4        |
|         |             |         |             |         |         |
Key to Table 5: Transaction Types
A          Admission
P          Placing
O          Offer
I           Introduction
RI        Rights issue
Furthermore, the sample was selected with a view to achieving a broad spread  across  a  range  of
14 industrial or commercial sub-sectors associated with the “new  economy”.  This  proved  useful
because it was important  to  consider  whether  such  companies  could  be  truly  be  regarded  as
distinct, an issue explored in the next section of this  paper,  and  enabled  the  sample  to  be  sub-
analysed by grouping companies according to their potential asset specificity. In broad  terms,  the
groupings adopted related to the health, computer hardware/  telecommunications  and  computing
services. The reason for the selection of these broad groupings  is  the  perception  that  computing
and related services are highly human asset specific, computer hardware, telecommunications  and
related sectors are highly fixed asset specific and health related sectors are both highly human and
fixed asset specific. 15 companies were selected from  each  of  the  health  related  and  computer
hardware/  telecommunications    and  related  sectors  and  20  from  the  computing  and   related
services groupings, reflecting the larger number of such companies. The health related  companies
were selected from companies within the biotechnology, health,  medical  equipment  &  supplies,
pharmaceuticals  sectors.  The  computer  hardware/  telecommunications  and  related  companies
were selected  from  companies  within  the  electronic  equipment,  fixed-line  telecommunication
services,  semi-conductors,  telecommunications   equipment   and   wireless   telecommunications
services’ sectors. The computing and related services  companies  were  selected  from  companies
within the computer services, software, home entertainment, internet and e-commerce sectors. The
initials “HR”, “CH/T” and “CS” have been adopted throughout to distinguish the groupings.
Survey of company annual reports and accounts
Company prospectuses have many advantages in terms of the  richness  of  data  they  present  and
their  quality  in  terms  of  the  almost  unparalleled  verification  process  undertaken.   They   are
therefore very suitable for the analysis of their narrative data. However, they are less valuable as a
consequence for the analysis of numerate data where it is desirable that the time frame of the  data
sample is as compressed as possible. For this reason, it was decided to supplement the  sample  by
a sample of  company  annual  reports  and  accounts  where  the  analysis  of  numerate  data  was
required. Two possible approaches were considered: firstly, to  take  a  further  random  sample  of
Techmark companies, the second to base the sample on  the  annual  reports  and  accounts  of  the
companies already in the sample. It was decided to  follow  the  second  option  because  it  would
provide some degree  of  consistency  in  terms  of  the  information  gathered  and  enable  further
linkages to be made. For example, it was desirable to identify the founders of a  company  and  the
ability to cross-reference biographical information  from  the  annual  report  and  accounts  to  the
appropriate  prospectus  enabled  the  information  on  founders  provided  to  be  verified  and   on
occasions supplemented. However, great caution was adopted: it would not have been  appropriate
to attempt any  longitudinal  study  based  on  a  comparison  of  information  in  the  two  samples
because of divergences in the prospectus dates. The disadvantage of this approach,  however,  was
that inevitably annual accounts and reports for all of the companies in  the  original  sample  could
not be obtained.
The annual reports and accounts were obtained in the  same  way  as  the  prospectuses:  an  initial
sample was taken  from  the  Thompson  Analytica  “ONE  Banker”  database  and  then  this  was
updated, where necessary, by visiting the individual web-site of the company.  A  total  of  5  were
missing, generally on account of  takeovers  etc;  however,  a  difference  of  10%  was  felt  to  be
acceptable  given  that  no  longitudinal  study  was  being  attempted.  Furthermore,  the   industry
classifications of three of the companies in the sample had changed; however, two companies  had
been  reclassified  from  e-commerce  to  general  retailers  and  one  had  moved  from   computer
hardware  to  computer  software.  Given  that  the  London   Stock   Exchange   had   changed   its
classifications and, therefore, there was some doubt as to the true  significance  of  the  changes,  it
was felt that these were not sufficiently material as to outweigh the benefits of consistency  arising
from their inclusion. The dates to which the annual reports and accounts were prepared are set  out
in Table 6 below.
|            |          |        |           |             |
|Table 6 :  Dates of Accounts, by|           |             |
|Sector                          |           |             |
|            |          |        |           |             |
|End of:     |HR (%)    |CH/T (%)|CS (%)     |All (%)      |
|Nov-02      |1 (8%)    |0 (0%)  |0 (0%)     |1 (2%)       |
|Dec-02      |0 (0%)    |4 (29%) |2 (11%)    |6 (13%)      |
|Mar-03      |1 (8%)    |4 (29%) |4 (22%)    |9 (20%)      |
|Apr-03      |0 (0%)    |1 (7%)  |1 (6%)     |2 (4%)       |
|Jun-03      |2 (15%)   |0 (0%)  |2 (11%)    |4 (9%)       |
|Jul-03      |0 (0%)    |0 (0%)  |1 (6%)     |1 (2%)       |
|Sep-03      |1 (8%)    |1 (7%)  |4 (22%)    |6 (13%)      |
|Nov-03      |1 (8%)    |0 (0%)  |0 (0%)     |1 (2%)       |
|Dec-03      |7 (54%)   |4 (29%) |4 (22%)    |15 (33%)     |
|            |          |        |           |             |
The most recent available accounts for the sample had  year-ends  which  ranged  from  November
2002 to December 2003. This was advantageous because 16  (35%)  had  as  a  consequence  year-
ends which began on or after 1st November 2003 and, therefore, were required to comply with the
revised  Code  on  Corporate  Governance[63],  reflecting  as   a   consequence   the   requirements
introduced as a consequence of the Smith and Higgs Committees.
THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF NEW ECONOMY COMPANIES
A major question to consider from the outset of this research related to the distinctiveness  of  new
economy  companies;  in  particular,  whether  it  was  correct  that  such   companies   were   truly
distinguishable by reference to the role played in them by human capital. This proved problematic
in terms of defining an  appropriate  category  of  comparator  companies.  It  was  found  that  one
survey, considered below, entailed a comparison between TechMARK-100 companies and FTSE-
100 companies. Yet such an approach was considered unsatisfactory for the purpose of  this  paper
because FTSE –100 companies are in many ways atypical companies. Equally, it would have been
unsatisfactory  to  have  attempted  a  comparison  with  a  representative   sample   of   companies
generally – the majority being in all probability owner-managed companies. A  further  alternative
would have been to have attempted  a  comparison  with  other  listed  companies  of  similar  size.
However, any such comparison would have  involved  first  identifying  companies  where  human
capital was important and then comparing them  with  companies  where  human  capital  was  not
important.
It became apparent that the argument that new economy companies are distinctive because  of  the
role played in them by human capital possessed a degree of circularity: new  economy  companies
are defined by reference to the importance played in them by human  capital.  However,  it  would
have been unsatisfactory not to attempt any comparative analysis because that would  have  led  to
an extensive and unfocused analysis of the characteristics of  new  economy  companies,  some  of
which might  be  relevant  to  their  corporate  governance  but  many  of  which  might  be  totally
irrelevant. Accordingly, it was decided to conduct a comparative survey  of  three  groups  of  new
economy companies distinguished by perceptions as to their  differing  asset  specificity  –  “HR”,
CH/T” and “CS” companies - , as explained in the previous section of this paper,  with  the  issues
for comparison being determined by a review of relevant literature. New economy  companies  are
regarded  as  distinctive  for  a  number  of  reasons  which  will  be  discussed  in  this  section  by
reference to their age, size,  type  of  assets,  research  and  development,  governance  and  human
capital.
Zingales has distinguished the traditional firm as having 4 characteristics:  (1)  it  emerged  during
the industrial revolution to exploit economies of scale  and  scope,  was  very  asset  intensive  and
highly vertically integrated; (2) it had a high degree of control over its employees; (3) the size and
asset intensity of the traditional firm required more  investment  and  risk-taking  than  was  within
management’s capacity; (4) the concentration of power at the top  of  the  organisational  pyramid,
separation of ownership and control made agency the problem[64].  In contrast, he argued that the
new  firm  witnesses  three  changes:  (1)  physical  assets   have   become   less   unique   and   are
commanding lower rents; (2) increased competition has increased demand for  process  innovation
and quality improvement which can only be generated by talented employees;  (3)  firms’  grip  on
human capital has weakened[65]. Hence, new firms tend to be  non-vertically  integrated,  human-
capital intensive organisations operating in a highly competitive environment, with the exercise of
HQ authority severely limited by the ability of human capital to leave[66].
Age of new economy companies
Generally, new economy companies tend to be perceived as  relatively  new  companies.  Goergen
has shown that the average age of a company coming to the UK stock market has been  around  12
years, in contrast to 50 years in Germany and 6 years in the United States[67].  A  possible  reason
for this is that, as Hill and  Rothaermel  observe,  the  standard  model  of  the  innovation  process
suggests that new entrants pioneer radical technologies while incumbents decline[68]. The ages of
companies at the prospectus transaction date, by sector, is set out in Table 7.
|Table 7: Company Ages, by   |           |       |
|Sector                      |           |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |
|Sector |           |Average age (years)|       |
|       |From founding date  |From incorporation |
|       |           |       |           |       |
|HR     |14         |       |9          |       |
|CH/T   |22         |       |9          |       |
|CS     |15         |       |7          |       |
|All    |17         |       |8          |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |
The prospectus date was taken because prospectuses generally contained more  detailed  historical
information on the origins of a company, setting out not only the incorporation  date  but  also  the
founding date of any underlying  business  activity.  This  was  particularly  valuable  for  research
purposes because the process adopted to float a considerable number of companies  on  a  publicly
traded market often entailed the creation of a new  corporate  vehicle  to  be  the  flotation  vehicle
with the existing company becoming  a  subsidiary.  To  have  taken  the  incorporation  date  then
would have presented a misleading picture of the youthfulness of many  of  the  companies  in  the
sample. Whilst it is not possible to be confident that all companies disclosed details of predecessor
companies, the picture that emerges from Table 1 is that the average age of companies  was  fairly
consistent across industrial sectors, with CH/T companies typically being the  longest  established,
an unsurprising result perhaps given their greater size, considered in the next section. Overall,  the
picture which emerges is that the companies within the sample were, on average, well  established
at  the  transaction  date  and  do  not  fit  the  perception  that  such  companies  are  new.  This  is
consistent with Hill and Rothaermel’s observation that it had been almost 25 years  since  the  first
bio-technology company went public yet the  pharmaceutical  industry  is  still  dominated  by  the
same companies that dominated it beforehand[69].
Size of new economy companies
Company size appears to be correlated to differing experiences in relation to innovation. Besanko,
Dranove  and  Shanley,  for  example,  observe  that  large  firms  present   particular   tensions   in
managing innovation between the need for a formal  structure  and  controls  to  coordinate  it  and
looseness and flexibility to foster it[70].  Kleinknecht  has  found  that  barriers  to  innovation  are
related to company size and, in particular, comprise access  to  capital,  management  qualification
and ability to obtain technical information and know-how[71]. Table 8 below sets out the  average
size of the companies in the sample based on the annual reports and accounts.
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |
|Table 8: Average Company Sizes at Transaction Date, by   |       |       |
|Sector                                                   |       |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |
|Sector      |Average   |        |Average value of         |Turnover as a % |
|            |turnover (£000)    |assets     |             |of assets (%)   |
|            |                   |(£000)     |             |                |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |
|HR          |4,479     |        |23,012     |             |19.5   |       |
|CH/T        |268,640   |        |216,832    |             |123.9  |       |
|CS          |86,249    |        |45,993     |             |254.1  |       |
|All         |116,873   |        |90,993     |             |128.4  |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |
The typical sizes of the companies surveyed varied dramatically with  CH/T  companies  being  by
far the largest, whether measured by turnover or assets, and HR companies the smallest,  but  with
CS companies generating the most turnover in relation to their assets.
Type of assets in new economy companies
Many authors comment on the importance of intangible assets in a new economy context.  Kontor
and Day review a number of attempts to estimate the value of such  intangibles  using  techniques,
such as calculating the ratio of market values of companies  to  their  accounting  book  values  for
different  industries,  and  conclude  that  the  results  provide  evidence  that   in   most   industries
significant amounts of assets are not represented in the published financial accounts of enterprises,
which  may  include  intangible  assets[72].  However,  as  they  point   out,   business,   legal   and
accounting  concepts  of  “intangibles”  differ   markedly[73].   For   example,   the   definition   of
“intellectual capital” is very broadly defined, whereas the legal definition of  intellectual  property
rights – which they argue are “ ... probably among the most important types of property  on  which
the “new economy is based ...”[74]  is  very  narrow.  The  approach  adopted  in  this  paper  is  to
calculate the ratio of average intangible assets to tangible assets,  by  industry  sector.  The  results
are set out in Table 9 below.
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|Table 9: Intangible and Tangible Assets |       |       |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|Sector |Average    |       |Average value of   |Ratio of        |
|       |value of   |       |                   |intangible      |
|       |intangible assets   |tangible assets (£)|to tangible     |
|       |(£)                 |                   |assets          |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|HR     |3,587,499  |       |3,165,002  |       |1.13   |       |
|CH/T   |561,204,500|       |533,991,143|       |1.05   |       |
|CS     |36,565,167 |       |17,728,167 |       |2.06   |       |
|All    |190,259,411|       |174,133,067|       |1.092  |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
Typically, the figures recorded for intangible assets related to intellectual property rights,  such  as
the value  of  patents.  However,  it  was  also  noted  that  frequently  a  substantial  proportion  of
intangible assets related instead to goodwill. Since  goodwill  may  arise  on  any  acquisition,  and
does not demonstrate any necessary relationship to the  high-technology  status  of  a  company,  it
was  decided  to  recalculate  the  figures  subtracting  the  value   of   goodwill   with   a   view   to
ascertaining whether this produced a difference. The results are set out in Table 10 below.
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |       |
|Table 10: Intangible Assets (less Goodwill) and Tangible |       |       |       |
|Assets                                                   |       |       |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |       |
|Sector      |Average value of   |Average value of         |Ratio of ’intangible    |
|            |                   |                         |assets less             |
|            |intangible assets  |tangible assets (£)      |goodwill’ to tangible   |
|            |                   |                         |assets                  |
|            |less goodwill (£)  |           |             |       |       |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |       |
|HR          |1,904,722 |        |3,165,002  |             |0.60   |       |       |
|CH/T        |269,350,42|        |533,991,143|             |0.50   |       |       |
|            |9         |        |           |             |       |       |       |
|CS          |1,004,500 |        |17,728,167 |             |0.06   |       |       |
|All         |84,513,742|        |174,133,067|             |0.49   |       |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |       |       |
The subtraction of goodwill from the value of intangible assets, creating  a  sharper  focus  on,  for
example, intellectual property rights  indicates  a  marked  difference.  The  ratio  of  intangible  to
tangible  assets  fell  below  1.0  in  each  instance  and  that  for  CS  companies   became   almost
insignificant. Such results demonstrate that care must be taken in relation to claims that  intangible
assets represent the bulk of the assets of new economy companies. However, a  degree  of  caution
must be observed when interpreting these  results,  especially  when,  as  here,  it  has  been  based
around acknowledgedly narrow measures of intangibles.  As  Teece,  Pisano  and  Shuen  observe,
global competitive battles in high-technology  industries,  such  as  semiconductors  and  software,
demonstrate that some well-known companies, despite having  accumulated  valuable  technology
assets,  often  guarded  by  an  aggressive  intellectual  property  rights  stance,  may   not   have   a
significant competitive advantage[75]. They conclude by stressing the importance of management
capability to effectively co-ordinate and redeploy competences[76]. Similarly,  Holbrook,  Cohen,
Hounshell and Klepper, in a detailed  historical  case  study  of  4  semi-conductor  manufacturers,
observed that one of the company’s belief that  a  strong  patent  position  was  key  to  its  success
doomed it[77]. These findings are suggestive of the importance of good corporate governance.
Research and development in new economy companies
Generally, new economy companies tend to be perceived as significant investors  in  research  and
development. Furthermore, Mayer has noted that  listed  companies  are  concentrated  in  research
and development  intensive  sectors  of  the  economy[78].  As  Youndt,  Subramaniam  and  Snell
observe,  “  ...  investment  in  research   and   development   is   one   of   the   fundamental   ways
organizations  create  new  knowledge   ...”[79].   Accordingly,   they   argue   that   the   more   an
organisation invests in research and development,  the  more  it  supports  individual  managers  to
enhance their knowledge and expertise and therefore builds human capital[80]. Accordingly,  they
sought as part of their research into how  human,  social  and  organizational  capital  coexisted  to
form distinct intellectual capital profiles across organisations, they sought to identify a measure of
research  and  development  investment   by   dividing   an   organisation’s   yearly   research   and
development expenditures by its annual sales[81]. An analogous approach has been  taken  in  this
paper where average research and development expenditure has been divided by average turnover,
by sector, based on the sample of annual reports and accounts.  Nonetheless,  a  degree  of  caution
must be adopted in the interpretation of these figures. Coombs and Tomlinson, for  example,  have
commented  on  how  research  and  development  expenditure  has  long  been  recognised  as   an
incomplete  indicator  of  innovativeness  because   it   may   be   reported   in   varying   ways   by
companies[82]. Similarly, Audretsch and Feldman observe how small  companies  forsake  formal
research and development for informal research, which defies  measurement[83].  The  results  are
set out in Table 11 below.
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|Table 11: Turnover and R&D Expenditure  |       |       |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|Sector |Average    |       |Average R&D|       |Ratio of R&D    |
|       |turnover   |       |expenditure|       |turnove|       |
|       |(£)        |       |(£)        |       |r      |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
|HR     |12,731,791 |       |9,187,113  |       |0.722  |       |
|CH/T   |485,583,857|       |6,238,357  |       |0.013  |       |
|CS     |262,128,556|       |6,840,111  |       |0.026  |       |
|All    |259,600,029|       |7,330,921  |       |0.028  |       |
|       |           |       |           |       |       |       |
It can be seen from the results in Table 11 that the ratio of research and  development  expenditure
to turnover is markedly stronger in HR companies than in either CH/T or  CS  companies.  Indeed,
the ratio in relation to health companies is highly striking at 0.722. It was considered possible  that
much research and development expenditure  might  relate  to  employee  costs  and  therefore  the
percentage of staff engaged in research and development were identified. The  figures  were  taken
from the prospectuses because often the relevant breakdown was given in more detail. The  results
are set out in the chart below.
The average percentage of  research  and  development  staff  by  sector  varied  significantly  with
health  related  companies,  unsurprisingly   given   that   some   were   scientific   research   based
companies, being much higher.
The  conduct  of  research  and  development  on  such  a  scale  has  significant   implications   for
corporate governance. Deeds, DeCarolis and Coombs have demonstrated in an  analysis  of  newly
public biotechnology companies that a strategy of narrowly focusing on research and development
during the development stage leads to significant increases  in  shareholder  wealth[84].  However,
as Jensen has observed, between 1980 and 1990 GM’s research and development  and  investment
programmes produced significant losses; the  total  of  $67.2  billion  spent  produced  a  company
worth $26.2 billion, enough to have enabled GM to have purchased both  Toyota  and  Honda[85].
Such apparently inconsistent results are, perhaps, explained by the research  of  Holbrook,  Cohen,
Hounshell  and  Klepper,  who  found  that  the  companies  differed  in  their  ability  of  their  top
managers to integrate research and development and the relative absence of  the  sort  of  decision-
making process assumed by economists, that would lead to  convergence  on  similar  research  an
development  activities[86].  Carlin  and  Mayer,  in  contrast,  point  to  the  role  of   comparative
institutional advantage, demonstrating a link between investment in research and development and
the dependence of industries on equity finance and  highly  skilled  labour,  with  such  investment
being large in countries with good information disclosure[87]. There is, again, evidence to suggest
a link between research  and  development  and  its  governance  but  also  with  good  information
disclosure.
Governance
A major – and valuable - survey has been conducted by  Cook  and  Leissle  into  the  comparative
governance of FTSE-100 and TechMARK-100 index companies[88].  The  survey  was  based  on
mutually exclusive samples of annual reports and accounts of 72 TechMARK  companies  and  87
FTSE-100 companies for the financial year ending between August  1999  and  August  2000[89].
They considered  the  following  main  areas:  director  age;  director  gender;  board  composition;
board  committees;  board  leadership;  board  shareholdings;  a  variety  of  remuneration   issues;
meeting activity; contract terms; reporting on board process; and director interlocks. Key areas  of
difference were:
5. TechMARK-100 directors were younger than FTSE-100 directors, with the age  difference
most noticeable amongst executive directors[90].
6. A much larger proportion of TechMARK-100 executive directors were women than  FTSE-
100 directors[91].
7. FTSE-100 boards were larger and more independent than TechMARK-100 boards[92].
8.  TechMARK-100  companies  had  a  nomination  committee  much  less  frequently   than
FTSE100 companies [93].
9. FTSE-100 companies made far greater use of other committees, especially in areas such as
risk management and compliance, social responsibility and strategy  and  investment,  than
TechMARK companies,  although  only  TechMARK  companies  made  use  of  technical
advisory committees[94].
10. TechMARK-100 boards held far greater proportions of their  company  share  capital  than
FTSE-100 boards[95].
11. TechMARK-100 directors earned much less than FTSE-100 directors  and  received  much
less by way of benefits-in-kind[96].
12. TechMARK boards met slightly more frequently, and TechMARK board committees,  less
frequently, than in FTSE-100 companies[97].
13. FTSE-100 boards generally provide much  longer  notice  periods  for  executive  directors
than TechMARK-100 boards[98].
14.  FTSE-100  boards  contained  a  much  greater  number   of   multiple   directorships   and
interlocks than TechMARK-100 boards[99].
Whilst the information gathered in relation to TechMARK companies is highly informative,  there
must be some doubt as to the adoption of a comparison with FTSE  100  companies  because  they
are  not  representative  of  the  population  of  companies  as  a  whole  and  it  is  likely  that   any
comparison of such companies with other companies would have concluded that  such  companies
were  broadly  older,  larger  and  have  more  formal   and   structured   systems   of   governance.
Accordingly, for the reasons indicated at the beginning of this  section  of  the  paper,  this  survey
focused  on  analysing  the   differences   between   three   distinct   groups   of   such   companies.
Nonetheless,  Cook  and  Leissle’s  survey  drew  attention  to  some  differences  in   TechMARK
companies which are very pertinent to this paper with its focus on human capital issues, especially
the differences in relation to committee structures. The results  of  the  survey  conducted  for  this
paper in relation to a selection of commonly used corporate governance  measures  are  set  out  in
Table 12 below.
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Table 12:  Corporate governance       |       |       |       |            |
|measures, by Sector                   |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Sector |           |       |          |HR     |CH/T   |CS     |All         |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Average board size |       |          |8.5    |6.9    |8.0    |7.8 (2.0)   |
|                   |       |          |(2.4)  |(1.5)  |(2.0)  |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Average no. of             |          |4.3    |3.7    |3.9    |4.0 (1.4)   |
|non-executives             |          |(1.4)  |(1.7)  |(1.3)  |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Average no. of independents|          |2.8    |2.8    |3.4    |3.1 (1.6)   |
|                           |          |(0.6)  |(1.9)  |(1.0)  |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Average age of     |       |          |53.7   |51.5   |48.1   |50.7 (4.0)  |
|board              |       |          |(0.3)  |(3.0)  |(3.6)  |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with separate          |92.3   |100    |77.8   |88.9        |
|CEO/Chairman                          |       |       |       |            |
|                                      |       |       |       |       |
|% of companies with at least half the |       |       |       |       |
|board                                 |       |       |       |       |
|comprising independent non-executives |  30.8 |   46.2|   76.5|       |
|                                      |       |       |       |53.5   |
|                             |   |   |       |       |       |       |
|% of companies with a senior          |  69.2 |   92.3|   58.8|       |
|independent                           |       |       |       |72.1   |
|director                              |       |       |       |       |
The basic structure of the boards of companies as between the three sectors surveyed differed little
in terms of measures such as average size, number of non-executives, number of independent non-
executive directors. However, there were much sharper differences in relation to measures relating
to  the  diffusion  of  power  on  the  board,  especially  in  terms  of  the  proportion  of  the  board
comprising independent non-executives,  where  HR  companies  demonstrated  poor  compliance.
This  raised  a  question  as  to  whether  the  boards  of  new   economy   companies   demonstrate
commitment or entrenchment. Further analysis was conducted to ascertain whether problems  with
the diffusion of power were additionally reflected  in  director  shareholdings.  The  definitions  of
“insider” and “outsider” are explained fully in the next section of this paper. Table  13  below  sets
out average individual director shareholdings by sector together with a  histogram  illustrating  the
range of board shareholdings so that their significance in company law terms can be seen.
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Table 13: Share Ownership, by Sector  |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Sector |           |       |          |HR     |CH/T   |CS     |All        |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Average % of issued shares held by::  |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|All directors (%)  |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|                   |       |          |1.14   |1.34   |1.94   |1.52       |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|All executive      |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|directors (%)      |       |          |0.81   |2.27   |3.50   |2.32       |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|All non-executive directors|          |       |       |       |           |
|(%)                        |          |1.44   |0.63   |0.57   |0.85       |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|All ’insider’ executive    |          |       |       |       |           |
|directors (%)              |          |1.97   |4.07   |6.85   |4.60       |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|All ’outsider’ executive   |          |       |       |       |           |
|directors (%)              |          |0.04   |0.34   |0.91   |0.50       |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
|       |       |        |        |        |        |       |
The proportion of companies where the directors between them held significant shareholdings was
interesting; not least in some cases the directors between them held percentages of shares carrying
specific  company  law  rights.  For  example,  at  the  top  end  of  the  spectrum  there  were   two
companies where the directors between them held in excess of  50%  of  the  issued  share  capital.
Further research would be needed to consider the precise consequences of this in regulatory terms.
 An alternative approach, which will be developed throughout the rest of this paper, related  to  the
use of alternative measures more relevant  to  the  circumstances  of  new  economy  companies,  a
selection of which are set out below in Table 14.
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Table 14:  New economy corporate      |       |       |       |            |
|governance indicators, by Sector      |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Sector |           |       |          |HR     |CH/T   |CS     |All         |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Academic distinction as %  |          |21%    |14%    |5%     |11%        |
|of all directors           |          |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with a CTO  |          |53.8   |7.1    |33.3   |31.1        |
|director                   |          |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with an R&D |          |15.4   |0      |5.6    |6.7         |
|director                   |          |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with a Development     |15.4   |0      |5.6    |6.7         |
|director                              |       |       |       |            |
Key to Table 14: new economy corporate governance indicators
CTO    Chief  Technical  Officer,  Chief  Technological  Officer/  Chief  Scientific  Officer/  Chief
Medical Officer
R & D  Research and Development Director
D          Development Director/ Business Development Director
The divergences between the three sectors become  much  more  marked  again  where  alternative
measures were used. In particular, HR and CS companies were far  better  served  by  scientific  or
technical expertise – or even development expertise - on the  board  than  were  CH/T  companies.
This justifies the focus on human capital issues in  the  governance  of  new  economy  companies,
which will be explored in the next section.
Human capital and human asset specificity in new economy companies
Human capital and human asset specificity: definition
It is widely thought to be the case that new economy companies are distinguished by  their  human
capital.  Becker[100]  has  traced  the  concept  of  “human  capital”  to  the   work   of   Walsh   in
1935[101], although the modern approach would appear to derive from Schultz in 1959[102]  and,
of course, Becker himself[103]. The term itself appears to have been  coined  by  Schultz[104].  A
number of writers have reviewed the extensive literature which has built  up  subsequently  on  the
meaning of the term and how it can be distinguished  from  related  concepts  such  as  intellectual
capital,  social  capital,  organisational  capital  and  structural  capital[105].  Foong  and   Yorston
identify that the term human capital has been use to refer to  a  combination  of  skills,  experience
and knowledge[106] and  even  personality,  appearance,  reputation  and  credentials[107],  whilst
noting that the significance of the term “capital” is used figuratively  to  what  might  probably  be
better described as the “quality of labour”[108].  A  further  categorisation  of  human  capital  has
been made between  the  concepts  of  “firm-specific”,  “industry-specific”  and  “generic”  human
capital,  which  is  potentially  of  great  value  in  explaining  some  existing  legal  problems,   for
example, as to confidential information.  Milgrom  and  Roberts  distinguish  firm-specific  human
capital as including the skills and knowledge that are valuable only in the  context  of  a  particular
firm  from  “general  purpose”  or  “nonspecific”  human   capital,   which   increases   a   person’s
productivity when working for any of several employers[109].  They  give  as  examples  of  firm-
specific human capital, knowledge of the idiosyncracies of the particular firm’s  machinery  or  its
accounting system, and of nonspecific human  capital,  knowledge  of  how  to  operate  a  type  of
machine or prepare accounting statements, a  familiarity  with  general  business  terminology  and
procedures, and general skills in sales and marketing[110].  Harris  and  Helfat  distinguish  “firm-
specific”, “industry-specific” and “generic” skills in relation  to  the  role  of  the  Chief  Executive
Officer in the US, a useful foundation for considering an appropriate classification  at  board  level
generally[111].  They  argue  that  generic  skills  are  those  that  can   be   transferred   across   all
businesses and firms, even though the nature of the skills can vary from person to person; industry-
specific skills are only transferable to firms that  operate  in  the  same  industry  and  firm-specific
skills cannot be transferred outside of the firm[112].
Human capital has been identified as the distinguishing feature of the “new enterprise” by  writers
such as Rajan and Zingales[113] They argue that the growing importance of human capital  at  the
expense of other more tangible assets makes it hard to  keep  the  vertically  integrated  firm  intact
because it weakens the command and control process[114]. They argue that what  makes  the  new
enterprise distinctive are mutual  dependencies  and  specialization  between  various  units  of  the
enterprise  because  the  primary  source  of  power  is  no  longer   the   ownership   of   inanimate
objects[115].  It is unsurprising in such a context that links with universities can be strong, since it
would be expected that universities would play a vital  role  in  the  creation  and  development  of
human capital. Accordingly, Audretsch and Stephan have demonstrated that out  of  101  founders
of new biotechnology companies in the early 1990’s, 50 –nearly half - were from universities  and
that of those 50, 35 continued to be associated with their universities on a part-time basis, with the
other 15 having left their universities to work full-time for the biotechnology company[116].
There are detractors as to the importance of human  capital,  notably  Donaldson[117].  He  argues
that the role of tacit knowledge in organisations is exaggerated and that, in contrast, an increase  in
the formal rationality of knowledge is taking place, accompanied by increasing  bureaucratization,
seen,  for  example,  in  the  creation  of  knowledge  champions,  who  provide  a   focus   for   the
development and propagation of knowledge across a company, so  that  new  assignments  can  be
tackled by consultants who lack  experience  and  expertise[118].  Disagreeing  with  conventional
assumptions that power and wealth are accruing to a new class of “knowledge workers”, he argues
that instead technical experts and professionals are  confined  to  the  lower  levels  of  hierarchical
organisations even they enjoy some degree of  autonomy  and  influence[119].  The  exceptions  to
this are seen as the disciplines of finance and  accounting  where  experts  have  risen  to  powerful
positions  at  higher  levels  of  firms  because  of  their  relevance  to  the  markets   and   property
rights[120]. The significance of this in terms of the governance of new economy companies is that
it would suggest that such companies may be or, as they grow in size, become, governed by  those
who are not technical experts in the specialised field in which the company is engaged.
A concept which is related to human capital and which can be easily – but mistakenly  –  confused
with it is that of human asset specificity. Asset specificity has received a strong emphasis  in  neo-
institutional economics where it was defined by Williamson as follows[121]:
“A specialised investment that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses  or  by  alternative
users except at a loss  of  productive  value.  Asset  specificity  can  take  several  forms  of
which human, site and dedicated assets are the most common. Specific assets  give  rise  to
bilateral dependency which complicates contractual relations ...”
Since  the  ideal  transaction  from  a  transaction  cost   economics   perspective   has   zero   asset
specificity[122],  Williamson  argues  that  such  investments  should  never  be  made   except   to
contribute   to   prospective   reductions   in   production   costs   or   additions   to    revenue[123].
Nonetheless, as Deeds, DeCarolis and Coombs  demonstrate,  increases  in  firm-specific  research
and  scientific  capabilities,  measurable  by  citation  analysis   of   scientists   across   companies,
dramatically  improve  a  company’s  absolute   ability   to   create   wealth[124].   New   economy
companies are likely to be affected by asset specificity in a variety of ways, for example, they may
own both tangible and intangible assets and  possess  human  capital  all  with  an  especially  high
specificity.  Whilst  human  asset  specificity,  considered  below,  is  an  important  example,   the
concept has a bearing on other forms of investment which in a high-technology environment  may
be equally specific. Maughan and Copp, in particular, have argued that insofar as  there  were  any
real differences between innovative high growth companies and others is that they exhibit  marked
characteristics  of  human  resource  asset  specificity  and  are  often  weak  in  physical  assets,  a
problem common to many categories of business  activity[125].  An  alternative  approach,  which
cuts across this problem, is provided by Quince and Whittaker,  who  argue  that  with  many  high
technology activities, such as software and telecommunications, the  distinction  between  product
and service is blurred; accordingly, they argue that the true distinction is between activities  where
the product is embodied in the person and  those  in  which  it  is  embodied  in  the  product,  with
research and development and intellectual property  rights  being  unimportant  in  the  former  but
crucial in the latter[126].
Human capital and human asset specificity: measurement
Measurement  of  human  capital  is  regarded  as  a  significant  research  priority  because  of  the
perceived link between human capital and corporate performance.  Foong  and  Yorston  surveyed
the most common indicators used in human capital  reporting  by  reference  to  the  percentage  of
times  mentioned,  but  noted  that  detailed  empirical  analysis  was  rare  because  there  was   no
common measure, even within the same country  over  time,  let  alone  for  comparisons  between
countries[127]. Their conclusions are summarised in Table 15.
Table 15
Foong and Yorston: Most common indicators used in human capital reporting
Turnover/ retention/ absence                           19%
Competencies/ training                                   17%
Employee productivity                                    16%
Workforce profile                                16%
Employee attitude/ engagement                      12%
Employee compensation                                 8%
Recruitment                                         4%
Health and safety                                             3%
Other statistics                                     6%
A high proportion of the measures which were surveyed were focused, as would  be  expected,  on
measures of employee human capital, although some had potential relevance to  the  measurement
of human capital within the  governance  function  of  a  company  as  well.  Those  with  potential
relevance related to turnover/ retention, competencies,  engagement  and  compensation  and  were
followed  in  this  survey,  for  example,  competencies  were  measured  by  using  a  measure   of
academic distinction.
The  measurement  of  human  asset  specificity  and  an  examination  of   its   role   in   corporate
governance was anticipated to be a major component of this paper.  A  very  helpful  precedent  of
the way in which this  might  be  conducted  was  found  in  the  work  of  Harris  and  Helfat  who
examined the relationship of the compensation of Chief Executive Officers in the United States  to
three types of skills: firm-specific, industry-specific,  and  generic  skills[128].  Their  survey  was
extensive consisting  of  305  CEO  successors  listed  in  10  years  of  Forbes  annual  surveys  of
executive compensation for the years 1978 through 1987[129]. The  classification  of  CEO’s  was
conducted by using the work  history  of  the  CEO  from  proxy  statements  and  the  Wall  Street
Journal article which announced the appointment[130]. An  external  successor  was  defined  as  a
CEO with  2  or  fewer  years  of  tenure  in  the  company  before  becoming  CEO  to  reflect  the
possibility of a CEO being appointed to another role with an expectation of becoming  CEO[131].
External successors were then classified as “within-industry” or  “outside-of-industry”  successors
depending on whether the CEO had prior  work  experience  in  at  least  one  of  the  industries  in
which his/ her employer conducted business within 5 years of moving to the  company[132].  This
was, in turn, determined by identifying all 3-digit  SIC  code  industries  in  which  the  employing
company had revenues in the year prior to the CEO’s first year,  based  on  information  in  annual
reports, Form 10-K reports and Moody’s manuals[133]. The rest of the study entailed a regression
analysis to test two hypotheses, namely that external CEO successors received greater initial  non-
contingent compensation than internal  successors[134]  and  that  external  CEO  successors  with
generic skills only received greater initial non-contingent compensation  than  external  successors
with industry-specific experience[135]. The detailed conclusions  will  be  discussed  later  in  this
paper.
The criteria adopted in this paper were adopted after various pilot attempts of  varying  degrees  of
success. For example, at an early stage it had been thought possible to distinguish all  directors  by
reference to whether they presented some  distinction  in  the  following  categories:  management,
professional, finance, technical, scientific/ academic or  experience.  This  worked  well  for  many
companies and was usually intuitively obvious; however, it was abandoned  because  of  a  risk  of
lack of rigour – some directors moved at different stages of  their  career  between  categories  and
there was a risk of undue weight being placed on subjective criteria.
The category of “founder” directors was identified  primarily  from  a  review  of  the  biographies
contained in the annual reports and accounts of the companies within the  sample  but  secondarily
by comparison with the information on the same directors from the prospectuses.  The  reason  for
this approach was that it was necessary to  make  the  identification  from  the  annual  reports  and
accounts so that the information could be linked to other indicators which  could  only  be  derived
from the annual reports and accounts. However, where the prospectus  gave  more  information  in
respect of the  same  individual  there  could  be  no  objection  to  supplementing  it  in  this  way;
although, in a number of cases, the biographical information in  the  annual  reports  and  accounts
appeared to be fairly identical and not updated from that in the prospectus. A “founder” was  often
identified as such; the leader of a management buy-out team was also included for the purposes of
analysis  as  a  “founder”.  An  “insider”  director  was  defined  by   reference   to   the   following
categories, again primarily by reference to the  annual  reports  and  accounts  and  secondarily  by
reference to prospectuses: founders; directors appointed from within the company  after  tenure  of
more  than  12  months[136];  directors  who  had  held  office  for  more  than  6  years[137].   An
“outsider” director was defined as a director who had demonstrably been  appointed  from  outside
the company. There were regrettably a  fair  proportion  of  directors  where  the  information  was
inadequate to make a confident determination and these were  excluded.  An  “academic”  director
was defined as a director with one  of  the  following  distinctions,  based  again  primarily  on  the
sample of annual reports and  accounts  and  secondarily  on  the  prospectuses:  high  level  prize-
winning,  for  example,  a  Nobel  prize,  a  Professorship,  a   Research   Fellowship,   a   PhD,   or
publications. Whilst there is a risk that  such  categories  might  be  to  some  extent  arbitrary,  for
example, they exclude academic management qualifications such as an MBA, they  possessed  the
advantage of being identifiable on a consistent basis and clear indicators  of  possession  of  strong
human capital.
Distinctiveness of new economy companies
The main approach adopted in this paper was to focus upon the identification of human  capital  as
an investment risk factor. The use of a  risk-based  approach  has  much  to  comment  itself  in  an
analysis of  corporate  governance  since  it  was  the  risk  of  major  corporate  failure  led  to  the
establishment of the Cadbury Committee and risk management the reason for the establishment of
the Turnbull Committee. If it were possible to ascertain what risks were actually perceived by new
economy companies as peculiarly a problem for them, and thereby to ascertain the  weight  placed
upon human capital issues as a specific risk, then it would be  possible  to  evaluate  the  extent  to
which this truly distinguished such companies. This approach also had the  benefit  that  is  related
closely to the concept of human asset specificity which is  also  concerned  with  risk  in  terms  of
bilateral  dependency.  This  was  a  major  factor  in  the  decision  to  rely  upon  the  information
disclosed in company prospectuses and listing particulars for this purpose where risk factors  must
be disclosed since gaining access to information from  companies  as  to  their  risk  profile  would
have  been  likely  to  be  difficult,  because:  (1)  questionnaires,  especially  as  to   commercially
sensitive issues were unlikely to receive a response; (2) interviews, conducted at such a level as to
elicit valuable information, were unlikely to be agreed  to;  (3)  observation  would  be  out  of  the
question.
There is a general requirement on a company publishing listing particulars to include[138]:
“ ... information on  the  group’s  prospects  for  at  least  the  current  financial  year.  Such
information must relate to the financial and trading prospects  of  the  group  together  with
any material information which may be relevant thereto, including all special trade  factors
or risks (if any) which are not mentioned elsewhere in the listing particulars and which  are
unlikely to be known or anticipated  by  the  general  public,  and  which  could  materially
affect the profits ...”
In the case of a scientific research based company, the listing particulars must additionally set  out
fully, explain and give appropriate prominence to the risks associated with the  exploitation  of  its
products and must include an independent report(s) assessing them[139]. Innovative  high  growth
companies are subject to a more broadly defined  obligation  to  include  in  a  separate  prominent
section entitled “Risk factors” full  details  and  an  explanation  of  the  risks  associated  with  the
business and, in  particular,  any  factors  which  could  have  a  substantial  adverse  effect  on  the
company’s financial condition or which could endanger the company’s business success and  must
similarly be subject to an independent report[140].
McCrum, in comparing the requirements for the identification of risk factors in  the  UK  with  US
practice[141], notes that the US Securities and Exchange Commission  (“the  SEC”)  requires  that
investors are made  aware  of  any  material  risks  of  investment[142]  and  that  the  SEC’s  plain
English rules include a  requirement  that  risks  should  be  set  out  in  short  sentences,  avoiding
technical or legal jargon and that each heading should specify the risk[143]. She concludes that on
account both of  Chapter  25  Listing  Rules  and  the  importance  of  maintaining  consistency  in
disclosure across jurisdictions, that UK listing documents would  increasingly  include  substantial
sections on risk factors[144]. Nonetheless, it was apparent from the survey that there was  a  “UK”
and a “US” style of drafting of prospectuses with the UK style appearing to be  much  crisper  and
clearer.
A good example of the level of disclosure provided in relation to a human capital  investment  risk
factor was as follows[145]:
            “Dependence on key executives and personnel
Actinic believes its future success will depend greatly  upon  the  expertise  and  continued
service of certain key executive, sales/ marketing  and  technical  personnel,  in  particular:
Kevin Grumball, Chief Executive Officer; Christopher Barling,  Chief  Operating  Officer;
David Dawson, Chief Financial Officer; and the senior management detailed  in  Part  I  of
this document. Furthermore, Actinic’s ability to expand its operations to  accommodate  its
anticipated  growth  will  also  depend  on  the  Company’s  ability  to   attract   and   retain
additional  qualified  finance,  management,  marketing,  sales   and   technical   personnel.
However, competition for these type of employees is intense due to the limited  number  of
qualified professionals.  Actinic  has  attempted  to  reduce  this  risk  by  (i)  entering  into
employment contracts with certain of its Directors which contain  limited  non-competition
provisions, (ii) offering incentive  schemes  to  such  employees  typical  for  this  industry,
such as an employee share option plan and (iii) taking out key man insurance on certain  of
its key executives. However, these measures do  not  guarantee  that  such  employees  will
join and / or stay employed with Actinic, and the key man insurance may not be  sufficient
to compensate the Company adequately in the event of the loss of those key executives.  If
Actinic fails to attract and retain such personnel it  may  be  difficult  for  the  Company  to
manage its business  and  meet  its  objectives  and  its  business,  results  of  operations  or
financial condition may be adversely affected.”
A key to the main categories of risk factor identified are set out below.
Key to Risk Factor Codes
Competition                            Commercial competition
Customer                                 Dependence on key customers
Development    and                       Risks    associated    with    development    and     manufacturing
manufacturing                         capability
Environment                            Environmental risk, use of hazardous materials
Financial          History of losses, absence of prior market, fluctuation of results,  future  additional
capital needs, dilution of existing shareholders, share price volatility
Growth            Limited history, management of growth,  integration  of  acquisitions  and  mergers
and costs of merger
Human capital Retention of employees, key personnel and management [? check]
International    Problems of international growth, currency fluctuations and US factors
Internet                                    Internet risk
Intellectual property                Intellectual property protection
Other                                       Other risks
Pricing                                     Pricing environment
Product             Risks  associated  with  early  stage  of   product   development,   product   testing,
customer acceptance,  growth  in  markets,  obsolescence,  insurance
and liability
Regulation                               Tax, competition law, regulatory approval of products
Supplier                                   Dependence on suppliers
Y2K                                         Year 2000 risk
The approach adopted to the analysis of the narrative information was based on  a  modified  form
of content  analysis[146].  Content  analysis  can  be  defined  as  “  ...  a  quantitatively  orientated
technique by which standardised measurements are applied to metrically defined  units  and  these
are used to characterised and compare documents ...”[147]. It is regarded as  an  accepted  method
of textual investigation and essentially consists of establishing  categories  and  then  counting  the
number of instances where those categories are used in a particular item of text[148]. Its  strengths
are accordingly seen as its reliability and its validity, but its weakness  that  it  may  come  to  trite
conclusions[149]. To this must be added that reliability may be threatened unless care is  taken  to
respect the text. For example, any survey must be careful to ensure that the use  of  language  truly
reflects a perceived emphasis and is undistorted, for example, by something as simple as the  word
“not” prefixing a word.
The  purpose  of  the  records  being  examined  for  this  paper  were  to  comply  with  regulatory
requirements and were often summed up with an opening statement, such as[150]:
“Before deciding whether to invest in the  Ordinary  Shares,  prospective  investors  should
carefully consider the risks set out below together with all other  information  contained  in
this document. If any of the following risks actually materialises, the Company’s business,
financial condition and/ or results of operations could be materially and adversely affected.
If as a consequence the trading price of the Ordinary  Shares  declined,  an  investor  might
lose some or all of his investment.”
The benefit of this from a methodological perspective is that the documents were intended for  the
benefit of similar categories of recipients and for an  essentially  common  purpose  so  ensuring  a
degree of comparability.  However,  there  were  significant  divergences  in  the  approach  to  the
drafting  of  the  documents,  for  example,  some  contained  simple  lists  of  risk   factors,   some
contained separate categories of risk factors, others sought to comply with US practice in drafting.
As a consequence, the approach taken to their  analysis  was  to  use  a  spreadsheet  recording  the
priority with which particular risks were identified and the number of lines of text associated  with
each risk. These were classified  into  groupings  of  the  most  common  types  of  risk  factor  and
additional explanatory narrative information recorded. These were then analysed  by  reference  to
the average number of lines of text devoted to selected risk factors  and  the  ranking  of  particular
risk factors, in each case by sector. The results of the analysis of the  average  number  of  lines  of
text devoted to types of risk factor is set out in Table 16 below.
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
|Table 16:  Average Number of Lines of Text Devoted to    |       |
|Selected Risk Factors                                    |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
|RISKS       |HR        |CH/T    |CS         |All Companies|       |
|Product     |25 (13%)  |24 (11%)|29 (15%)   |78 (13%)     |       |
|IP          |30 (16%)  |19 (9%) |16 (8%)    |65 (11%)     |       |
|Competition |10 (5%)   |21 (10%)|13 (6%)    |44 (7%)      |       |
|Price       |7 (4%)    |2 (1%)  |2 (1%)     |11 (2%)      |       |
|Human       |7 (4%)    |10 (5%) |15 (8%)    |32 (5%)      |       |
|Capital     |          |        |           |             |       |
|Growth      |6 (3%)    |9 (4%)  |16 (8%)    |31 (5%)      |       |
|Internationa|5 (3%)    |8 (4%)  |17 (9%)    |30 (5%)      |       |
|l           |          |        |           |             |       |
|Regulation  |31 (17%)  |14 (6%) |7 (4%)     |62 (10%)     |       |
|Customers   |7 (4%)    |6 (3%)  |8 (4%)     |21 (3%)      |       |
|Suppliers   |4 (2%)    |17 (8%) |6 (3%)     |27 (4%)      |       |
|D and M     |11 (6%)   |8 (4%)  |5 (3%)     |24 (4%)      |       |
|Internet    |0 (0%)    |8 (4%)  |15 (8%)    |23 (4%)      |       |
|Environment |4 (2%)    |3 (1%)  |0 (0%)     |7 (1%)       |       |
|Financial   |29 (16%)  |53 (24%)|37 (19%)   |119 (20%)    |       |
|Y2K         |4 (2%)    |7 (3%)  |6 (3%)     |17 (3%)      |       |
|Other       |6 (3%)    |8 (4%)  |8 (4%)     |22 (4%)      |       |
|TOTAL       |187 (100%)|217     |200 (100%) |604 (100%    |       |
|            |          |(100%)  |           |             |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
The most significant risks for CH/T companies and  CS  companies,  by  this  measure,  related  to
financial issues (24% and 19% respectively) whereas in the case of HR companies  this  was  very
important (16%) but ranked slightly behind regulation and the protection  of  intellectual  property
rights (17% and 16%, as rounded, respectively), issues which were  not  especially  significant  for
the  other  types  of  company.  Human  capital  issues  were  most  important  in  relation   to   CS
companies, where they ranked equal fifth (5%) whereas in relation to the other types  of  company
they ranked seventh (4% and 5% respectively). In  conclusion,  then,  it  would  seem  that  human
capital  issues  must  be  regarded  as  an  important  perceived  risk  though  far   from   the   most
significant. The results of the alternative  analysis  of  the  priority,  in  terms  of  place  within  the
relevant section of the prospectus, of types of risk factor is set out in Table 17 below.
|          |           |       |          |       |
|Table 17  Rankings of Risk    |          |       |
|Factors                       |          |       |
|(based on the order in which they are included in|
|the prospectus)                                  |
|          |           |       |          |       |
|RISKS     |HR         |CH/T   |CS        |       |
|Product   |1          |3      |2         |       |
|IP        |2          |7      |8         |       |
|Competitio|2          |2      |4         |       |
|n         |           |       |          |       |
|Price     |8          |13     |15        |       |
|Human     |6          |5      |3         |       |
|Capital   |           |       |          |       |
|Growth    |12         |9      |5         |       |
|Internatio|14         |11     |12        |       |
|nal       |           |       |          |       |
|Regulation|5          |8      |11        |       |
|Customers |9          |6      |7         |       |
|Suppliers |11         |4      |9         |       |
|D and M   |7          |10     |10        |       |
|Internet  |16         |15     |6         |       |
|Environmen|10         |16     |16        |       |
|t         |           |       |          |       |
|Financial |4          |1      |1         |       |
|Y2K       |15         |14     |14        |       |
|Other     |13         |12     |13        |       |
|          |           |       |          |       |
The analysis of  the  priority  of  investment  risk  factors  based  on  their  order  in  the  document
showed  that  financial  risks  were  the  most  important  for  both  CH/T  companies  and  for  CS
companies, whereas product risks were the highest priority for HR companies. The importance  of
financial risks was consistent with the previous analysis; product risk had also  been  a  significant
factor  for  HR  companies  where  it  fell  immediately  below  those  specifically  identified.  The
explanation for this would almost certainly be the presence of scientific research based companies
in the sample who were at the earlier stages of  product  development.  The  risks  which  received
lowest priority related broadly to the  environment  and  Year  2K.  Risks  associated  with  human
capital fell somewhere towards the higher end of the spectrum  at  6th,  5th  and  3rd  respectively,
confirming  again  that  such  risks  were  regarded  as  important,  but  far  from  being   the   most
significant.
What these analyses failed to do was to identify whether the risks  associated  with  human  capital
related to employees generally or those in governance roles. Accordingly,  a  further  analysis  was
conducted to investigate whether when human capital issues were identified as  a  risk  factor,  the
risk related to employees, management or governance. A number of the references to management
in risk factors were quite vague so that  it  is  unclear  whether  this  was  additionally  intended  to
encompass those in governance roles. The results were tabulated by categorising the risk  between
those  companies  which  identified  employees  only,   those   which   identified   employees   and
management only and those that identified all three.  The  results  of  this  analysis  are  set  out  in
Table 18 below.
|            |           |             |           |
|Table 18 Types of Human Capital Risk  |           |
|            |           |             |           |
|            |HR (%)     |CH/T (%)     |CS (%)     |
|Management  |43.3       |40.0         |20.0       |
|Governance  |33.3       |20.0         |70.0       |
|Employee    |0          |15.3         |5.0        |
|No record/  |           |             |5.0        |
|no such     |23.4       |26.7         |           |
|factor      |           |             |           |
|            |100.0      |100.0        |100.0      |
|            |           |             |           |
There were marked differences in the profile of the nature of human capital risks identified  in  CS
companies where that relating to governance amounted to  70%,  contrasting  with  that  for  CH/T
companies at 20%, although  this  might  have  been  (partially)  accounted  for  by  differences  in
language given that such companies recorded a risk in relation to management at 40%  rather  than
20%. The reason for the dominance of  concerns  in  CS  companies  may  well  reflect  the  higher
proportion of founder directors in such companies, identified earlier in this section.
An alternative approach to measuring human capital, based  on  the  prospectuses,  was  simply  to
analyse those companies which had identified this as  a  key  strength.  Whilst  perhaps  an  overly
simplistic measure, given that some statements were fairly  brief,  it  was  nonetheless  interesting.
The results are set out in Table 19 below.
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
|Table 19: Percentage of Companies Identifying Human Capital as a  |
|Key Strength                                                      |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
|Sector      |% of Companies     |           |             |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
|HR          |20.0      |        |           |             |       |
|CH/T        |46.7      |        |           |             |       |
|CS          |50.0      |        |           |             |       |
|All         |44.4      |        |           |             |       |
|            |          |        |           |             |       |
The results were surprising with health related companies  which  presented  a  much  lower  score
than the other types of company.
THE     GOVERNANCE     OF     NEW     ECONOMY     COMPANIES:     AN     “IDEAL”
REGULATORY SYSTEM
Competing or complementary regulatory  goals:  efficiency,  good  governance  and  investor
protection, innovation and human capital
This section will seek to identify an “ideal” regulatory system for the governance of new economy
companies, focusing especially on the human  capital  issues  which  arise.  It  will  commence  by
examining some of the more important regulatory goals which are relevant:  economic  efficiency,
good corporate governance and investor protection, the promotion and development of innovation,
and human capital, and the extent to which these can be seen as competing or complementary with
a view to identifying from the  relevant  literature  specific  indicators  as  to  the  ideal  regulatory
approach. The order in which these regulatory goals is not a signifier of  their  priority;  they  have
been addressed in this way because much of  the  recent  literature  in  relation  to  innovation  and
human capital relies to some extent on  concepts  developed  within  an  economic  or  governance
context.
Economic efficiency
The rationale for  the  use  of  “law  and  economics”  analysis  in  this  paper  has  been  stated  by
Maughan and Copp in the following terms[151]:
“Economic efficiency, the rationale for the discipline of economics, is not  “real”.  It  is  an
entirely abstract concept which is the outcome of a theoretical model of how resources can
best be allocated in society.”
However, economic efficiency is not an indivisible concept and, in principle, consists  of  a  series
of interconnected efficiencies, all of which must be achieved simultaneously if resource allocation
is to be efficient: these  consist  of  productive  or  technical  efficiency,  allocative  efficiency  and
dynamic or  innovative  efficiency[152].  The  most  relevant  of  these  to  the  regulation  of  new
economy  companies  is   dynamic   or   innovative   efficiency   where   technological   change   is
encouraged and  productivity  gains  retained  rather  than  frittered  away  in  slackness  and  rent-
seeking activities[153]. Viscusi,  Vernon  and  Harrington  observe,  however,  that  a  competitive
equilibrium results  in  static  efficiency  but  that  it  is  not  clear  whether  it  results  in  dynamic
efficiency, especially in terms of research and development expenditure[154].  Accordingly,  there
may  –  albeit  rarely  -  be  a  conflict  between  the  regulatory  goals  of  encouraging   economic
efficiency and encouraging innovation.
There are a number of assumptions made in neo-classical economic theory as to  the  role  of  law,
some of which are explicit, others implicit. They have been summarised by Copp as requiring: the
protection of  natural  and  legal  persons;  the  protection  of  property  rights;  the  assurance  that
promises will be enforced;  the  protection  of  free  and  fair  competition;  and  state  intervention
where  there  is  evidence  of  market  failure[155].  These  explain  and  justify  the   existence   of
seemingly disparate fields of  law,  such  as  criminal  law,  tort,  property  law,  contract  law  and
competition law. The criteria for state intervention in company law in the event  of  market  failure
have been summarised by Cheffins by reference to the following  criteria:  imperfect  information;
transaction costs; judgement problems, negative externalities  and  collective  action  problems  or
related  types  of  strategic  behaviour[156].  He  contrasts  non-efficiency  justifications  for   state
intervention  such  as  fairness,  participation,   the   protection   of   community   ideals,   and   the
preservation  of  morality  in  the  market  system[157].  The  relevance  of  the  criteria   for   state
intervention to innovative high growth companies has been argued by Copp and Maughan to lie in
the problems which such companies give rise to in terms of the  costs  of  measuring  information,
asymmetric information and investor judgement problems[158].
The need for a property law is of particular relevance to new economy companies, since it extends
to the existence of intellectual  property  law  because,  as  Cooter  and  Ulen  explain,  the  special
problems in defining property rights in information lie in that buyers cannot  determine  the  value
of information until they have it and this removes their willingness to pay for it and  that,  because
information is costly to produce and cheap to transmit, buyers become competitors and consumers
may free ride [159]. Accordingly, as they argue, an unregulated market may undersupply ideas  so
that state intervention may take place in  the  form  of  state  supply,  public  subsidies  for  private
provision, or the creation and protection of property rights  in  information[160].  Even  then  they
argue that markets may produce problems  because  producers  of  information  can  obtain  profits
from speculative investments, for example, private companies searching for a cure for cancer may
duplicate efforts[161].
Competition law is also of importance to new economy companies. Cooter and Ulen observe  that,
in addition to legal monopolies created by intellectual property  laws,  high  technology  industries
have elements  of  a  natural  monopoly,  because  average  costs  fall  as  the  scale  of  production
rises[162]. Given natural monopoly the largest firm with lowest costs can  drive  out  competition,
for example, spreading research and development costs over  larger  production  volumes  reduces
the average cost of innovation. It is observed that monopoly theory and policy were  developed  to
analyse resource allocation in industries with stable technologies  and  “the  development  of  high
technology industries challenges both economic theory and policy”[163].
Contract law is also potentially significant to new economy companies because of the  problem  of
human asset specificity, defined earlier in this paper. Zero transaction costs have to be assumed  to
exist if economic efficiency is to be attained and the presence of transaction costs has been seen to
be a potential justification for state intervention. Williamson has argued that bilaterally  dependent
parties – such as  where  there  is  human  asset  specificity  -  cannot  respond  quickly  and  easily
because of disagreements and self-interested bargaining so maladaptation costs are  incurred[164].
The transfer of such costs from market to hierarchy in the  company  adds  bureaucratic  costs  but
these  may  be  offset  by  bilateral   adaptive   gains[165].   Bilateral   dependency,   according   to
Williamson, poses contractual hazards in the face of incomplete  contracting  and  opportunism  in
response to which contractual safeguards are commonly provided[166]. Maughan and  Copp  have
argued in relation to innovative high growth companies that human asset  specificity  can  only  be
said to constitute a “problem”, and then only to the companies concerned, in relation to borrowing
from  risk-averse  lenders,  entailing  instead  reliance   on   equity   capital,   high-risk   unsecured
borrowing or some system of guarantors,  unless  there  is  there  is  the  reification  of  intellectual
property and the use of contracts with covenants[167].
The role of company law in general terms might be expected to be  fairly  neutral  in  terms  of  its
consequences for the economic efficiency of  new  economy  companies.  Care  must  be  taken  to
avoid the  oversimplification  of  the  economic  analysis  of  companies  for,  as  Easterbrook  and
Fischel have demonstrated, each aspect of company law presents unique and complex questions of
economic analysis[168].
Perhaps  the  most  important  insight  towards  explaining  the  phenomenon  of  the  company   is
Coase’s seminal work which viewed the company as primarily  a  means  of  reducing  transaction
costs[169], although his perception of the company as, in effect, a  minature  command  economy,
would seem at odds with the perception (at least) of  new  economy  companies[170].  In  contrast,
the alternative and more recent “property-rights”  approach  out  forward  by  Grossman  and  Hart
suggests  that  corporate  organisation  is  desirable  because  it  increases  the  incentive  to   make
relationship-specific  investments,  so  enabling  an   acquiring   company   to   own   an   acquired
company’s non-human  assets  and  exploit  the  perceived  contractual  incompleteness  that  such
assets are subject to[171]. The extensive mergers and acquisition activity  between  new  economy
companies may suggest that such a theory is not limited to “ownership” of non-human  assets  and
may extend to incomplete contracts for human assets.
Company law is often seen not  through  the  lens  of  the  reduction  of  transaction  costs  but,  on
account of the work of  Jensen  and  Meckling,  through  the  lens  of  being  responsible  for  their
increase in the form of the agency costs incurred through the need for  increased  monitoring[172].
The relevance of this to new economy companies  is  plain:  since  such  companies  often  involve
much more complex issues than traditional companies, it would be expected that monitoring costs
would be higher,  potentially  throwing  into  doubt  the  benefits  of  corporate  organisation.  This
emphasis on monitoring costs is also significant because of the susceptibility of the company form
to problems of imperfect information and judgement problems. Both  these  have  the  potential  to
induce market failure because of their  tendency  to  lead  to  management  opportunism  and  may
justify extensive state intervention by way of mandatory disclosure  requirements[173].  Problems
of imperfect information may be particularly severe in the case of new economy companies where
confidentiality  may  be  vital  to  corporate  performance  and  where  many  investors  may   face
judgement problems in attempting to assess complex product  information.  One  of  the  principal
means by which management opportunism may be addressed  is  by  the  alignment  of  ownership
and managerial interests and there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness of this.  One  such
study  by  Morck,  Sheleifer  and  Vishny  sought  to  relate   performance   to   insider   ownership
percentages  finding  that  between  0  and   5%   performance   improved,   between   5   to   25%,
performance deteriorated, and that over 25%, performance improved,  although  the  interpretation
of this was not necessarily straightforward[174].
An alternative, and more sophisticated alternative approach to the concept of asset specificity  and
the identification of firm-specific assets, with a substantial bearing on the form that  company  law
might take, has recently been put forward by Rock and Wachter[175]. It is particularly pertinent to
this paper because the context of their analysis is that of “Silicon Valley start-up”  companies  and
their use of a hypothetical case study, involving the  development  of  a  high-technology  product,
the “network switch”. They define “match specific investments” as “ ... investments that are  more
valuable to the contracting parties than to a third party ...”[176]. The reasons given  for  preferring
this definition are that it captures a  broader  range  of  activities,  including  training,  learning-by-
doing and adaptation to interaction with each  other,  is  not  limited  to  investments  taking  place
within a firm and that it requires the identification of the specific asset created or improved by  the
investment[177]. “Match assets” are created by the “match-investments”  because  they  will  have
great value to insiders and little value to outsiders – the pay-off from success would be huge, from
failure nil[178].
Rock and Wachter observe that in the early stages of the development of  the  switch,  the  venture
will be hugely dependent on the individuals who provide human or financial  capital[179].  Whilst
Rock  and  Wachter  focus  on  the  problems  of  close  corporations  in  obtaining  finance,   their
conclusions are relevant for companies which may wish to seek finance  from  a  public  listing  of
shares as well because they raise important questions as to the  governance  of  the  venture.  They
argue that such companies will have difficulties obtaining venture capital  finance  because  of  the
high cost entailed in outside investors needing to learn and stay informed as to the potential  value
of the switch[180]. They argue, therefore, that  such  investors  would  need  to  be  brought  in  as
insiders but would remain vulnerable to insiders threatening dissolution to extract a  greater  share
of the enterprise, thus threatening the prospect of optimal investment[181]. Yet they conclude that
the close corporation form is preferable to a public listed company because limitations on exit and
the rule  against  non-pro-rata  distributions,  largely  prevent  opportunistic  behaviour[182].  One
significant factor is argued to be that the reason for reduced agency costs in high-technology close
corporations compared with listed companies  arises  on  account  of  the  need  to  lock-in  parties
whilst developing vulnerable match-specific assets[183]. This contrasts with the  usual  reason  for
reduced agency costs being related to the presence of family relationships which are rarely present
in high technology ventures[184].
This  analysis  raises  potentially  interesting  questions  for  the   governance   of   new   economy
companies which are listed. The effect  of  a  listing  will  remove  the  limitations  on  exit  which
characterise the close corporation. In the case of the close corporation the absence of a market  for
shares means that a shareholder/ director will usually have an incentive to remain a director as  the
most effective means of monitoring, and  ultimately  realising,  the  investment;  in  the  case  of  a
listed company the constraint will be much weaker. This would suggest that  risk-averse  investors
in a listed company would seek to recreate some of the advantages found in close corporations  by
requiring strong contractual protection against the termination of the employment  relationship  by
those who have made match-specific investments, combined with restrictions on the realisation  of
shares. It would suggest the  importance  of  an  analysis  of  the  role  these  play  in  particular  in
relation to founders and insiders.
Good governance and investor protection
Good corporate governance encompasses an  exceptionally  broad  range  of  issues,  reflecting  its
multi-disciplinary nature. These issues have been identified by Copp as  the  following:  a  lack  of
consensus as to the purpose of the company; a lack of consensus  as  to  the  purpose  of  company
law; concern over corporate structure; concern over  high  profile  scandals  and  failures;  concern
over directors’ remuneration levels; and concern over corporate ethics[185]. Most  of  these  apply
to a greater, or lesser, extent to new economy  companies.  Investor  protection  is,  in  principle,  a
separate goal but the two will be addressed together in this paper.
The theoretical debate over the purpose of the company might appear to be dulled by the focus  on
innovation in such companies but in  practice  the  conflict  between  shareholder  and  stakeholder
interests  can  be  as  marked,  for  example,  as  to  consumer  protection   in   drug   development.
Similarly, it might be anticipated that the purpose  of  company  law  should  veer  on  the  side  of
being facilitative rather than regulatory out of a desire to promote innovation but  an  argument  to
the contrary based on the unique risks posed by such companies could also be  put.  Concern  over
corporate structure might appear to pose less of an issue because the perception  is  that  employee
interests are already well represented in such companies; however, it will be seen from  this  paper
that in practice even directors holdings in  such  companies  are  typically  low  in  relation  to  the
whole  and  therefore  may  carry  limited  influence.  Concerns  over  high  profile   scandals   and
corporate ethics have impacted on new economy companies much as for other  companies,  as  the
example of  British  Biotech  has  readily  demonstrated.  Perhaps  the  only  significant  exception
relates to directors’ remuneration  where  there  appears  to  be  a  high  level  of  tolerance  of  pay
awards, indeed, the reverse concern can be demonstrated in the case of the companies involved  in
health: that there might be a “brain drain” of such skills overseas if those  with  relevant  academic
backgrounds were not appropriately rewarded.
The range of issues with which “good corporate governance” is concerned potentially renders it  a
diffuse tool for evaluating particular legal and regulatory mechanisms. There are two  core  issues,
however, which appear to dominate academic perspectives on the relationship  between  corporate
governance, innovation and human capital. These are  whether  a  “shareholder”  or  “stakeholder”
concept of corporate governance or the related concept of “outsider” and “insider” control are  the
more  desirable.  Debate  over  these  concepts  has   dominated   the   development   of   corporate
governance and attracted a vast literature both as to  the  implications  of  stakeholder  theory[186]
and  the  practical  ramifications  of   the   “outsider”   and   “insider”   systems   for   international
convergence[187]. Accordingly, it would be neither feasible, nor desirable, to attempt to reconcile
such issues in this paper, not least because it would involve the need to evaluate issues as broad as
the institutional framework for  corporate  governance,  including  the  mechanisms  for  financing
business, which would clearly be impracticable. Indeed, it  would  be  irrelevant  in  terms  of  this
paper to revisit the case for a “stakeholder” company law when a “pluralist” approach to company
law reform has been so clearly and recently rejected by the Modern Company  Law  Review[188].
The reasons for this rejection were  that  a  pluralist  company  law  would  confer  a  broad  policy
discretion on directors; would not necessarily achieve its objectives given the realities  of  a  broad
and largely unpoliced managerial discretion; be  largely  unnecessary  if  the  law  made  clear  the
inclusive  character  of  existing  duties  and  maximised  the  opportunity   for   synergy   between
shareholder and wider interests; would constitute an  attempt  to  achieve  external  benefits,  often
better secured by specific legislation bearing on business activity as a whole; and enable  directors
to frustrate takeover bids where a wider public interest requires  it[189].  Similarly,  the  corporate
governance committees, considered further below have also consistently rejected any fundamental
change to the system of corporate governance[190]. However, it  is  recognised  that  some  of  the
potential  features  of  a  regulatory  framework  which  facilitates  new  economy  companies,  for
example, the encouragement  of  employee  shareholding  may  be  consistent  with  a  stakeholder
approach.
Whilst the theoretical foundations of corporate governance may  be  fairly  diffuse  and,  therefore,
fail  to  provide  a  straightforward  method  of  evaluating   relevant   regulation,   the   conceptual
foundations of the work of the various non-governmental  bodies  which  have  contributed  to  the
development  of  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  are  rather  clearer[191].   The
emerging values on which their work has been based has been examined by Copp  who  traces  the
early emphasis  on  broad  principles  of  openness,  integrity  and  accountability  in  the  Cadbury
Report  to  accountability,  responsibility,  alignment  of  directors  and  shareholder  interests  and
improved company performance in the  Greenbury  Report[192].  Whilst  such  values  are  clearly
significant in human capital terms, the emphasis appears to have  changed  in  subsequent  reports.
Copp notes  how  the  Hampel  Committee  stressed  the  role  of  people,  team  work,  leadership,
enterprise, experience and skills in producing prosperity over that of  accountability  and  how  the
Higgs Committee took the view that transparency and accountability were more developed  in  the
UK than in some other markets and that people were the key[193]. He argues that  there  are  signs
of a new direction in corporate governance with the  Tyson  Report  emphasis  on  values  such  as
diversity,  defined  in  terms   of   the   backgrounds,   skills   and   experiences   of   non-executive
directors”[194]. However, in terms of the  utility  of  identifying  such  values  for  the  purpose  of
evaluating law and regulation affecting corporate governance, there is an inherent difficulty  given
that  hostility  to  legal  regulation  has  been  a  strong  emphasis   of   the   corporate   governance
committees[195]. The solution adopted by Copp is to identify the following  overriding  principles
which characterise “good” corporate governance,  entailing  the  need  to:  define  the  role  of  the
board;  improve  the  quality  of  board  members;   diffuse   power   within   the   board;   improve
information  and  information  flows  within   and   without   the   board;   and   to   facilitate   self-
accountability[196].
Innovation
There are various definitions of innovation. Porter has remarked that[197]:
“Innovation can be manifested in a new product design, a new production  process,  a  new
marketing approach, or a new way of conducting  training.  Much  innovation  is  mundane
and incremental, depending more on accumulation of small insights and advances, than on
a single major technological breakthrough ... It  always  involves  investment  in  skill  and
knowledge, as well as in physical assets and brand reputations.”
O’ Sullivan has adopted a similarly broad definition of innovation as[198]:
“ ... the process through which productive resources are developed and utilised to generate
higher quality and/or lower cost products than had previously been available ...”.
It is, therefore, not limited to particular sectors of the economy, such as  perceived  fields  of  high
technology  which  can  rapidly  become  out  of  date.  Maughan  and  Copp  have  contrasted  the
approach then adopted by the London Stock Exchange in giving guidance for companies applying
for inclusion in Techmark, by stating that six core  sub-sectors  were  immediately  identifiable  as
areas of technological innovation and therefore automatically included in Techmark, although  the
majority of companies  from  eight  other  sub-sectors,  were  to  be  assessed  individually  by  the
London Stock  Exchange[199].  Companies  from  other  sub-sectors  were  eligible  for  inclusion
subject to  nomination  by  their  corporate  sponsor  or  broker  and  were  required  to  satisfy  the
London Stock Exchange’s perhaps rather unhelpful definition of technology companies as a[200]:
“ ... company whose business growth and success is dependent on the development of  one
or  more  technologies  or  on  the  development  of  products  or  services   which   require
significant technological innovation.”
Competition law would appear to play a significant role in encouraging innovation  because  there
is a strong link between the strength of competition and innovation. Innovation may  be  explained
by differing incentives to innovate or differing abilities to innovate[201].  Incentives  may  include
Schumpeter’s  evolutionary  process  of  “creative  destruction”  and  D’Aveni’s  phenomenon   of
“hyper-competition”,  with  the  incentive  being  provided  by  shocks  such  as  new  technology,
affecting  or  possibly  created  by  the  company[202].  Disincentives  may  be  provided   by   the
presence of “sunk costs”, for example, where a company is  committed  to  current  technology  or
the “replacement effect”, where a new entrant has more to gain from innovation which would give
it a monopoly than an existing company which  already  has  a  monopoly[203].  The  question  of
monopoly  is  significant  since  an  existing  company  with  a  monopoly  may  have   a   stronger
incentive to innovate than a new entrant if the  result  of  entry  would  be  to  create  duopoly,  the
“efficiency effect”[204].
Intellectual property rights also play a key role in encouraging innovation in creating incentives to
innovate. The reason is that the existence of the possibility of gaining  intellectual  property  rights
may give rise to a race to achieve them and achieve at best a lawful monopoly and even  otherwise
the possibility of “early mover” advantages, such as setting an industry standard[205].
The  role  of  the  framework  for   corporate   governance   in   facilitating   innovation   has   been
challenged. O’Sullivan focuses on the  enterprise  as  the  central  unit  of  analysis,  an  interesting
perception given that neo-institutional economists – who tend to be against  realist  perceptions  of
the company - would argue that it should be the transaction[206]. She argues against a shareholder
perspective in corporate governance on the basis that shareholders are  not  the  only  residual  risk
bearer and criticises both shareholder and stakeholder models for depending  on  the  neo-classical
model of static resource allocation which directly contradict research on innovation  that  shows  it
requires   an   allocation    process    which    is    developmental[207],    organisational[208]    and
strategic[209].  She  argues  that  a  system  of   corporate   governance   supports   innovation   by
generating three conditions:  financial  commitment,  organisational  integration[210]  and  insider
control[211]. She warns that governance institutions which support innovation in one activity  and
era may not be appropriate  in  another  and  may  need  to  change[212].  This  is  consistent  with
Jensen’s view that as ownership falls, a manager’s incentive to learn about new  technologies  also
falls[213].
Tylecote and Conesa have also focused on the appropriateness  of  the  theoretical  framework  for
corporate governance and innovation, and build upon the concepts of  firm-specific  and  industry-
specific expertise identified earlier in this paper[214]. Their framework consists of three principles
related to the novelty, visibility and appropriability of innovation[215]. Firstly, where an  industry
is  characterised  by  a  high  degree  of  novelty,  shareholders/  stakeholders  with  high  levels  of
industry-specific expertise are required[216]. Second, where an industry is characterised by a  less
visible activity, shareholders/ stakeholders with  a  greater  degree  of  firm-specific  expertise  are
required[217]. Third, depending on the extent to which intellectual property protection is  possible
in an industry, the returns from innovation may accrue to shareholders or involve  large  spillovers
to other stakeholders, such as employees, in which case strategies of stakeholder inclusion may be
required[218]. Ramirez and Tylecote argue, in the context of a case study of AstraZeneca, that the
pharmaceutical industry is characterised by all three  principles  and  that,  therefore,  an  outsider-
dominated corporate governance system should  be  more  favourable  than  an  insider-dominated
corporate governance system[219]. They concluded,  however,  that  the  UK  outsider  dominated
corporate governance system showed a serious weakness in supporting innovation  because  many
UK institutional investors did not develop either  firm-specific  perceptiveness  or  in  many  cases
even the industry-specific expertise  required[220].  The  framework  developed  by  Ramirez  and
Tylecote is  potentially  valuable  to  this  paper  because  it  provides  a  means  of  evaluating  the
corporate governance structures of the three differing industries in the sample.
Mergers  and  acquisition  activity  is  influenced  by  a  variety   of   regulatory   frameworks   and
institutions,  not  least  competition  law  and  company  law.  Its   desirability   in   facilitating   or
restricting innovation is therefore significant.  Generally,  there  has  been  some  scepticism  as  to
whether mergers and acquisitions do improve corporate performance. As  Pisano  observes,  in  an
examination of the biotechnology industry, acquiring such companies by vertical  integration  is  a
dangerous strategy because it is difficult to  guarantee  that  the  key  assets  of  the  company,  the
people, will stay and also because a large firm  lacking  experience  in  research  and  development
may not have the know-how to manage the acquisition in such a way as to preserve  the  incentive
structure to keep key people on board[221].  Rajan and  Zingales  similarly  argue  that  horizontal
acquisitions simply represent a way of a  company  strengthening  its  control  over  its  employees
and, therefore, postponing the adaptation of a company’s governance  system  to  change[222].  In
contrast, Ahuja and Katila, based on a survey of the acquisition behaviour of companies within the
global chemicals industry, concluded that under the appropriate circumstances, acquisitions  could
have a positive impact on innovation output[223].  They suggest  that  the  reason  for  this  is  that
such acquisitions  enable  companies  to  access  new  technology,  although  managers  can  make
mistakes in picking acquisitions to closely related to existing activities[224]. These findings  again
emphasise the importance of the robustness of  corporate  governance  in  supervising  the  merger
and acquisition process.
Human capital
From a macro-economic perspective, the role of the state in encouraging or providing  appropriate
investment in human capital through training and education should form a significant aspect of the
legal and regulatory framework for new economy companies. Neo-classical  growth  theory  seeks
to explain the overall growth in an economy by reference to the  contributions  made  by  different
inputs such as capital, labour and  technological  progress[225].  A  significant  part  of  growth  in
developed  economies  appears  to  be   correlated   with   exogenous   technological   change   and
productivity growth but it has been difficult at a theoretical level to explain how and why this  had
such an effect[226]. Endogenous growth theory seeks to explain productivity growth by  reference
to  investment  in  training  and  education  to  enable  labour  to  make   better   use   of   available
technology[227]. Given these assumptions it would be hardly surprising if  universities  could  not
be demonstrated to play a  key  role  in  the  development  of  human  capital.  Zucker,  Darby  and
Brewer have shown that universities play a fundamental role in endogenous growth because of the
role  played  by  geographically  localised  knowledge  spillovers  by  a  study  of   the   effects   of
individual scientists, major  universities  and  United  States’  federal  research  support[228].  The
range of policy measures, therefore,  to  encourage  human  capital  growth  at  a  macro-economic
level,  which  might  be  adopted  would  include  either  public  sector  provision   or   subsidy   or
alternatively concessions through the taxation system.
The role of the framework of  corporate  governance  in  facilitating  intellectual  capital  has  been
highlighted by Keenan and Aggestam[229]. They  argue,  in  essence,  that  corporate  governance
should be concerned with strategy, critical decisions,  monitoring  the  management  of  and  being
accountable for the investment of intellectual property[230]. They are critical of the role of market-
orientated corporate governance systems (i.e. those with an  active  market  for  corporate  control)
because of the short-term focus on profit and short-term investment combined  with  an  insistence
on innovating as fast as possible[231]. However, they  are  equally  critical  of  network-orientated
corporate governance systems (i.e. one predominantly influenced by  networks  of  interconnected
shareholders) on the basis that, despite their stability and  long-term  focus  being  consistent  with
the development of knowledge capital, they may be relatively impervious to market,  professional,
scientific and technological influences[232]. Perhaps more interesting are the  questions  that  they
pose as an agenda-setting exercise. These  in  essence  relate  to  how  the  differing  paradigms  of
corporate governance and intellectual property might be aligned; the  differing  responsibilities  of
investors, directors and  executives  for  intellectual  capital;  what  expertise  and  commitment  is
needed at governance level, for example, to create and develop,  intellectual  capital;  whether  the
questions vary with type of business entity[233]. Whilst interesting,  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish
how these insights in relation to  intellectual  capital  add  to  the  approach  adopted  by  corporate
governance for other types of asset.
The use of increased remuneration to encourage the  development  of  human  capital  is,  perhaps,
unsurprising. Keenan and Aggestam  suggest  that  executive  compensation  should  be  linked  to
creating,  nurturing  and  using  intellectual  capital  to  create  value  for   stakeholders[234].   The
problem in relation to directors’ remuneration in new economy  companies  appears  to  lie  in  the
incentives for the creation of firm-specific as opposed  to  “industry-specific”  or  “generic”  skills
observed earlier in this paper. Milgrom and Roberts argue that it is worthwhile for an employer  to
invest in firm-specific human capital because there will be  no  market  pressure  to  pay  more  for
these skills, since they do not increase an employee’s value to other employees[235]. Indeed,  they
argue that unless employees remain with a company for a long period  of  time,  then  it  would  be
illogical to invest in such skills at all[236]. Consequently, the company may generate a  quasi-rent
from not paying such employees the full value of the  extra  output  of  their  firm-specific  human
capital[237], who will therefore be a bargain in comparison  with  those  with  generic  skills[238].
Harris  and  Helfat  have  tested  the  question  of  differential  remuneration  for  Chief  Executive
Officers with firm-specific, industry-specific and generic skills and demonstrated that  on  average
external Chief Executive Officer  successors  received  13%  more  initial  salary  and  bonus  than
internal successors and that, even after controlling for factors such as company  size,  there  was  a
premium to external successors of 30%, suggesting a marked differential  in  the  returns  to  these
skills[239].
One particular form of remuneration which attracts much attention is  the  potential  role  of  share
options  because  these  additionally  present  other  advantages  in  the  context  of  new  economy
companies. There is some measure of consensus that enabling employees to acquire share  options
can be an effective measure to encourage the development of human capital.  Rajan  and  Zingales
observe that human capital poses new challenges because  legal  mechanisms  do  not  help  confer
control over it[240]. Their solution is for a company to build links  between  it  and  the  person  it
wants power over, which enable the person to be better off  voluntarily  following  its  commands:
complementarity[241]. The answer to getting  employees  to  make  firm-specific  investments  (as
opposed to more marketable technical skills rewarded in an industry) is by greater rewards, that is,
through privileged  access  to  the  company  or  its  resources,  so  that  they  have  power  if  they
specialise[242]. They,  therefore,  suggest  the  use  of  ownership  to  motivate  employees,  citing
specifically the use of long-term stock options, because these vest over a long period of time[243].
They also argue for the use of share options because they avoid the  possible  conflict  of  interests
arising from giving employees voting  power[244].  Zingales  subsequently  goes  further  arguing
that the differences between traditional and new companies have implications  for  the  boundaries
of the firm in terms of power over human capital, how this power can be maintained and lost, how
this  power  system  differs  from  market  transacting  and  how  the  surplus  should  be  allocated
(including between employees)[245]. He concluded that the de-integration of the company and the
growing  importance  of  human  capital  meant  that  power  in  firms  was  now  diffuse  and  that
accordingly a move to a cooperative framework of corporate governance was desirable to  prevent
conflicts among stakeholders[246]. Roberts and den Steen distinguish contractual and  governance
approaches to protecting employees investments in human capital and conclude  that  shareholder-
dominated  governance  results  in  low  investments   in   firm-specific   human   capital   whereas
employee representation in corporate governance makes  more  sense  where  high  levels  of  such
investment  is  desirable[247].  They  observe  that  employee  share  ownership  is  significant   in
knowledge  intensive  and  human  capital  intensive  companies,  with   one   extreme   being   the
partnership  form  used  for  professional  services[248].  Accordingly,   they   argue   that   as   the
importance  of  human  capital  relative  to  physical  capital  increases  the  net   attractiveness   of
including human capitalists in governance increases[249].  It is notable  that  the  rationale  behind
the proposals to encourage employees holding share  options  involves  one  of  the  non-economic
criteria for state intervention identified by Cheffins, namely that  of  participation[250].  However,
O’ Sullivan warns that to focus on firm-specific skills is to ignore the dynamics of  the  innovation
process and is likely to encourage the entrenchment of the claims  of  economic  actors  who  have
participated in and benefited from wealth creation in the past, even when the  integration  of  these
skills is no longer a viable basis on which the  economy  can  generate  the  returns  to  meet  those
claims[251]. Ferran goes further  and  argues  that  share  options  can  have  a  counter-productive
effect where, for example, a senior manager fails to object  to  strategic  decisions  because  of  the
adverse effect on share price and share option value[252].
GOVERNANCE  IN  NEW  ECONOMY  COMPANIES:   AN   EVALUATION   OF   THE
REGULATORY SYSTEM
Company strategies for dealing with human capital risk
The survey of prospectuses identified the extent to which human capital issues were regarded as  a
risk factor and further the extent to which this  related  specifically  to  governance.  Although  not
required, except perhaps to demonstrate the materiality of the  risk,  many  companies  gave  some
indication of their strategy for addressing such risks. These are summarised in Table 20. It  should
be noted that the figures in Table 20 can represent  multiple  entries  for  one  company;  however,
only 1 company in each grouping had 3 or more entries.
|       |           |       |          |       |
|Table 20 Strategies for Dealing with Human    |
|Capital Risk                                  |
|       |           |       |          |       |
|       |           |       |          |       |
|       |HR         |CH/T   |CS        |       |
|C      |38.9       |15.8   |20.8      |       |
|R      |22.2       |26.3   |25.0      |       |
|I      |11.1       |10.5   |29.2      |       |
|T      |0.0        |5.3    |0.0       |       |
|X      |27.8       |42.1   |25        |       |
|       |100.0      |100.0  |100.0     |       |
|       |           |       |          |       |
Key to Table 20: Strategies for dealing with human capital risk
C          Contract, typically restrictive covenants
R          Remuneration/ share options
I           Insurance
T          Technical edge attracts
X          No strategy mentioned
In the main, the strategies identified by  the  companies  were  contractual  in  nature,  whether  by
providing incentives or imposing constraints  or  seeking  insurance  through  a  third  party.  Even
reliance on a technical edge to attract employees is a pre-contractual measure. It is significant  that
there was only one company which specifically identified a corporate governance related  strategy
for reduction of this risk. That related to one of the companies in the sample of CS companies  and
involved reliance on a succession plan. It will be seen  that  overall  there  was  approximately  the
same degree of reliance on remuneration as an incentive and  contractual  constraints  (24.5%  and
25.2%  respectively)  with  significant,  but  less,  reliance  on  insurance  (16.9%).  Perhaps  more
surprising was the  proportion  of  companies  which  did  not  mention  a  specific  strategy  when
identifying the risk, an astonishing 31.6% of the sample.  However,  this  should  not  be  taken  as
meaning that such companies do not  possess  such  a  strategy,  only  that  it  was  not  considered
material to qualify the risk factor identified in this way.
There  were  a  few  significant  variations  by  sector.  The  use  of  remuneration  was   the   most
consistently relied upon strategy of the three sectors surveyed, although there was a slight drop  in
the  case  of  HR  companies.  HR  companies  appeared  to  place  more  reliance  on  the   use   of
contractual constraints than the use of remuneration and this was markedly higher  than  the  other
companies in the sample. This, perhaps, reflected the need to reassure risk-averse investors  where
products  were  at  the  development  stage  and   also   the   higher   percentage   of   academically
distinguished directors who might have possessed more firm-specific skills. CS companies  placed
far  greater  reliance  upon  insurance  solutions  than  the  other  sectors.   One   additional   factor
identified on one occasion in relation to a CS company was succession planning,  implying  a  link
to governance. It  was,  perhaps,  disappointing  that  the  role  that  good  governance  might  play
received little attention. CH/T companies noted that it was their technical edge that assisted in  the
attraction and retention of employees, perhaps reflecting the greater size  of  such  companies  and
differing career opportunities presented as a consequence. However, it  was  CH/T  companies,  in
contrast, which were the most likely not to expressly identify their strategy in the  investment  risk
factors.
It was interesting to note that human capital issues were often identified as a specific reason in the
prospectus for the transaction, in other words the company was being brought to market  partly  to
assist in employee motivation either by enabling share options to be conferred in a publicly traded
company, the realisation of shares or simply prestige. The results are set out below:
It is  clear  that  human  capital  issues  were  a  far  more  important  factor,  towards  entering  the
transaction, in relation to CS companies (60%) than to the others (20% in relation to both).
Remuneration as an incentive
Remuneration payments
Company law has traditionally been concerned with  the  regulation  of  the  adjectival  aspects  of
payments and other benefits provided  to  directors,  such  as  where  and  how  responsibility  lies,
rather than with the regulation of their substantive size, other  than  in  exceptional  cases[253].  In
contrast, corporate governance has been primarily  concerned  with  their  size,  although  this  has
necessarily entailed some consideration of adjectival  aspects.  More  recently,  both  aspects  have
been  brought  squarely  within  the  boundaries  of  company  law  with  the  introduction  of  The
Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations  2002,  which  make  extensive  amendments  to  the
Companies Act 1985[254]. Central to  the  new  regime  is  the  requirement  that  the  directors  of
quoted companies must now prepare a directors’  remuneration  report[255],  which  is  subject  to
members’ approval[256] and parts of which are subject to  audit[257].  Information  which  is  not
subject  to  audit  relates  broadly  to  how  the  directors   considered   matters   relevant   to   their
remuneration[258], such as details of any person who provided any remuneration committee  with
advice or services[259], a statement of the company’s policy  on  directors’  remuneration[260],  a
performance graph[261] and  details  of  directors’  service  contracts[262].  Information  which  is
subject to audit relates broadly to the amount of directors’ emoluments  and  compensation  in  the
relevant    financial    year[263],    share    options[264],    long-term     incentive     schemes[265],
pensions[266], excess retirement benefits (past  and  present  directors)[267],  compensation  (past
directors)[268] and sums paid to third parties in respect of a director’s services[269].
The purpose of such disclosures is essentially to seek to control increases in directors’ rewards  by
requiring their disclosure. As such it may be tempting to conclude that their relevance is limited to
new economy companies where, broadly, there tends to  be  greater  public  acceptance  of  reward
levels than in companies perceived as less innovative – and consequently less  risky.  Nonetheless,
they may  well  be  relevant  because  of  the  distinction  drawn  between  firm-specific,  industry-
specific and generic human capital. The reason for this is that the acceptability of reward levels  in
such companies is probably because of the perception that high levels of reward, say for  scientists
working on anti-cancer drugs are justifiable, rather than for those  introducing  generic  skills  into
such companies (though some might argue that the increased risk instead means that such  salaries
would  be  justifiably  higher).  Accordingly,  the  research  in  this  paper  was   directed   towards
establishing to what extent those with firm-specific skills were less well rewarded than those  with
industry-specific or generic skills.
The  revised  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  sets  as  a  main  principle   that   “   ...   levels   of
remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to
run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for  this
purpose ...”[270]. Despite the neutral appearance of this principle the rest of the Code is orientated
rather more towards avoiding  paying  too  much  than  to  attraction,  retention  or  motivation.   It
requires the  board  to  establish  a  remuneration  committee  of  at  least  three  independent  non-
executive directors or, in the case of a smaller company, two[271]. Its  terms  of  reference  should
be made available[272]; in addition, the Higgs Report included a summary of the  principal  duties
of the remuneration committee, which are annexed to the Code and which were compiled with the
assistance of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators[273].  Where  remuneration
consultants are appointed a statement is required of whether they have any other  connection  with
the company[274]. Such principles may or may not be appropriate for mainstream  companies  but
there must be a question as to their orientation  in  terms  of  new  economy  companies,  not  least
because performance conditions may be very difficult to assess in  the  case  of  companies  where
performance  may  not  be  easily  assessed  in  the  short-term,  for  example,   drug   development
companies.
There  are  no  distinct  rules  for  scientific  research   based   companies;   however,   there   is   a
requirement that the listing particulars must state that the proceeds of the issue of  securities  made
at the time of the listing, together with the company’s  own  resources,  will  be  applied  primarily
towards  progressing  identified   products   to   a   stage   where   they   can   generate   significant
revenues[275]. Furthermore, the listing particulars must explain  in  detail  the  uses  to  which  the
monies will be applied[276]. There is a much weaker requirement in  relation  to  innovative  high
growth companies, relating to disclosure  amongst  other  things  of  how  the  company’s  funding
requirements will be met from existing resources  and  the  issue  proceeds[277].  Such  disclosure
might serve to act as a constraint on remuneration levels.
The Bioindustry Association Code of Best  Practice  states  that  companies  with  publicly  traded
shares should seek to achieve a balance among  non-executive  directors  between  those  who  can
offer relevant business expertise and those who understand  and  are  familiar  with  the  risks  and
uncertainties of product development in the relevant  product  sector[278].  This  is  an  interesting
provision from a number of perspectives but it raises the prospect that such a  company  will  have
on its remuneration committee a non-executive with  appropriate  ability  to  assist  in  valuing  the
contribution made by executive directors with, say, a scientific background.
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|Table 21: Remuneration, by Sector            |         |         |         |              |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|Sector   |             |         |            |HR       |CH/T     |CS       |All           |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|Average annual remuneration of: |            |         |         |         |              |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|All directors (£)     |         |            |         |  129,397|  132,472|              |
|                      |         |            |92,115   |         |         |118,828       |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|All executive         |         |            |  154,916|  250,731|  244,738|              |
|directors             |         |            |         |         |         |221,061       |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|All non-executive     |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|directors             |         |            |25,148   |36,063   |34,047   |31,948        |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|All ’insider’ executive         |            |  170,390|  278,369|  205,445|              |
|directors                       |            |         |         |         |219,294       |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|All ’outsider’ executive        |            |  238,550|  235,592|  275,964|              |
|directors                       |            |         |         |         |253,981       |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|         |             |         |            |         |         |         |              |
|                |        |            |            |            |            |
|Table  22: Remuneration of founders, academics and   |          |          |
|CTOs, by Sector                                      |          |          |
|                  | | | |               |              |          |          |
|Sector            | | | |HR             |CH/T          |CS        |All       |
|                  | | | |               |              |          |          |
|Average annual        |               |              |          |          |
|remuneration (£000s)  |               |              |          |          |
|of:                   |               |              |          |          |
|                  | |  | |               |              |          |          |
|Founders          | |  | | 163.5 (85.2)  | 199.5 (175.3)| 168.3    | 174.4    |
|                  | |  | |               |              |(66.7)    |(104.5)   |
|                  | |  | |               |              |          |          |
|Academics          |  | | 210.4 (136.0) | 144.4 (45.7) | 172.3    | 176.6    |
|                   |  | |               |              |(82.9)    |(98.7)    |
|                  | |  | |               |              |          |          |
|CTOs              | |  | | 158.0 (79.6)  | N/A          | 141.3    | 148.9    |
|                  | |  | |               |              |(61.7)    |(68.2)    |
|                  | |  | |               |              |          |          |
|(Standard deviations  |               |              |          |          |
|in brackets)          |               |              |          |          |
The analysis of the use of  remuneration  as  an  incentive  was  based  on  the  annual  reports  and
accounts since the figures in the prospectuses were spread over a longer period and invalidate  any
comparison. The comparison was made by analysing the total figures for  directors’  remuneration
(including,  therefore,  such  items  as  benefits,  bonuses  and   pensions,   but   excluding   certain
transactions involving share capital). The reason for this is that no great significance  was  seen  in
the breakdown of these elements for the purpose of  this  survey  by  type  of  director  or  industry
sector, which was concerned with testing an academic hypothesis.
The most striking aspect of the results was that  in  HR  companies,  the  average  remuneration  of
founders,  directors  with  academic  distinction  and  chief  technology  officers  all  exceeded  the
average of all executive directors whereas in CH/T companies and  CS  companies  all  fell  below
the average. However, the results for insider directors were patchier with remuneration  exceeding
the average executive remuneration in both HR and CH/T companies but being  slightly  below  in
CS companies. In theoretical terms, this might imply a number  of  possibilities.  The  most  likely
would appear that founders,  directors  with  academic  distinction  and  chief  technology  officers
generally possess firm-specific skills which receive lower remuneration as expected but that  there
was some factor unique to the HR companies to reverse this. It is  submitted  that  the  most  likely
explanations are either that such directors in fact possess  industry-specific  skills  or  alternatively
that there are specific valuation or  agency  problems  in  such  companies  which  merit  attention.
However,  there  was  another  possibility,  given  that   some   companies   were   subject   to   the
Bioindustry Association Code of Best Practice, that the requirement for a balance of business  and
product development expertise among non-executive directors ensured a more  accurate  valuation
of these directors’ services.
Share options
A share option has been defined in the following terms[279]:
“ ... a conditional contract for the allotment of shares to a person (called an  option  holder)
under which the option holder is given an option to  require  the  allotment  of  shares  at  a
time specified in the contract ...”
Extensive  disclosure  of  information  on  directors’  share  options  is  required  in  the  directors’
remuneration report[280]. Otherwise, the regulation of  share  options  by  company  law  is  fairly
limited[281]. Much more extensive is the impact of tax law on the structure of share  options  and,
accordingly, this paper will concentrate on this aspect of their regulation.
Standard tax treatment of share options (income treatment)
There is no tax charge on  the  grant  of  a  share  option.   However  on  exercise  an  employee  or
director is subject to income tax on the difference between the  open  market  value  of  the  shares
received and the amount paid.[282]  For a higher rate taxpayer[283] this will be taxed at 40%, and
in addition[284] the employer will be liable to employer’s national insurance  at  12.8%.[285]  On
sale of the shares, the employee is subject to capital gains tax on any  increase  in  value  since  the
date of exercise.  Any fall in value will create a capital loss.[286]
Tax-advantaged share option schemes (capital gains treatment)
Certain types of ‘approved’ share schemes instead qualify for capital gains treatment.   Under  this
there is still no tax on grant of the  share  options,  but  also  there  is  no  tax  charge  on  exercise.
Instead the employee or director is subject to capital gains tax on  the  sale  of  the  shares,  on  the
difference between the sale proceeds and the  actual  price  paid  under  the  option.  Tax  rates  on
income and  capital  gains  have  been  harmonised  since  the  late  1980s,[287]  but  capital  gains
treatment still carries various advantages:
(1)        Taper relief
Introduced by Finance Act 1998, Taper Relief exempts a proportion of a capital gain from tax, the
proportion depending on the type of  asset  and  the  length  of  time  it  has  been  held  for.   After
various amendments, taper relief can exempt up to 75% of the gain from tax, after only 2 years  of
ownership.  This effectively reduces the tax rate (for a higher  rate  taxpayer)  from  40%  to  10%,
and so is a significant advantage of capital gains treatment. The maximum  exempt  amounts,  and
the number of years ownership required to achieve the maximum, are given below:
|                            |Max. exempt  |Years  |
|                            |             |       |
|Non-business asset          |25%          |10     |
|                            |             |       |
|Business asset:             |             |       |
| April 1998 – April 2000    |75%          |10     |
| April 2000 – April 2002    |75%          |4      |
| April 2002 –               |75%          |2      |
|                            |             |       |
Clearly the distinction between business and non-business assets is critical, and  this  has  changed
frequently in the few years since taper relief was introduced.  For shares in a company held  by  an
employee of that company, the relevant conditions are:
April 1998 – April 2000
Minimum 5% holding (calculated by voting rights)
April 2000 –
No  minimum  shareholding.  Company  must  be  unlisted   or   trading.   For   listed   non-trading
companies, must own less than 10% of shares.
(2)        Annual Exemption
An individual’s first £7,900[288] capital gains in any tax year are exempt.   The  vast  majority  of
taxpayers do not have enough taxable capital gains (if any) to use this exemption, so capital  gains
treatment for share options takes advantage of an exemption that would otherwise be wasted.  The
annual exemption is deducted after taper relief, so if full 75% taper relief  is  available  effectively
£31,600 of actual gain can be exempted.
(3)        National insurance contributions
National insurance contributions are  not  charged  on  capital  gains,  saving  12.8%[289]  for  the
employer.
(4)        Timing
Income tax on share options is collected under the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system if  the  shares
are ‘readily convertible assets’ (all quoted shares, and any unquoted shares where there is  a  ready
market).[290]  Tax is therefore due at the end of the month in which  exercise  occurs.   This  does
not apply to options that qualify for capital gains  treatment;  instead  tax  is  due  by  31st  January
following the tax year in which the shares are sold.
Types of share options qualifying for capital gains treatment
There are several types of ‘approved’ share option scheme that will  give  capital  gains  treatment,
each with its own rules and requirements.  Some are intended to apply to all (or a  wide  range  of)
the company’s employees, and are not covered here.  There are also two targeted schemes that can
be limited to senior employees:
(1)        Approved Company Share Option Plans[291]
Commonly known as an ‘executive’ share option  scheme,  this  has  been  in  existence  since  the
early 1990s.  Options  may  be  granted  to  as  many,  or  as  few,  employees  or  directors  as  the
company desires (although directors must work fro at least 25 hours per week),  and  exercise  can
be set for any time from 3 to 10 years after grant.  The option price must not be less than the value
of the shares at the time of grant. Although flexible, the main restriction under this scheme  is  that
the maximum value of shares[292] over which  any  employee  can  hold  options  at  any  time  is
£30,000.
(2)        Enterprise Management Incentives[293]
The £30,000 limit was seen as too low for some companies, particularly those  that  were  growing
rapidly and those that, due to a shortage of cash, had to give a  high  proportion  of  executive  pay
through share options.  Consequently a new type of scheme, the Enterprise Management Incentive
(EMI) was introduced in 2000. Under the EMI, options over up to £100,000 of shares[294] can be
granted to each employee, subject to an overall limit for the company of £3million.   Exercise  can
be set for any time up to  10  years  after  grant,  and  options  can  be  granted  at  a  discount[295]
(although any discount will be subject to income tax at the time of grant).  Employees  must  work
at least 25 hours per week for the company.  EMI  is  not  available  for  all  companies;  there  are
restrictions on  the  company’s  activities.[296]   Effectively  the  company  must  be  small  (gross
assets less than £30million), trading (excluding certain land-based trades), operating mainly in the
UK, and independent (not controlled by  another).   If  the  company  ceases  to  qualify,  then  any
unexercised options lose their beneficial treatment. As an additional advantage,  where  shares  are
acquired under an EMI scheme the period  of  ownership  for  taper  relief  purposes  is  calculated
from the date of grant of the option (rather than the date of exercise  under  other  schemes).   This
means that potentially an employee can exercise an option and  sell  the  shares  immediately,  and
yet still qualify for full taper relief. Initially EMI options could only be granted to a  maximum  of
15 employees,[297] and had to be “to recruit or retain  a  key  employee”.   This  requirement  was
dropped by Finance Act 2001.
Key dates
There are therefore several key dates when approved share options became increasingly  attractive
(as opposed to unapproved share options or salary) for small high-tech  companies.  These  are  set
out in Table 23 below.
Table 23
Key dates for approved share options
April 1998
Introduction of taper relief
April 1999
All new unapproved share options liable to National Insurance contributions.
April 2000
Introduction of EMI
Extension of business asset taper relief to virtually all employee shareholdings
Reduction of ownership period for maximum taper relief from 10 to 4 years.
April 2002
Reduction of ownership period for maximum taper relief to 2 years.
Of these, April 2000 was the most important, with significant improvements in taper relief and the
ability to grant options over £100,000 of shares under EMI.
Results of survey
(1)        Data
The  level  of  detail  disclosed  in  the  accounts  in   respect   of   share   option   schemes   varied
considerably.  Five companies  gave  too  little  information  for  useful  analysis,  and  these  were
therefore  excluded  from  the  sample,  leaving  40.   At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum   a   few
companies gave generous amounts of information, and were this group larger it would  have  been
possible to perform far more analysis.  However in order to be  properly  representative  the  study
was limited to those areas where information was available across the bulk of the sample.
(2)        Use of share option schemes
All companies in the main sample had, or were in the process of  establishing,  at  least  one  share
option  scheme.   As  can  be  seen  from  the  following  table  all   companies   studied   used   an
unapproved  share  scheme,  usually  in  combination  with  one  or  more  of  the   tax-advantaged
schemes. Many of the companies that operated a tax-advantaged scheme made  use  of  more  than
one type, which left 25% of companies in the sample apparently not taking  advantage  of  any  of
the tax-advantaged schemes.
Table 24:
Percentage of companies in sample using each type of share option scheme:
Table 25
Types of share option scheme adopted by operations sector
When examining the types of share option scheme  adopted  by  each  of  the  business  operations
sectors in the study, the percentage of  companies  adopting  the  standard  approved  scheme  was
roughly comparable across all three sectors.  However with the other schemes there was a  notable
difference, with CH/T companies far more likely to adopt an all-employee plan (67% compared to
36% for health and 25% for CS), but with no  CH/T  companies  adopting  an  EMI  scheme.  This
may be partially explained by the different size  of  companies  in  the  three  sectors  (in  terms  of
gross assets the average size of CH/T company in the sample was  £18  billion,  against  only  £46
million for Health and £210 million for CS).  Larger companies are of course unable  to  adopt  an
EMI scheme and may also be more likely to adopt an all-employee scheme. However the  average
company size masks wide variations, and on further investigation it appeared that despite the  high
average gross assets approximately one third of CH/T companies in  the  sample  were  still  small
enough to qualify to adopt an EMI scheme (the proportion for CS  companies  was  similar).   The
percentage of qualifying companies in Health was slightly higher (54%), but not sufficiently so  to
account for the far greater level of adoption.  Accounts do  not  disclose  sufficient  information  to
discover the reasons for these differences so further research, possibly in the form of interviews or
a questionnaire, would be needed.
The most common type of tax-advantaged share scheme is the ‘executive’ approved scheme,  used
by  over  half  of  the  companies  in  the  sample.   This  may  reflect  the  relative  simplicity  and
flexibility  of  these  types  of  scheme,  or  merely  companies’  familiarity  with  them.  The  ‘all-
employee’ types of scheme[298] are also popular, but due to the flat nature of these schemes, with
options over a small number of shares being awarded to a wide number  of  participants,  they  are
unlikely to be significant in retention of key staff. The number of companies in  the  study  having
in place an EMI share option scheme is very low.  This was initially surprising, as the scheme was
introduced primarily for the benefit of high-growth companies such  as  those  the  subject  of  this
study.  However further analysis showed that most of the companies in the  study  did  not  qualify
for EMI, mainly due to having assets in excess of £30 million but also  in  two  cases  (5%)  solely
due to more than 50% of the company’s activity being outside the UK.[299]
Table 26:
Percentage of companies qualifying for and using the EMI scheme:
This table show that of those companies  that  appear  to  satisfy  the  EMI  criteria  the  take-up  is
approximately one-third, higher than suggested by the initial analysis but still disappointingly  low
given how advantageous the tax reliefs available are.
(3)        Importance of share option schemes
Not only did all companies in the sample use at least one share option  scheme,  the  schemes  also
tended to be of significant size.  Two criteria were used to assess the significance of share  options
for the companies in the sample. Firstly the number of shares  under  option  at  the  accounts  date
was compared to the total issued share capital of the company, to assess  the  size  of  the  schemes
relative to that of the company.
Secondly the value of shares under option as at the accounts date was compared to the  company’s
total employee  costs  (excluding  options).   If  the  value  of  shares  under  option  were  high  as
compared to employee costs, this would suggest that share  options  are  a  significant  part  of  the
company’s remuneration, and therefore staff attraction and retention, policy.
Table 27:
Value of shares under option by company as percentage of total issued share capital (bar, left hand
scale) and total employee costs (line, right hand log scale):
The table shows that for the majority of companies in the sample  share  options,  if  all  exercised,
would increase the company’s issued share capital by between 4% and 10% (mean average  7%).
This suggests that share  options  are  significant  for  the  company,  as  involving  an  appreciable
dilution of  shareholder  equity  and  a  substantial  potential  employee  stake.  In  addition,  when
comparing share options  to  other  employee  costs  the  options  were  found  to  be  a  significant
element of total remuneration.  For most  of  the  sample  the  value  of  shares  under  outstanding
options was in the range 10% to 50% of total other employee costs, with a significant minority in
excess of 100% (although it must be remembered that the exercise of the options  would  normally
be expected to be spread over  a  number  of  years).  The  graph  shows  a  reasonable  correlation
between the two tests, suggesting that they reinforce each  other,  although  with  a  few  divergent
results (in some cases due to very low staff costs).
(4)        Reasons for non-use of approved schemes
There are several potential reasons for non-use of approved share option  schemes  by  companies,
including complexity and set-up costs, restrictions on exercise period and restrictions  on  exercise
price.   One  potentially  significant  restriction  is  the  limit  of  £30,000  of  shares  under  option
(calculated by market value at time of grant) per employee.  In order to determine whether  or  not
this was a significant reason for non-adoption of approved schemes, for each of the  companies  in
the  sample  the  maximum  value[300]  of  shares  under  option  for  any  one  director[301]   was
calculated. All companies in the sample granted options in excess of the £30,000 limit  to  at  least
one director.  Options beyond that  limit  would  of  course  have  to  be  granted  under  a  parallel
unapproved scheme[302], hence all companies in the sample  have  an  unapproved  scheme  even
where they also have an approved one.
Table 28:
Value of shares under for director with highest level of options in each company (bar);  companies
with approved share options are marked with a diamond:
From the graph it appears that there is no link between the level of options that a company  wishes
to grant and the likelihood  of  its  using  an  approved  scheme,  suggesting  that  there  is  another
constraint on adoption that is more relevant than the financial limit. Analysis  of  those  companies
that appear to qualify to grant options under the EMI  scheme  showed  a  similar  absence  of  any
correlation between the level of options to be granted and whether or not such  a  scheme  were  in
place.  Indeed it appears that none of those companies that could have  covered  all  of  their  share
option  within  the  EMI  limit  (£100,000)  had  introduced  a  scheme.  However  the  number   of
apparently qualifying companies in the sample (15) was relatively small and it  may  be  unsafe  to
extrapolate from this finding without further research.
Table 29:
Value of shares under for director with highest level of options in each  company  that  appears  to
qualify to introduce an EMI scheme (bar); companies with EMI share options are  marked  with  a
diamond:
 (5)       Options under water
On initial analysis of the accounts it came to light that nearly all (88%)  of  the  companies  in  the
sample clearly had at least some options granted and unexercised that were  under  water  (i.e.  the
exercise price was in excess of the market value of the  shares).   In  some  cases  this  excess  was
small, but in many cases the shares would have to increase in value by several hundred percent  or
even tenfold before the option became worth exercising. This may in many cases explain the  need
for the substantial levels of options (way in excess of the  limits  for  the  approved  schemes)  that
were encountered (see Table T4 above).  If options have been issued at a time  when  share  values
are high, then they will rapidly exhaust the limits of the approved scheme.  When share prices  fell
with the collapse of the dot.com bubble and it become necessary to re-incentivise management  by
issuing new options from the new share value base, these would then have had to be  issued  under
the  unapproved  scheme.  Further  analysis  was  performed,  looking  at  one   director   for   each
company (in each case the one with the highest level[303] of options) to determine the  percentage
of options that were under water as at the accounts date.
Table 30:
Percentage of director options under water for each company in sample:
For 17% of the sample the studied director[304] had no  options  under  water,  although  in  some
cases this may be as a result  of  cancellation  of  options  that  are  hopelessly  overpriced.  For  an
astonishing 43% of companies all of the  chosen  director’s  options  were  under  water,  in  some
cases by substantial amounts, despite  the  director  continuing  in  office.   Clearly  if  options  are
substantially under water then this casts doubt on their having a realistic prospect of  incentivising
the director concerned, despite the claims in the companies’ remuneration reports  that  this  is  the
intention of the scheme. In the remaining 40% of companies in the sample some of  the  director’s
options were under water but others were worth exercising; generally this appears to  indicate  that
further tranches of options have been granted at a lower strike price to re-incentivise  the  director,
but without cancelling the earlier options.
Recommendation:
This may be an area that the government should wish to address, in order to permit the transfer  of
under-water options from the approved  to  the  unapproved  scheme,  freeing  up  capacity  in  the
approved scheme.  Alternatively of course the company could cancel options that are substantially
under water, but this could have a demotivating effect on the employee (who  may  see  at  least  a
‘hope’ value in the option) and could be perceived as signalling a loss of long-term confidence  by
the company in its prospects.
(6)        Limitations of study
The existence of substantial numbers of share options that are significantly under water constitutes
a limitation on  parts  of  this  study.   When  analysing  the  importance  of  share  options  for  the
company figures for the amounts of shares under  option,  and  hence  their  value,  are  artificially
inflated by the existence of a large number of options which the company and employee may  feel
are  highly  unlikely  to  ever  be  worth  exercising.  Some  analysis  of  this   problem   has   been
performed, but it has been limited to directors’ options (as the disclosure requirements  in  relation
to directors are significantly more substantial); unfortunately  too  few  companies  give  sufficient
information to make any overall determination  of  the  value  of  the  extant  options  possible.  In
addition it was hoped that it would be possible to look for changes in company practice  following
the changes in tax legislation (e.g. an increase in the use of EMI  following  the  improvements  in
taper relief).  Unfortunately only a very small proportion of companies give sufficient information
for this to be undertaken reliably. It is also possible  that  the  study  has  suffered  more  generally
from limited disclosure in the companies’ accounts;  in  particular  there  may  be  more  approved
schemes than is apparent and fewer companies may qualify for EMI than it appears.
Contractual constraints on human capital
Company strategies to address human capital risk have been seen to involve a  mix  of  contractual
incentives and constraints. However,  the  role  that  might  be  played  by  contractual  constraints
would appear to  be  very  different  in  nature  and  involve  very  different  implications  from  an
innovation and human capital perspective  because  their  role  is  deterrent  and  may  involve  the
prospect  of  litigation  if  they  are  to  be  enforced.  In  conducting  any   survey   of   contractual
constraints, however, it is important to be  aware  that  business  norms  may  override  contractual
norms. Macaulay in the United States found that business disputes were frequently settled without
reference to the contract of potential or actual  legal  sanctions  and  that  law  suits  for  breach  of
contract appeared to be rare[305]. The reasons he suggested for this was because of  the  existence
of effective non-legal sanctions, such as reputational factors combined  with  the  potential  impact
of gossip and because the gains from litigation often failed to outweigh the costs[306].  Beale  and
Dugdale conducted a smaller survey, but with more  emphasis  on  the  role  played  by  individual
contract  clauses,  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  came  to  rather  more  mixed   conclusions[307].
Nonetheless, they also found, for example, that delivery delays gave rise  to  few  serious  disputes
and only one in which legal action was likely[308]. However, great care must be taken in applying
the results of the earlier of these two surveys: firstly they took place some years ago in  what  may
have  been  a  different  business  culture;  furthermore,  a  significant  factor  may  have  been,   as
Macaulay identified[309], that the parties  may  have  wished  to  avoid  a  “divorce”  between  the
parties,  a  consideration  which  may   be   negatived   on   the   termination   of   an   employment
relationship, even with a senior director. A more recent study by Deakin, Lane  and  Wilkinson  of
contract practices in Britain, Germany and Italy found that the vast majority of British  companies
saw both the use of writing and the attachment of legal force as important means of  clarifying  the
agreement and providing security in the event of a dispute[310].  Furthermore,  British  companies
were  far  more  likely  to  take  legal  action  against  customers  or  suppliers  than  in   the   other
countries[311].  Accordingly,  it  may  be  that  the  importance  of   the   contractual   mechanisms
examined in this section should not be underestimated.
The use of restrictive covenants
The basic economic model for efficiency assumes that all  exchanges  are  voluntary  and  costless
and that they take place in response to  price  signals  in  perfectly  competitive  markets  in  which
information is perfect, entry is unrestricted and  prices  are  unable  to  be  distorted  by  individual
agents  or  colluding  groups  of  agents[312].  This  statement,  however,   highlights   a   potential
dilemma for economic theory in the face of a voluntary exchange which would purport to  prevent
one or more parties from competing. Which principle from within the model  should  be  preferred
in the event of a conflict? Macneil has stated the issue well in stating that[313]:
“It is plain that contracts in restraint of trade may be used in attempts to destroy the market
mechanism itself, to  destroy  its  diversity  and  multiplicity  of  decision  making,  and  to
centralise it in the hands of those who enter the contracts in restraint of trade.  This  fact  is
but one facet of potential or actual monopoly control of an economy.”
Milgrom and Roberts argue that it would be inefficient for the employer and employee to agree  to
any contract in which the employee is discouraged from  moving  when  the  value  created  in  the
new job is greater than in the current one[314]. Their reason  is  that  penalties  for  leaving  would
make the initial job offer less attractive and require the payment  of  other  compensating  benefits,
which would be worthwhile only when the penalties discourage  value-reducing  job  moves[315].
However, this may be putting the case  too  highly  since  some  discouragement  of  an  employee
from leaving, especially perhaps where the  employee  has  valuable  firm-specific  skills,  may  be
necessary to prevent opportunistic hold-up  problems.  It  is  also  interesting  to  reflect  that  such
measures amount to an attempt to protect firm-specific knowledge or skills that the law fails  –  or
cannot - protect  as  property  rights,  and,  therefore,  may  possess  some  economic  justification.
However, there is a more fundamental argument to be considered in relation to  the  enforceability
of restrictive covenants, namely that even were they  consistent  with  economic  efficiency  based
upon a static equilibrium, they would still be likely to be inconsistent with dynamic  efficiency.  If
a broader range of policy goals were to be taken into account, it  is  probable  that  they  would  be
regarded as inconsistent with the facilitation of either innovation or human capital, since it is often
new businesses which are responsible for innovation and restrictive  covenants  will  ordinarily  be
structured to prevent their establishment and restrictive covenants are more likely to be  conducive
to the maintenance of (less valued) firm-specific  skills  than  the  development  of  (more  valued)
industry-specific skills.
The use  of  restrictive  covenants  is  particularly  relevant  to  the  governance  of  new  economy
companies for the following reasons: (1) their  innovative  and  high  technology  nature  makes  it
probable that their directors will have access to know-how which is not susceptible  to  intellectual
property right protection; (2) they are  critically  vulnerable  at  the  time  of  a  flotation  or  major
capital  raising  exercise  to  commercial  damage  from  the  departure  of  a   key   director   to   a
competitor[316].  Such  restrictive  covenants  will  usually   take   the   form   of   restrictions   on
competition,  soliciting  or  dealing  with  customers,  suppliers  or  employees  and/  or  on   using
confidential information. The  significance  of  such  covenants  is  that  they  seek  to  restrict  the
activities of an employee after their  contract  of  employment  has  ended;  during  an  employee’s
contract of employment an employer has an exclusive right to an employee’s services,  as  will  be
considered in relation to “garden leave” clauses in the next section of this paper.
The basic common law rule was settled by the House of  Lords  in  T.  Nordenfelt  v.  The   Maxim
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd in the following terms[317]:
“ ... The public have an interest in every person’s carrying on his  trade  freely:  so  has  the
individual. All interference with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints  of
trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to  public  policy,  and  therefore
void. That is the general rule. But there are exceptions: restraints of trade  and  interference
with  individual  liberty  of  action  may  be  justified  by  the  special  circumstances  of   a
particular case. It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the  only  justification,  if  the
restriction is reasonable – reasonable, that is, in  reference  to  the  interests  of  the  parties
concerned and reasonable in reference to  the  interests  of  the  public,  so  framed  and  so
guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it  is  imposed,  while
at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public.”
The context in which the restrictive covenant is made may well be  relevant  to  its  enforceability.
The law generally distinguishes between covenants which accompany the sale of the goodwill of a
business and those which apply between employer and employee, with the former being  accorded
more  latitude[318].  In  particular,  where  the  employee  is  also  a  shareholder  (as  will   almost
invariably  be  the  case  with  a  director)  and  the  restrictive  covenant  is  taken  as  part   of   an
arrangement for the sale of shares in the relevant company then a more wide-ranging restraint may
be upheld than would otherwise be acceptable[319]. This is potentially applicable in the case  of  a
flotation of a company where some existing shares are being brought onto the market.
The  law  also  distinguishes  between  covenants  made  by  employees  with  greater   and   lower
seniority,  with  the  latter  being  afforded  a  greater  measure  of  protection[320].  Mehigan  and
Griffiths have prepared an interesting “ready reckoner” as a quick reference guide to  decisions  in
relation to employees in  restraint  of  trade  cases,  tabulating  the  job  involved,  the  time  of  the
restraint, the restricted area or activities and validity[321]. They identify  67  cases  between  1909
and  1991,  of  which  7  relate  to  directors[322]  (excluding  one  which  refers  to  a   “divisional
director” which is unlikely to be  a  main  board  director[323]).  In  28  of  the  cases  (41.8%)  the
restrictive covenant was successfully enforced (subject to some examples  of  judicial  severance).
In contrast, in 6 of the 7 cases (85.7%), which  involved  a  director  the  restrictive  covenant  was
successfully enforced (subject to one example  of  judicial  severance)[324].  In  2  of  the  cases  a
managing director was involved and in both  the  restrictive  covenant  was  successfully  enforced
(subject  to  one  example  of  judicial  severance)[325].  Further  analysis  would  be  required   to
establish whether there was a formal correlation in statistical terms between the status  of  director
and the enforceability of a clause. However, whilst it is interesting to reflect on the significance of
the empirical data which can be derived from such a survey it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  the
very different dynamics of law methodology, for example, the precedent value of  the  older  cases
in the survey, the precedent value of cases decided by different courts and judges and the  need  to
take into account the factual matrix  not  easily  reduced  into  such  a  tabulation.  This  last  point
cannot be too strongly emphasised because the courts have consistently stressed the  need  for  the
judge in every case to decide whether or not a restraint of trade is reasonable, having regard to  the
appropriate evidence and the particular circumstances of the case[326].
Regrettably, there is some doubt as to the precise boundaries of the  interests  which  an  employer
may legitimately protect, extending to whether trade secrets and confidential  information  will  be
protected, whether an employer may be protected from the  “poaching”  of  employees,  customers
and suppliers and how reasonable the restraint is in terms of its scope, area and length.
The most controversial issue relates to the extent to which the law will restrict an  employee’s  use
of trade secrets and confidential information to which he has had access. Whilst  it  is  fairly  clear
that  a  “trade  secret”  may  be  protected,  the  definition  of  what  amounts  to  a  trade  secret  is
somewhat unclear and furthermore there is some overlap between the two concepts. This is  likely
to  be  especially  relevant  to  new  economy  companies  which  operate  at  the  leading  edge  of
innovation. A typical example of what the  courts  regard  as  a  trade  secret  is  that  of  a  product
manufacturer’s secret formula[327] yet the courts are also willing, in principle, to recognise  other
forms  of  confidential  information,  broadly  where  they  amount  to  the  equivalent  of  a   trade
secret[328].
An  early  test  which  still  finds  some  favour[329]   was   to   distinguish   between   “objective”
knowledge and “subjective” knowledge. Objective knowledge was  originally  defined  to  include
matters such as trade secrets, whereas subjective knowledge was that  comprising  the  employee’s
own  aptitudes,  skill,  dexterity,  manual  or   mental   dexterity[330].   The   significance   of   the
distinction is that objective knowledge will be treated as the employer’s property  even  if  it  is  in
the  employee’s  memory,  whereas  subjective  knowledge  belongs  to  the  employee[331].   One
alternative test is whether the relevant information can be easily  isolated  from  other  information
which the employee is free to use or disclose[332]. Another alternative  is  rather  more  subjective
being based upon whether a person of average  intelligence  and  honesty  would  think  there  was
anything improper in disclosure[333].
It is tempting to see in these judicial  dicta  a  reflection  of  economic  theory  and  the  distinction
between firm-specific and generic  skills,  with  the  courts  being  broadly  willing  to  protect  the
former. Yet this is unconvincing because there would be no benefit to an employee  in  seeking  to
use  truly  firm-specific  skills  elsewhere  (except  perhaps  in  direct  competition).  A  reasonable
question to ask, especially from an  economic  perspective,  is  whether  the  language  adopted  of
property rights ought to be translated into legal recognition of confidential information  as  a  form
of property, normally regarded as an efficiency  enhancing  approach.  The  arguments  have  been
reviewed by Leng and Leong, who  conclude  that  the  majority  of  academic  opinion  is  against
treating confidential information as property[334]. Harvey not unnaturally concludes that[335]:
“ ... the boundaries  between  information  which  an  employer  may  legitimately  seek  to
protect and that which he may not remain shadowy and ill  defined.  Inevitably,  given  the
enormous range of potential factual permutations,  any  attempt  to  accurately  define  that
boundary is doomed to fail ...”
Uncertainty also exists in relation to the extent to which the law will protect an employer from the
“poaching” of his employees, customers and  suppliers.  Whilst  there  are  inherent  difficulties  in
seeking to prevent an employee working for another employer if both want this,  or  in  seeking  to
prevent  any  employee  regardless  of  their  expertise  or  juniority   from   working   for   another
employer[336], it does appear that the courts will protect an employer’s interest  in  maintaining  a
stable trained workforce in a highly competitive business[337]. This is  particularly  so  where  the
restrictive covenant is limited to the  soliciting  of  directors  and  senior  employees[338].  This  is
particularly relevant to new economy companies which suffer from a degree of  instability  in  any
event and which may suffer from a market shortage of  appropriately  skilled  staff.  In  relation  to
customers, the test is  particularly  nebulous  where  enforceability  may  depend  on  the  personal
qualities  of  the  employee,  such  as   personality,   temperament   and   ability   to   get   on   with
people[339].
The reasonableness of a restrictive covenant in terms  of  its  scope,  length  and  area  is  a  further
source of uncertainty since the covenant must do no more than protect  the  legitimate  interests  of
the employer. No restraint may be imposed  in  respect  of  a  business  different  from  the  one  in
which the trade secrets exist or where the customer connection was built up[340].  This  raises  the
question as to how a business may be defined which may not constitute a problem in the examples
of bakers and milkmen cited but may  not  be  so  easily  resoluble  in  the  case  of  new  economy
companies where the activity may be less readily understood.  In  Mehigan  and  Griffith’s  “ready
reckoner”, the covenants restraining directors that were upheld involved restraints of 5 years and 3
miles, 3 years and 16 countries, 5 years and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 18  months  and  a
severed non-solicitation clause, and 2 years and not working in the UK.  The  restrictive  covenant
not upheld involved 1 year and the UK[341]. Whilst this returns to the principle enunciated above,
that the courts have consistently stressed the need to consider each case on its facts, it also  creates
substantial uncertainty.
Yet further obstacles may lie in the successful enforcement of a restrictive covenant.  Even  where
a restrictive covenant is considered by a court to be reasonable as  between  the  parties,  it  is  still
possible that it may be invalidated as contrary  to  the  public  interest.  The  hypothetical  example
given by Beatson  is  that  of  a  distinguished  engineer  or  economist  whose  restraint  would  be
detrimental to the community at large[342]. Such an example is readily  applicable  to  many  new
economy companies,  not  least  those  surveyed  in  this  paper,  which  includes  scientists  at  the
forefront of the development of new medical treatments and where it is not hard to imagine  that  a
court would not be minded to restrain the scientist from continuing such activity. In addition,  it  is
possible that skilled drafting of a restrictive covenant may  render  an  otherwise  overly  extensive
clause enforceable on account of the doctrine of severance – the “blue pencil” test[343]  -,  though
there is some evidence of  judicial  antipathy  towards  artificial  strategems[344],  perhaps  posing
problems for drafters who include numerous alternative options in the hope  that  the  court  might
choose the least unfavourable. Further, whilst it has long been settled that an employee will not be
bound by a restrictive covenant where wrongfully dismissed[345], there is some evidence that  the
courts may be weakening in their robust attitude towards  attempts  to  contract  around  this[346].
Finally, it is important to bear in mind the differential impact of legal costs in such cases  between
claimant and defendant, a recent example of which can be seen in  IS  Innovative  Software  Ltd  v.
Howes, a claim brought by the company against its former managing director[347]:
“This has been ruinously expensive litigation  and  in  due  course  Mr  Howes  decided  to
appear at the trial on his own behalf, without legal assistance ... Mr Howes  bore  the  brunt
of conducting the action, which he did with considerable forensic skill  and  without  many
unnecessary diversions.”
A fair proportion of companies within  the  sample  disclosed  details  of  restrictive  covenants  in
executive director  service  agreements  in  their  prospectus.  These  were  analysed  by  sector  by
reference to the scope of the covenant and its length.[348].  The  results  are  set  out  in  Table  31
below.
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Table 31:  Restrictive        |          |          |          |          |
|covenants                     |          |          |          |          |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Sector         |               |HR        |CH/T      |CS        |All       |
|               |               |          |                                 |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|% of companies disclosing     |40%       |40%       |40%       |40%       |
|information                   |          |          |          |          |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|% OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS WITH THE        |          |          |          |
|FOLLOWING TYPES OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS |          |          |          |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Soliciting employees          |91.6%     |50.0%     |61.3%     |42.2%     |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Competing      |               |91.6%     |96.4%     |100.0%    |96.4%     |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Soliciting customers          |62.5%     |50.0%     |96.4%     |67.5%     |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Intellectual property         |25.0%     |14.3%     |6.5%      |12.0%     |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Research and development      |12.5%     |0.0%      |32.3%     |15.7%     |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|TYPICAL  (MODAL) LENGTHS OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS   |          |          |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Soliciting employees          |6 MONTHS  |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Competing      |               |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Soliciting customers          |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
|Research and development      |6 MONTHS  |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |12 MONTHS |
|               |               |          |          |          |          |
A substantial example of the disclosure of details of a restrictive covenant was as follows[349]:
“The service contracts referred to above (with the exception  of  ...)  contain  covenants  on
the part  of  the  executive  Director  such  that,  for  a  period  of  six  months  immediately
following termination of employment thereunder, the executive Director shall not, directly
or indirectly, (without the written consent of the board) within the United Kingdom or  any
other country  in  the  world  where,  on  the  date  the  service  contract  is  terminated,  the
Company develops, sells, supplies, manufactures or researches its products  or  services  or
where  the  Company  is  intending  within  three  months  following  the  date  the  service
contract is terminated to develop, sell, supply or manufacture its products  or  services  and
in respect of which the executive Director has been responsible  (whether  alone  or  jointly
with others), concerned or active  on behalf of  the  Company  during  any  part  of  the  12
months immediately preceding the date the service contract is terminated:
            (a)        be employed or engaged in; or
            (b)        perform services in respect of; or
            (c)        be otherwise concerned with:
(i)         the research into, development, manufacture, supply  or  marketing  of  any
product which is of the same or similar type to any  product  researched,  or
developed, or  manufactured,  or  supplied,  or  marketed  by  the  Company
during the six months immediately preceding the date  the  service  contract
is terminated; or
(ii)        the development of provision of any services (including but not  limited  to
technical and product support, or consultancy or  customer  services)  which
are of the same or similar type to any  services  provided  by  the  Company
during the six months immediately preceding the date  the  service  contract
is terminated.
These provisions only apply in respect of products or  services  with  which  the  executive
Director was either personally concerned or for which he was responsible whilst employed
by the Company during the six months immediately preceding the date the service contract
is terminated.”
The most common type of  restrictive  covenant  was  against  competition  (96.4%),  followed  by
conventional restrictions relating to employees and  customers  (42.2%  and  67.5%  respectively).
Perhaps surprising in the light of the high technology nature  of  the  companies,  a  relatively  low
proportion sought to impose a specific covenant restricting competing  research  and  development
activity (15.7%): indeed the highest proportion of those which did were CS companies, rather than
HR companies (32.3% as against 12.5%). It is only possible to speculate as  to  what  the  possible
reasons for this might be,  perhaps  differing  perceptions  as  to  risk  or  perceived  difficulties  of
enforcement might be explanations. The length of the restrictive covenants adopted might  at  first
sight  appear  modest;  however  in  the  fast  moving  fields  of  expertise  covered  by  many  new
economy companies  the  restrictions  might  do  considerable  damage.  However,  given  that  the
courts stress the need to examine each case on its own facts, it is impossible to seek  to  make  any
generalisations as to enforceability on such a limited factual matrix.
The use of director notice periods as a constraint
Generally, the corporate governance debate has concentrated on contractual notice  periods  which
a company is required to give to a director rather than  on  the  notice  period  which  a  director  is
required  to  give  to  his  company.  The   reason   for   this   was   well   stated   by   the   Hampel
Committee[350]:
“The fundamental problem lies in the fiction of the notice period.  Neither  party  seriously
expects the typical notice period required  from  the  employer  under  a  director’s  service
contract to be worked out. It is merely a mechanism for the payment of  money.  However,
it is an inherently unsatisfactory mechanism  because  it  hinges  on  a  breach  of  contract,
leading to  damages  for  breach.  The  damages  are  (i)  quantifiable  only  at  the  time  of
termination and (ii) subject to an  obligation  (which  can  be  significant)  to  mitigate,  for
which it is impossible  to  provide  a  mechanical  calculation  and  this  therefore  leads  to
uncertainty and hence controversy. A solution which brings certainty would be desirable”.
The solution, in practical terms, has taken the form of progressive restrictions on the notice period
which a company is required to give a director. The present position under the Combined Code  is
that notice or contract periods should be set at one year or less and that if it  is  necessary  to  offer
longer notice periods to a new director recruited from outside then the period should reduce to one
year or less after the initial period[351]. The assumption which appears to underpin this  provision
is that of the Hampel Committee, namely that the issue  to  be  addressed  is  that  of  reducing  the
company’s monetary exposure.
New economy  companies  give  rise  to  different  questions  from  those  which  have  led  to  the
drafting of the Combined Code and it has been seen earlier that there is less evidence  of  concerns
over  remuneration  in  them.  In  contrast,  there  are  concerns  raised  by  the  identification  of  a
directors’ ability to leave the company, which must in turn raise the issue of  the  adequacy  of  the
notice period which such directors are required to give their company.
The legal position regarding the termination of a contract of employment by  a  director  is  that  at
common law a contract for an indefinite period is terminable by notice given by either party to the
other[352]. This would also appear to apply to the termination of a contract for services by a  non-
executive director. Where there is no indication to the contrary, a court will infer that the  contract
is terminable by “reasonable” notice, to be assessed by reference to all the circumstances,  such  as
seniority, length of service, nature of employment, frequency of paydays etc[353]. An employer is
entitled by statute to at least one week’s notice of termination of employment for  employees  who
have been continually employed for at least one month[354]. It has been held that 3 months was  a
reasonable period of notice for an executive director of an advertising agency to give his company
and  that  a  failure  to  give  such  notice  could  result  in  liability  to  the  company  for  resulting
loss[355]. But, as Freedland points out, resort rarely  needs  to  be  had  to  the  implied  or  default
requirement of notice of reasonable length because of  the  requirement  to  specify  the  length  of
notice in the statutory particulars of terms and conditions of employment[356].  There  must  be  a
question over compliance with such requirements at board level  though  the  existence  of  formal
contracts of employment would appear  to  dominate.  Quoted  companies  have  an  obligation  to
disclose in the directors’ remuneration report details of the date of a director’s contract  of  service
or contract for services, the unexpired term and “ ... the details of any notice periods ...”[357].
|Table 32:  Typical lengths of notice to be given by directors, by    |            |
|sector                                                               |            |
|               | | |               |               |               |            |
|Sector         | | |HR             |CH/T           |CS             |All         |
|               | | |               |               |               |            |
|Executive         | |               |               |               |            |
|directors         | |               |               |               |            |
|Minimum notice      |12  (8)        |24  (4)        |12  (4)        |12  (16)    |
|(months)            |               |               |               |            |
|General notice      |12 (48)        |12 (43)        |6 (61)         |12 (152)    |
|(months)            |               |               |               |            |
|               | | |               |               |               |            |
|Non-executive       |               |               |               |            |
|directors           |               |               |               |            |
|Minimum notice      |24  (6)        |36  (9)        |36 (15)        |36  (30)    |
|(months)            |               |               |               |            |
|General notice      |3 (30)         |3 (21)         |3 (22)         |3  (73)     |
|(months)            |               |               |               |            |
|               | | |               |               |               |            |
|[Note: The figures in the table are modal lengths in months. As data on notice    |
|periods                                                                           |
|is somewhat patchy, the figures in brackets represent the number of directors for |
|whom                                                                              |
|data were         | |               |               |               |            |
|available.]       | |               |               |               |            |
|               | | |               |               |               |            |
The data on notice periods  was  regrettably  patch  as  the  information  above  on  the  number  of
directors in the sample demonstrate. It is difficult, therefore, to be  confident  in  the  interpretation
of the results, especially in the case of non-executive directors where, as a consequence, there may
be no notice required. Subject to this, it would appear that many companies have negotiated  fairly
lengthy notice periods which would enable them to rely on the provision of directors’ services  for
a reasonable length of time, typically 12 months minimum followed by a further 12 months.
A “garden leave” clause has been defined in the following terms[358]:
“Under such a provision, the employer inserts a term in the contract stating  that  following
notice of termination of  the  contract,  the  employee  will  not  be  permitted  to  work  for
another employer until the expiration of the notice period”.
 Such clauses can be distinguished  from  restrictive  covenants  because  they  impose  restrictions
during the currency of the employment relationship and might  therefore  be  thought  to  be  more
effective. There is a close relationship between the use of “garden leave”  clauses  and  the  use  of
restrictive  covenants[359]  and  it  has  been  observed  that  there  is  a  trend  towards  increasing
reliance on them in preference to conventional restrictive covenants because the courts have in the
past treated them with greater flexibility[360]. The purpose of a garden leave clause  is,  in  effect,
to  attempt  to  sterilise  an  employee’s  knowledge,  for   example,   as   to   up-to-date   technical
developments within the company and also to weaken any bond between the employee and fellow
employees, customers and suppliers. As Dillon, L.J. put it in Provident Financial  Group  plc  and
Whitegates Estate Agency Ltd v. Hayward[361]:
“The practice of long periods  of  ‘garden  leave’  is  obviously  capable  of  abuse.  It  is  a
weapon in the hands of the employer to ensure  that  an  ambitious  and  capable  executive
will not give notice if he is going to be unable to work  at  all  for  anyone  else  for  a  long
period of notice. Any executive who gives notice and leaves his employment is very likely
to take fresh employment with someone  in  the  same  line  of  business,  not  through  any
desire to act unfairly or  to  cheat  the  former  employer  but  to  get  the  best  of  his  own
personal expertise.”
 It is self-evident that, if successful, such a strategy could  prove  more  effective  than  the  use  of
restrictive covenants. To take a hypothetical example a former employee could attempt to breach a
restrictive covenant by soliciting former colleagues the very day after departing work; it would  be
much more difficult to do this after, say  3  months  garden  leave  has  weakened  such  links,  and
policing a breach of an exclusivity obligation contained  in  a  contract  of  employment  might  be
easier, perhaps, than policing a non-compete obligation in a restrictive covenant.
At common law, there is no duty on an employer to provide an employer with work, although  the
employer must continue to pay an employee who  is  willing  to  work[362].  There  are,  however,
exceptions to this principle, such as where an employee needs to continue  to  exercise  skills[363]
or where publicity received from working is part of the bargain[364].  Such  exceptions  may  well
apply to employees in new economy companies engaged, for example, in research work, though it
is interesting to speculate on how such principles might be  applied  at  board  level.  However,  an
express garden leave clause is highly desirable because the courts  may  be  unwilling  to  imply  a
power to insist on garden leave where there is a  contractual  obligation  to  provide  the  employee
with work[365], the test for which has been seen to be ill-defined. The courts have been willing to
grant an injunction to enforce the full period  of  a  garden  leave  clause  amounting  to  6  months
following a resignation without due notice[366] but have also indicated that similar principles will
be applied as to the validity of restrictive covenants[367]. The courts, however, take the view  that
there is no relationship between a garden leave clause and a restrictive covenant so that  there  was
no basis for allowing a set off of the period of paid  leave  against  the  restrictive  covenants[368],
although  the  combined  effect  of  the  two  might  be  relevant  to  the  validity  of   a   restrictive
covenant[369].
The sample of healthcare companies revealed some use of garden leave  clauses.  In  all  cases  the
clauses  were  incorporated  into  the  service  agreements  with  all   of   the   executive   directors.
However, information was available in relation to only 3 of the relevant 15 companies in that  part
of the sample (20%). Since it was not possible to say whether the reason for this was that  no  such
clause had been used or alternatively that it had not been  considered  material  to  disclose  it  was
considered that reliance on such a small amount of data  would  be  unreliable.  An  example  of  a
disclosure linking a garden leave clause to restrictive covenants, from within the sample, is set out
below[370]:
“The agreement includes a garden leave clause, a restriction on the use or disclosure of the
Company’s confidential information and post-termination restrictions  for  a  period  of  12
months (less any period spent  on  garden  leave)  which  prohibit  him  from  soliciting  or
having dealings with the  Company’s  or  Group’s  customers  or  potential  customers  and
from  soliciting  the  Company’s  or  Group’s  directors   or   senior   employees,   or   from
competing with the business of the Company during that period.”
Garden leave clauses may useful in the context  of  good  corporate  governance  where  they  may
serve to minimise risk to companies. However, the  growing  practice  of  companies  of  requiring
garden leave clauses, in addition to restrictive covenants, would appear  questionable  in  terms  of
economic efficiency and the facilitation of  innovation  and  human  capital.  There  may  be  some
merit in their use being prohibited.
The use of shareholder lock-ins as a constraint
The term “lock-in” agreement used in this section should be distinguished from the form  of  lock-
in agreements which have received  extensive  academic  consideration,  namely  those  which,  in
effect, attempt to create an agreement to negotiate or to agree. The term is used here to refer to  an
agreement by a shareholder in a company on the admission of share to trading on a publicly traded
market not to sell shares for a specified period. The practical  impact  of  clauses  may  well  be  to
effectively tie  directors  (who  are  also  shareholders)  into  the  relevant  company  as  they  may
consider it unwise to retain shareholding in  a  company  without  the  ability  to  participate  in  its
management. It would seem probable  that  a  lock-in  agreement  should  be  subject  to  the  same
principles as apply to restraint of trade clauses generally and that the  relevant  standard  might  be
analogous to that which applies on the sale of the goodwill of a business. However, there are  only
two reported cases which concern a lock-in agreement or deed;  both  arise  out  of  essentially  the
same factual matrix and the judges in both cases  appears  to  have  assumed  the  validity  of  such
agreements without argument[371].
Directors, as  well  as  senior  management  and  substantial  shareholders,  who  hold  shares  in  a
scientific research based company or in an innovative high growth company are subject to  special
rules after admission of their company to listing. The listing particulars must contain  a  prominent
and  detailed  statement  of  the  arrangements  agreed  for  them  not  to  dispose  of   their   shares
following admission[372]. If there  are  no  such  arrangements  for  one  or  more  of  the  persons
concerned then there must be a prominent statement that there are none for them, together with  an
explanation of the reasons[373].
|Table 33:  Lock-in agreements, by sector        |            |            |            |
|                       |             |          |            |            |            |
|Sector                 |             |Health    |CH/T        |CS          |All         |
|                       |             |          |            |            |            |
|Number of companies (% of sample)    |7 (47%)   |5 (33%)     |12 (60%)    |24 (48%)    |
|                       |             |          |            |            |            |
|Lengths (months)       |6 months     |2         |2           |3           |7           |
|                       |9 months     |0         |0           |2           |2           |
|                       |12 months    |3         |3           |6           |12          |
|                       |18 months    |1         |0           |0           |1           |
|                       |24 months    |0         |0           |0           |0           |
|                       |             |          |            |            |            |
|In all three sectors, the typical (modal) lock-in length is  |            |            |
|12 months.                                                   |            |            |
An example of the disclosure of a lock-in agreement is as follows[374]:
“A  lock-in  deed  dated  30th  October  2000  between  those  Directors  and  members   of
management who hold Ordinary Shares and certain other Shareholders  (1),  the  Company
(2) and Williams de Broe (3), pursuant  to  which  the  Directors  and  certain  members  of
management have agreed not to dispose of their Ordinary Shares for  two  years  following
Admission, subject to limited exceptions, and for a further period of  one  year  will  notify
Williams de Broe of any proposed disposal of Ordinary Shares and effect the sale  through
them. Certain other shareholders have agreed not to dispose of  their  Ordinary  Shares  for
six months following Admission, thereafter being able to dispose up  to  one  half  of  their
Ordinary Shares for a further  period  of  six  months.  The  limited  exceptions  referred  to
above  include  a  general  offer  for  the  whole  of  the   issued   equity   share   capital,   a
compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the court under sections 425 to 427A of  the  ....
[Companies  Act  1985]  ...,  death,  and  the   disposal   of   Ordinary   Shares   by   certain
shareholders to repay loans due to EBT1 or to pay deferred consideration to EBT2.”
The typical modal lock-in agreement period was 12  months.  This  was  consistent  with  both  the
typical length observed for restrictive  covenants  and  to  general  (i.e.  not  the  initial  minimum)
notice periods. The purpose of such clauses would appear to be valuable for corporate governance
since their purpose is to seek to minimise share price volatility – already identified in this paper as
a  significant  risk  factor.  Whilst  further  research  might  be  conducted  into  the  nature  of   the
exceptions to these agreements and whether they operate equitably, there appears to be  no  reason
to question their use.
Insurance
Insurance was identified as a means of dealing with human capital risk  by  relatively  few  HR  or
CH/T (11.1% and 10.5% respectively) but it  was  the  most  significant  strategy  adopted  by  CS
companies. It typically took the form of key-man insurance for specified directors  and/  or  senior
employees. One possible explanation for its use by CS companies was that the highest  proportion
of  companies  with  founder  directors  fell  into  this  category  and  it  is  possible  that   in   such
companies there was a greater perceived need to reassure investors as to the risk. However, further
research would be necessary to determine this.
Governance
Good corporate governance was not identified in the  survey  of  risk  factors  as  being  a  strategy
adopted by companies for  addressing  human  capital  issues,  either  generally  or  specifically  in
relation to the board itself (apart  from  one  oblique  reference  to  succession  planning).  This  is,
perhaps, disappointing given that the  regulatory  frameworks  for  corporate  governance  now  do
much  to  address  such  human  capital  issues  but  may  reflect   a   perception,   given   that   the
prospectuses  analysed  were  issued  prior  to   the   Higgs   Committee   Review,   that   corporate
governance  was  more  about  accountability.   Much   of   the   legal   framework   for   corporate
governance, for example, requirements as to meetings,  have  no  particular  significance  for  new
economy companies or their human capital  aspects  and,  therefore,  will  not  be  discussed.  This
paper  will  concentrate  on  the  role  of  corporate  governance  in  ensuring  that  the  board  of  a
company has the appropriate quality of human capital required to be effective.
The immediate problem presented  by  the  regulatory  framework  for  the  governance  of  human
capital  issues  at  board  level,  and  especially  in  new  economy   companies,   is   the   array   of
superficially  similar   or   overlapping   requirements,   but   often   with   widely   differing   legal
consequences attached for breach. To take one illustration, compare
the statement of Jonathan Parker, J. as follows[375]:
“ ... Directors have, both collectively and individually,  a  continuing  duty  to  acquire  and
maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of  the  company’s  business  to  enable
them properly to discharge their duties as directors ...”
with the requirements of the Listing Rules[376]:
“The directors and senior management ... must have collectively appropriate  expertise  for
the management of the group’s businesses. Details of such expertise and  experience  must
be disclosed in any listing particulars prepared by the company ...”
The first statement relates to case law concerned with the imposition of liability  in  an  action  for
negligence;  the  second  is  a  requirement  imposed  on  the  directors  under  the  Listing   Rules,
supported by a regulatory regime which includes the power to impose  civil  penalties  for  breach.
Yet there are significant differences in emphasis,  for  example,  the  first  refers  to  directors,  the
second encompasses senior management. This sort of confusion is undesirable and it is clear that a
more joined-up approach is required.
Appointment
Ultimate responsibility for the quality of the board of a company lies with  the  shareholders,  who
have the power to appoint[377]. Directors may also appoint a director, but the  person  only  holds
office until the  next  annual  general  meeting,  when  the  person  must  be  reappointed[378].   In
practice, shareholders in large  companies  with  diffuse  shareholder  bodies  may  find  collective
action to oppose the directors wishes on such issues difficult, which  is  one  reason  why  this  has
become a matter for corporate governance regulation.
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance has emphasised the need for  the  appointments  of
directors to be on merit and against objective criteria, yet does little to give guidance on what  that
means[379]. It is helpful that the Combined Code requires the papers  accompanying  a  resolution
to elect or re-elect a  director  to  include  sufficient  biographical  details  and  any  other  relevant
information to enable shareholders to make an  informed  decision[380].  It  would  be  hoped  that
such papers will give further information than has been given to date in  prospectuses  and  annual
reports and accounts. During the course of this survey, such information was often found to  be  of
poor quality for analytical purposes. For example, qualification details were given in  the  form  of
lists of letters, the significance of which might be far from clear to any  but  a  specialist  from  the
same field; career histories were often very incomplete,  even  extending  to  whether  the  director
had been recruited internally or externally. Perhaps worse still the lack of any standardised  format
made intra-company comparisons very difficult. If an assessment of the quality  of  human  capital
is to be regarded as significant in making investment decisions, this needs to be remedied.
The Combined Code provides that appointees, especially to  chairmanships,  should  have  enough
time[381] and that non-executive directors should undertake that they  have  sufficient  time[382].
More specific controls apply in the case of  FTSE-100  companies[383].  The  average  number  of
current directorships may  provide  a  proxy  measure  of  availability  and  was  derived  from  the
survey  of  prospectuses.  The  results  (which  should  usually  exclude  group  companies  of   the
relevant company) are set out in Table 34 below.
|               |                |          |          |          |          |
|Table 34:  Number of current and previous directorships per      |          |
|director, by sector                                              |          |
|               |                |          |          |          |          |
|Sector         |                |HR        |CH/T      |CS        |All       |
|               |                |          |          |          |          |
|Average number of current       |3.4 (3.6) |4.4 (7.2) |3.3 (4.0) |3.7 (5.1) |
|directorships                   |          |          |          |          |
|               |                |          |          |          |          |
|Average number of previous      |3.3 (4.7) |5.3 (11.1)|4.1 (7.0) |4.2 (8.0) |
|directorships                   |          |          |          |          |
|               |                |          |          |          |          |
|(Standard deviations in         |          |          |          |          |
|brackets)                       |          |          |          |          |
It can be seen that the average number of directors, which encompasses both  executive  and  non-
executive directors, appears quite high, though further research would be desirable to evaluate  the
true significance of these figures.
Competence
The distinctiveness of new economy companies in  terms  of  their  human  capital  was  measured
principally by reference to whether directors had founder or insider/ outsider status (as  a  measure
of firm-specific or generic skills) and academic distinction. The  results  are  set  out  in  Table  35
below.
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Table 35:  Board Structure - Founders, Academics and Insiders, |           |
|by Sector                                                      |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Sector |           |       |          |HR     |CH/T   |CS     |All        |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|% of companies with ’founder’         |46%    |50%    |61%    |53%        |
|directors                             |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Academic distinction as %  |          |21%    |14%    |5%     |11%        |
|of all directors           |          |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Insiders as a % of all executive      |39%    |53%    |41%    |46%        |
|directors                             |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |           |
|Outsiders as a % of all executive     |27%    |33%    |32%    |30%        |
|directors                             |       |       |       |           |
The proportion of directors possessing some academic distinction revealed the sharpest distinction
in these measures of human capital, with a much higher proportion in  relation  to  HR  companies
than in CS companies. This may well be explained by  the  presence  of  scientific  research  based
companies in the sample; however, it is perhaps interesting to reflect that the overall  proportion  –
in the region of 1  in  5  –  is  relatively  slight  compared  with  what  might  have  been  expected.
Equally, it may be explained by the presence of some  computer  entertainment  companies  in  the
CS sample where there were a number of examples of self-trained technical  experts  as  directors.
Such a distinction might also have been reflected in the comparatively disproportionate number of
founder directors identified in CS companies compared with HR companies, some of  which  may
have  started  life  as  university  spin-off  companies  and,  therefore,  not  have  a  founder  in  the
conventional sense.
Company law has been  much  criticised  for  failing  to  ensure  an  adequate  level  of  directorial
competence,  not  least  in  failing  to  require  any  minimal  level   of   educational   qualification.
However, some of the criticism  is  misplaced  given  that  Parliament  has  not  demonstrated  any
significant  enthusiasm  for  change[384]  and  the  ability  of  judges  to  innovate  in  this  area  is
significantly limited by the doctrine of judicial precedent and the inherent ability  of  the  common
law to lay down rules of sufficient specificity. Accordingly, the common law rules have had to  be
developed in such a way to apply to companies  of  all  types,  including  therefore  new  economy
companies where the skills required may be of considerable complexity. The  general  standard  of
care applicable to a director is that a director need not exhibit a greater  degree  of  skill  than  may
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience[385] – usually referred  to
as a “subjective” test, in that it is subjective to the director in question, rather than  an  “objective”
standard[386]. Historically, there has been evidence of  some  laxity  in  the  interpretation  of  this
rule. Accordingly, in a well-known 1911 case the court found that a director  might  undertake  the
management of a rubber company in  complete  ignorance  of  everything  connected  with  rubber
without  incurring  liability  for  mistakes  resulting  from  this   ignorance[387].   Yet,   seemingly
paradoxically, the same court went on to observe that if such a director were  acquainted  with  the
rubber business, he was bound to give the company the benefit  of  his  knowledge[388].  Such  an
approach presents dangers for directors of new economy companies  because  it  would  provide  a
disincentive for appropriately qualified persons to become directors.
Such  laxity  has,  however,  been  challenged  both  by   statutory   intervention   in   the   case   of
insolvency[389] but also as a result of the Barings Bank scandal. The  litigation  arising  from  the
Barings Bank litigation is especially  pertinent,  however,  because  of  the  statement  of  Jonathan
Parker, J. as follows[390]:
“ ... Directors have, both collectively and individually,  a  continuing  duty  to  acquire  and
maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of  the  company’s  business  to  enable
them properly to discharge their duties as directors ...”
The case, of course, arose, of course, out of disqualification proceedings relating to the collapse of
Barings Bank. Its applicability to new economy companies is potentially serious since the  duty  is
stated as one imposed on directors individually as well as collectively. If this  were  to  be  applied
strictly then it could make it difficult for technically complex companies (as many  new  economy
companies appear to be) to find sufficient directors with generic but not firm- or industry- specific
skills; alternatively, that such directors face greater potential liabilities than perhaps they realise.
In terms of considering directorial competence, it was interesting to review the insolvency records
of directors in the sample of prospectuses, which are set out in Table 36.
|            |           |             |           |             |         |            |
|Table 36: Number of Directors with Insolvency    |             |         |            |
|Records, by Sector                               |             |         |            |
|            |           |             |           |             |         |            |
|            |           |             |           |             |         |            |
|Sector      |           |Number of directors with:|             |         |            |
|            |AD         |AR           |C          |CVA          |Total    |% of all    |
|            |           |             |           |             |         |directors   |
|Health      |2          |4            |4          |1            |11       |9.3         |
|CH/T        |3*         |5            |5          |2            |15       |13.8        |
|CS          |2          |2            |3          |0            |7        |4.9         |
|All         |7          |11           |12         |3            |33       |8.9         |
|* One director had a US Ch 11 administration     |             |         |            |
|order.                                           |             |         |            |
|            |           |             |           |             |         |            |
A surprisingly high proportion of directors had  been  a  director  of  a  company  which  had  been
involved in a formal insolvency procedure, such as administration, administrative  receivership  or
a compulsory winding up (8.9%  overall).  The  highest  proportion  came  from  the  CH/T  sector
(13.8%).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  weight  to  place  on  such   information.   One
interpretation would be to see this as a sign of incompetence; another  as  the  gaining  of  valuable
experience; perhaps both.
Key to table as to insolvency records
A          Adminstration
AR       Administrative receivership
C          Compulsory winding up
CVA    Corporate voluntary arrangement
D          Dissolution
V          Voluntary winding up
Companies seeking to have their shares publicly traded must in addition  satisfy  the  requirements
of the Listing Rules as follows[391]:
“The directors and senior management ... must have collectively appropriate  expertise  for
the management of the group’s businesses. Details of such expertise and  experience  must
be disclosed in any listing particulars prepared by the company ...”
These  rules  are  especially  noteworthy  in  that  they  extend  the  test  of  expertise  to   cover   a
company’s senior management, which might appear to amount to a concession where the directors
themselves do not have adequate expertise.
Scientific research based companies are subject to additional rules. The company must be  able  to
demonstrate that not only the directors but again senior managers  as  well  have,  collectively,  the
knowledge and experience necessary for the company’s activities,  including  technical,  financial,
marketing  and,  if   appropriate,   manufacturing   experience[392].   These   categories   are   well
supported by the risk factors identified  earlier  in  this  paper.  In  particular,  the  board  or  senior
managers must include  at  least  one  executive  director  or  senior  manager  responsible  for  the
company’s research activities throughout the relevant period and other persons who have played “
...  a  significant  role  ...”  in  the  company’s   activities   throughout   the   relevant   period[393].
Furthermore, the listing particulars must demonstrate  that  laboratory  research  and  development
operations are supported by directors and technical staff of  appropriate  expertise  and  experience
and  that  those  directors  are  reasonably  expected  to  remain  available  to   the   company[394].
Contractual constraints, such  as  those  discussed  earlier  in  this  paper  may  be  one  method  of
satisfying this latter requirement.
Innovative high growth companies are subject to a less rigorous standard  than  scientific  research
based companies. The directors and senior managers must be able to demonstrate  that  they  have,
collectively, the  knowledge  and  experience  necessary  for  the  development  of  the  company’s
activities,   including   technical,   financial,   marketing    and,    if    appropriate,    manufacturing
experience[395]. Listing particulars must  identify  the  extent  to  which  the  development  of  the
company’s business is dependent on any key individuals, identifying those concerned[396].  Table
37 below identifies the comparative numbers of boards and key employees respectively.
|            |           |             |           |
|Table 37: Average Board Size and Average Number  |
|of Key                                           |
|Employees Disclosed in the Prospectus, by Sector |
|            |           |             |           |
|Sector      |Average    |Average No.  |           |
|            |Board      |of           |           |
|            |Size       |Key Employees|           |
|Health      |7.9        |4.8          |           |
|CH/T        |7.5        |6.4          |           |
|CS          |7.4        |6.7          |           |
|All         |7.5        |6.5          |           |
|            |           |             |           |
The importance of  human  capital  issues  in  the  Combined  Code  on  Corporate  Governance  is
demonstrated by the explicit requirement that the board should ensure  that  the  necessary  human
and financial resources are in place for the company to meet its  objectives[397].  In  addition,  the
board is expected to satisfy itself that plans are in place for an orderly succession to the board  and
senior management, with non-executive directors having a prime role in  this[398].  The  evidence
from investment risk factors for human capital considered earlier in this paper suggested that there
was only limited succession planning (in prospectuses prior to the  new  version  of  the  Code)  to
address such  risks  in  which  case  the  introduction  of  these  requirements  will  hopefully  have
brought about a significant change  in  practice.  Non-executive  directors  are  required  to  satisfy
themselves as to whether systems of risk management are robust and defensible, and, presumably,
this should extend to issues of human capital risk management at all levels[399].
The role required of board committees under the Combined Code has some potential relevance for
new economy companies but, again, shows signs of a lack of a joined-up  approach.  Accordingly,
important aspects of board level human  capital  are  spread  across  at  least  three  separate  board
committees. The nomination committee is required to evaluate  the  balance  of  skills,  knowledge
and experience on the board and to prepare a description of the role and  capabilities  required  for
any board appointment[400]. Whilst the role of the remuneration committee is  dominated  by  the
attempt to control excessive remuneration it is nonetheless  required  to  ensure  that  remuneration
levels are sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required[401]. The  audit
committee is required to review internal controls and risk management systems  generally[402]  as
well as to monitor the effectiveness of the audit process[403].
The chart below sets out the various committee structures found in the sample of companies.
This chart shows that, whilst there is complete compliance with the requirements to have an  audit
and remuneration committee, there is much poorer  compliance  with  the  requirement  to  have  a
nomination committee, a conclusion  consistent  with  other  academic  research.  This  presents  a
serious problem in terms of human capital issue  because  of  the  pivotal  role  of  the  nomination
committee in this regime. In addition, 2 HR companies were found to  possess  scientific  advisory
boards, one of which was entirely composed of independent experts. However, no such equivalent
technically orientated committees were  identified  in  respect  of  companies  from  other  sectors,
although  there  was  a  fairly  even  spread  of  risk  committees  across  the  sectors  (2,  2  and   4
respectively). Other committees identified included  safety,  environmental,  charity,  commercial,
regulatory, finance, treasury and executive and their use was most common within HR companies.
The  composition  of  such  committees  varied  strikingly  as  to  mixes  of  board  and  non-board
members.
The Bioindustry Association Code of Best Practice, as has been considered earlier in this paper, to
state that the board should  seek  to  achieve  a  balance  among  non-executive  directors  between
relevant  business  expertise   and   understanding   of   the   risks   and   uncertainties   of   product
development[404]. It  also  provides  that  companies  should  have  access  to  external  scientific,
regulatory and clinical advice and that boards should make appropriate use of that advice and take
it into account[405]. One example of how the requirement for access  to  relevant  external  advice
may be satisfied might involve  the  use  of  a  scientific  advisory  board.  Accordingly,  one  such
[prospectus] disclosure that such a board had been established to: “ ... to assist the Group with  the
assessment of its core technologies and  research  and  development  programmes  and  to  provide
scientific advice to the board  ...”[406].  Audretsch  and  Feldman,  more  cynically,  note  that  the
concept of scientific advisory boards provides a company with the  option  of  having,  at  minimal
cost, a full roster of the key players doing research in  its  area  of  expertise[407].  However,  they
also observe that in  addition  to  the  ostensible  role  of  providing  a  company  with  knowledge,
university-based scientists provide a  signal  of  company  quality  to  the  scientific  and  financial
communities and cite a case study of how one company attributed much of its success  to  the  role
of its scientific advisory board in enabling it to recruit young scientists[408].
A small number of companies in the sample have already been  identified  as  having  access  to  a
scientific advisory board; Table 38 below contains the results of the survey in  terms  of  access  to
board directors as a source of expertise.
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Table 38:  Board access to technical  |       |       |       |            |
|expertise                             |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|Sector |           |       |          |HR     |CH/T   |CS     |All         |
|                           |          |21%    |14%    |5%     |11%        |
|Academic distinction as %  |          |       |       |       |           |
|of all directors           |          |       |       |       |           |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with a CTO  |          |53.8   |7.1    |33.3   |31.1        |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with an R&D |          |15.4   |0      |5.6    |6.7         |
|director                   |          |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
|% of companies with a development     |15.4   |0      |5.6    |6.7         |
|director                              |       |       |       |            |
|       |           |       |          |       |       |       |            |
The results in Table  38  have  already  been  evaluated  in  relation  to  the  distinctiveness  of  the
companies within the sample.
Consistent with the regulatory expectations of directorial competence,  the  Combined  Code  now
emphasises  the  needs  for  induction[409]  and  training[410]  and  the  role  of  the  chairman   in
ensuring that directors continually update their skills and the knowledge and  familiarity  with  the
company required[411]. The company secretary is responsible for facilitating aspects of  this[412]
and in practice may play a larger role in suggesting appropriate training. This raises an  interesting
question again as to the perceived nature of skills which are required at board level:  firm-specific,
industry-specific or generic. Arguably, a balanced board will contain a range of such skills, giving
rise to a diversity which might call into question what might constitute effective training.
Removal
Another feature of the Combined Code relevant to the effective governance of  human  capital  are
the requirements for board self-evaluation. Under company law generally  the  shareholders  have,
in principle, ultimate responsibility for corporate performance, extending to the power  to  remove
directors[413]. Yet this suffers in practice from the same weaknesses as were identified in relation
to appointments. The Board is required to  undertake  a  formal  and  rigorous  review  of  its  own
performance and that of its committees and individual directors[414]. The chairman is required  to
act on the results of the performance  evaluation,  where  appropriate,  seeking  the  resignation  of
directors[415].
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The importance of an analysis of new economy companies
The reason for this paper was the near universal perception of a major change taking  place  in  the
worldwide  economy   associated   with   significant   rises   in   knowledge   investment   and   the
development of a new type of company, referred to in this paper as  a  “new  economy”  company.
Such companies, associated with sectors as diverse as biotechnology, information technology  and
even retailing, have as a consequence become a major priority for policymakers, demonstrated  by
a range of policy documents which  acknowledge  this,  notably  in  fields  such  as  company  law
which have a bearing on corporate governance. This paper aimed to evaluate the true  significance
of human capital in the  governance  of  such  companies  and  how  existing  regulation  might  be
evaluated by the potentially  competing  or  complementary  goals  of  economic  efficiency,  good
corporate governance, innovation and human capital development.
Methodology
A  number  of  differing  methodologies  were  used  throughout  the  paper  to  achieve  its   aims,
including “black letter”  legal  analysis,  the  economic  analysis  of  law,  an  empirical  survey  of
Techmark  companies  (using  both  company  prospectuses  and  annual  reports   and   accounts),
content analysis and the use of accounting ratios. The legal analysis focused  upon  company  law,
contract law and, in relation to share options, taxation law, but specifically  excluding  intellectual
property law. The survey of company prospectuses was relatively novel  in  the  United  Kingdom,
although not without precedent - and not without difficulties in terms of the  bulk  and  complexity
of the relevant documentation. Nonetheless, the benefits in terms of the richness and quality of the
data gathered justified this approach, providing fresh insights  into  areas  as  diverse  as  company
risk profiles and individual director integrity.
The survey itself consisted of prospectuses, listing particulars or exempt listing documents  over  a
5-year period, with the majority relating to the boom year of 2000. Almost all (92%) related to the
Official List rather than  the  Alternative  Investment  Market,  with  10%  consisting  of  scientific
research based companies applying under Chapter 20 of the Listing Rules and  16%  consisting  of
innovative high growth companies applying under Chapter 25 of the Listing  Rules.  The  majority
of transactions related to admission, a placing and/ or an offering. The survey further consisted  of
the most recent annual accounts and reports of 45 companies available from  the  original  sample,
with year-ends falling between November 2002 and December 2003. This was also beneficial as it
meant that 35% of the sample were required to report under the provisions of the revised Code  on
Corporate  Governance,  introduced  as  a  consequence   of   the   Smith   Committee   and   Higgs
Committee.
It proved valuable to be able to subdivide the companies surveyed into  three  broad  groupings  of
health related companies, computer hardware and telecommunications and  related  companies,  as
well as computing and related services  companies,  reflecting  the  perceived  asset  specificity  of
such companies.  15  companies  were  selected  from  each  of  the  health  related  and  computer
hardware/ telecommunications   and  related  sector  groupings  and  20  from  the  computing  and
related services sector groupings,  reflecting  the  larger  number  of  such  companies.  The  health
related  companies  were  selected  from  companies  within  the  biotechnology,  health,   medical
equipment & supplies, pharmaceuticals sectors. The computer hardware/ telecommunications  and
related  companies  were  selected  from  companies  within  the  electronic  equipment,  fixed-line
telecommunication  services,   semi-conductors,   telecommunications   equipment   and   wireless
telecommunications  services’  sectors.  The  computing  and  related   services   companies   were
selected from companies within the computer services, software, home entertainment, internet and
e-commerce sectors.  The  initials  “HR”,  “CH/T”  and  “CS”  have  been  adopted  throughout  to
distinguish the groupings.
Distinctiveness of new economy companies
The first question addressed related to the distinctiveness of new economy companies and whether
it was correct that such companies were truly distinguishable by reference  to  the  role  played  by
human capital. To avoid identifying too  diffuse  a  range  of  characteristics  the  comparison  was
based  around  confirming  or  rejecting  existing  academic  views   that   key   issues   surrounded
company  age  and  size  and  the  relative  importance  of   intangible   assets   and   research   and
development, as well as their corporate governance and human capital.
There was no real distinction which could be drawn between the different types of company based
on their age. On average, when the original founding date of the underlying business  activity  was
taken into  account,  the  perception  that  such  companies  were  very  young  proved  to  be  only
partially founded, being on  average  8  years  old.  When,  in  relation  to  governance,  this  paper
examined the ages of directors, it was found that average  age  (for  executive  directors  and  non-
executive directors combined) was 50.7 years  overall,  again  dispelling  any  preconceptions  that
directors of such companies were youthful. Accordingly, these factors raised little  in  the  way  of
any implications for the governance of new economy companies.
There was, in contrast, a marked difference between the different types of company in the  sample
in terms of their size. CH/T companies  were,  unsurprisingly,  the  largest,  whether  measured  by
turnover or assets, and HR companies the smallest, but with  CS  companies  generating  the  most
turnover in relation to their assets. The significance of these  figures  for  the  governance  of  such
companies is that it would be  expected  that  the  larger  companies  would  experience  particular
tensions in managing innovation in terms of the looseness or formality of  structures  and  that  the
smaller companies might experience barriers in access to  capital,  management  qualification  and
ability to obtain technical information and know-how.
Claims that new economy  companies  mainly  comprise  intangible  assets  were  rebutted.  When
goodwill was subtracted from  the  value  of  intangible  assets,  creating  a  sharper  focus  on,  for
example, intellectual property rights, the ratio of intangible to tangible assets fell to  below  1.0  in
each instance and that for CS companies became  almost  insignificant.  Such  results  demonstrate
that care must be taken in relation to claims that intangible assets represent the bulk  of  the  assets
of new economy companies. However, academic views indicate that  formal  intellectual  property
right holdings in isolation can prove an unreliable guide to competitive  advantage  and  suggest  a
link with their governance instead.
The ratio of research and development expenditure to turnover was found to be markedly  stronger
in HR companies than in either CH/T or CS. Indeed, the ratio  in  relation  to  HR  companies  was
highly striking at 0.722. The  average  percentage  of  research  and  development  staff  by  sector
varied significantly with HR companies, being much higher, unsurprisingly given that  there  were
some scientific research based companies in the sample. Academic views again  suggested  a  link
between  research  and  development  and  its  governance  but  also,  in  this  context,  with   good
information disclosure.
The governance of TechMARK companies  had  been  demonstrated  by  other  researchers  to  be
distinct in a number of ways from that of FTSE 100 companies, although  such  a  conclusion  was
perhaps to be expected, and that some of the distinctions, for example, as  to  committee  structure
had  potential  ramifications  for  human  capital  issues.  The  research  conducted  for  this  paper
confirmed that, in terms of a range of conventional measures, such as average size, number of non-
executives, number of independent non-executives, there was a surprising degree of  homogeneity
across the sectors surveyed.
There  were  much  sharper  differences  relating  to  the  diffusion  of  power   across   the   board,
especially in terms of independent non-executive directors, where HR companies were far weaker.
Further analysis was conducted to ascertain whether problems with the  diffusion  of  power  were
additionally reflected in director shareholdings. The proportion of companies where  the  directors
between them held significant shareholdings was interesting; not least in some cases the  directors
between them held percentages of shares carrying specific company  law  rights.  For  example,  at
the top end of the spectrum there were two companies where the directors  between  them  held  in
excess of 50% of the issued share capital.
When a selection of measures which might be more relevant to the specific  governance  needs  of
new economy companies  were  surveyed  the  differences  between  the  three  sectors  were  very
marked. Accordingly, 53.8% of HR companies  had  a  board  member  responsible  for  scientific,
technological or medical  issues  and  15.4%  of  such  companies  had  a  director  responsible  for
research and development,  only  7.1%  of  CH/T  companies  had  either.  In  case  differences  of
classification might  have  played  a  part,  the  presence  of  a  general  development  director  was
analysed, but it was then found that 15.6% of HR companies possessed  one,  but  not  any  of  the
CH/T companies surveyed. This was  considered  to  justify  the  focus  on  human  capital  in  this
paper.
The problem of how to define and measure human capital in  relation  to  the  governance  of  new
economy companies presented a significant  difficulty.  Human  capital  was  seen  to  be  a  wide-
ranging term, capable of including such diverse traits as skills,  experience,  knowledge  and  even
personality, appearance, reputation and credentials, capable of being summed up as the  quality  of
labour. Unsurprisingly, it was found that  links  with  universities  could  play  a  vital  role  in  the
creation and development of human capital. A useful distinction  could  be  drawn  between  firm-
specific skills, industry-specific skills and generic skills, not least because in economic terms, firm-
specific skills posed difficulties from an efficiency perspective because  they  resulted  in  bilateral
dependency and therefore had the potential  to  increase  transaction  costs.  Put  simply,  there  are
problems in convincing an employee to invest in skills which are of limited market value which, it
was seen later in the survey, may lead companies to offer governance  related  incentives,  such  as
share options. The problem of the definition of human capital was compounded by the diversity of
potential means by which to measure it, especially at board level. Nonetheless, a range of valuable
measures were identified for adoption. For  example,  a  valuable  precedent  was  found  in  a  US
study, which sought  to  relate  chief  executive  pay  between  insider  and  outsider  appointments
serving, in effect, as a proxy for  firm-specific  and  generic  skills  respectively  and  was  adopted
widely throughout the paper.
The preliminary question which needed to be addressed was whether the human capital profiles of
the companies in the industry sectors surveyed were similar or diverged.  The  principal  approach
adopted was to analyse the risk factors identified in the prospectuses of  the  companies  surveyed.
One reason that this was considered a valuable measure was its potential  rigour:  there  is  a  wide
perception that it is fashionable for companies to talk  about  how  much  they  value  their  human
capital and there may be a suspicion that this may simply be good public relations. Because of  the
limited  circulation  of  prospectuses  and  because  of  the   severe   legal   sanctions   attached   to
misrepresentation, it was felt that the adoption of such a measure would reduce, if not avoid,  such
distortion. A modified form of content analysis was adopted to analyse the risk factors.
The most significant risks for CH/T companies and CS companies,  measured  by  the  number  of
lines devoted to them, related to financial issues (24% and 19% respectively) whereas in  the  case
of HR companies this was very important (16%)  but  ranked  slightly  behind  regulation  and  the
protection of intellectual property rights (17% and 16%, as  rounded,  respectively),  issues  which
were not especially significant for the other types of company.  Human  capital  issues  were  most
important in relation to CS companies, where they ranked equal fifth (5%) whereas  in  relation  to
the other types of company they ranked seventh (4% and 5% respectively).
The analysis of the priority  of  investment  risk  factors,  based  on  their  order  in  the  document,
showed  that  financial  risks  were  the  most  important  for  both  CH/T  companies  and  for  CS
companies, whereas product risks  were  the  highest  priority  for  health  related  companies.  The
importance of financial risks was consistent with the previous analysis; product risk had also been
a  significant  factor  for  HR  companies  where  it  fell   immediately   below   those   specifically
identified. The explanation for this would almost certainly be the  presence  of  scientific  research
based companies in the sample who  were  at  the  earlier  stages  of  product  development.  Risks
associated with human capital fell somewhere towards the higher end of the spectrum  at  6th,  5th
and 3rd respectively.
The overall pattern of results adopting alternative measures were sufficiently similar as to  provide
some confidence in the accuracy of the method  adopted.  What  it  confirmed  was  that  the  risks
associated with human capital issues were an important priority  for  companies  but  far  from  the
most significant. In contrast, CH/T companies and CS  companies  were  much  more  prepared  to
identify human capital factors as a “key strength” (46.7% and 50% respectively),  but  the  brevity
and tenor of such statements would suggest that they were a less effective  source  of  information.
When the text of the risk factors was further analysed to identify their significance specifically for
corporate  governance,  it  was  found  that  CS  companies  had  the  greatest  concerns   (70%   of
companies) contrasting with  CH/T  companies  (20%  of  companies).  There  were  a  number  of
potential explanations for this, for example, the higher proportion of CS  companies  containing  a
founder director (61% of companies).
The quality of information  disclosed  as  to  the  risk  factors  associated  with  investment  in  any
particular company was, despite the overall success  of  the  exercise,  found  to  be  disappointing.
Firstly, there was no attempt  to  quantify  risk,  either  in  terms  of  potential  monetary  value,  or
probability  –  a  stark  contrast  with  many   internal   risk   management   policies.   Second,   the
disclosures  were  often  found  to  be  formulaic  in  nature  and  therefore  were   informative   by
exception. Disclosures as to the risks associated with governance and human capital were as much
subject to these general criticisms as other risks  identified.  In  some  cases  companies  identified
what measures had been taken to reduce risk exposure, in other cases  this  was  left  unclear.  The
quality of other information disclosed to investors in relation to human capital and governance,  in
particular, the biographical information needed to identify founder, academic, insider and outsider
directors, was also found to be deficient. In particular,  such  information  was  not  provided  in  a
consistent  format  as  between  different  companies  which   made   inter-company   comparisons
difficult.
Ideal regulatory system
Once it had been confirmed that human capital issues were an important issue  in  the  governance
of new economy companies, though far from being as significant as might have been supposed,  it
was necessary to consider what the “ideal” regulatory system for such  companies  might  be.  The
approach adopted, so as to avoid being confused by an excessively broad range of  issues,  was  to
examine some  of  the  more  important  regulatory  goals  relevant  to  new  economy  companies:
economic  efficiency,  good  corporate  governance  and  investor  protection,  the  promotion  and
development  of  innovation,  and  human  capital.  The  order  of  these  was  not  significant   but
reflected the development of the underlying concepts. The exercise was based on a  review  of  the
relevant theoretical literature on innovation and human capital. Regrettably, much of the  literature
was found to be too vague for specific application to the development of policy measures or to  be
concentrated on “big” issues that could not easily be changed, for example,  the  contrast  between
US/UK and Continental European systems  of  governance.  Furthermore,  much  of  the  literature
emphasised  the  importance  of  competition  law   and   intellectual   property   law,   which   was
necessarily outside the scope of this paper.
It was seen for economic efficiency to be attained,  it  was  important  for  dynamic  or  innovative
efficiency to be achieved  simultaneously,  although  this  could  –  albeit  rarely  –  give  rise  to  a
conflict, for example, in terms of the encouragement  of  research  and  development  expenditure.
Much of the approach to economic analysis of law which was relied upon was familiar  and  broke
no new ground, for example, in terms of the justifications  for  state  intervention  and  the  role  of
market failure, which in  the  case  of  new  economy  companies  could  be  seen  to  be  linked  to
problems, such as information asymmetry and investor judgement problems.
The use of contract law, for example, to  enforce  restrictive  covenants  in  employment  contracts
was seen  as  essential  if  risk-averse  investors  were  to  invest  in  such  companies.  The  use  of
company law as a means of imposing disclosure requirements was seen as valuable  in  addressing
the information asymmetry and investor judgement problems identified. It  was  also  seen  that  in
economic theory the private company form was preferable for such companies because limitations
on exit would serve to  prevent  opportunistic  behaviour  and  therefore  reduce  agency  costs.  In
contrast, therefore, it was seen  that  if  the  public  company  form  was  adopted  then  alternative
means of alleviating agency problems would need  to  be  utilised,  including  share  ownership  to
align incentives, linked to  restrictions  on  sale  (if  possible  in  a  public  company  context),  and
contractual protections.
In contrast to the clarity of economic thinking, what constituted “good” corporate governance was
seen to encompass an exceptionally diffuse range of issues, reflecting its multi-disciplinary nature,
including matters such as the purpose of the company and  company  law.  The  approach  adopted
was to identify the overriding principles which  have  guided  the  development  of  the  Combined
Code, and which relate to human capital issues, which were subsequently interpreted to  lead  to  a
focus on appointment, competence and removal.
The  goal  of  facilitating  innovation  was  seen  to  again  require  sound  competition   laws   and
intellectual property laws. In addition, the appropriateness of the shareholder  model  of  corporate
governance was  seen  to  have  been  questioned  in  academic  research,  not  least  in  relation  to
industries where intellectual property protection was difficult and where  as  a  consequence  there
might be large spillovers of the returns from innovation to other stakeholders, such as  employees.
Two perspectives from academic research were identified as a consequence: one  to  minimise  the
effect of spillovers by a strategy of stakeholder inclusion,  the  other  to  ensure  that  control  over
resources  was  conferred  on  decision  makers  integrated  with  the  innovation  process.  Similar
considerations applied in the academic literature as to the goal of developing human  capital,  with
the principal strategies involving enhanced remuneration or share options. An  important  problem
was identified from a  theoretical  economic  perspective  that  companies  may  be  able  to  avoid
paying employees who develop firm-specific skills  the  full  value  of  the  extra  output  for  their
human capital, who will therefore be a bargain compared with those with generic skills. Academic
research indicates the possibility as a consequence of  significant  insider/  outsider  differences  at
board level. Share options were again the  preferred  solution  to  this  problem  with  shareholding
being regarded as giving rise to a risk of employee entrenchment.
Company strategies
The survey of  investment  risk  factors  in  prospectuses  was  beneficial  because  in  many  cases
companies not only set out the risks associated with human capital in the company  but  also  their
strategy for addressing these risks. Unsurprisingly, these  were  essentially  contractual  in  nature,
although all to a greater or lesser extent operated in the shadow of either common law or  statutory
regulation. Overall, there was approximately the same degree of  reliance  on  remuneration  as  an
incentive and contractual constraints (24.5% and 25.2%  respectively)  with  significant,  but  less,
reliance on insurance (16.9%). Perhaps more surprising was the  proportion  of  companies  which
did not mention a specific strategy when identifying the risk, an astonishing 31.6% of the  sample.
However, this should not be taken as meaning that such companies do not possess such a strategy,
only that it was not considered material to qualify the risk factor identified in this way.
There  were  a  few  significant  variations  by  sector.  The  use  of  remuneration  was   the   most
consistently relied upon strategy of the three sectors surveyed, although there was a slight drop  in
the  case  of  HR  companies.  HR  companies  appeared  to  place  more  reliance  on  the   use   of
contractual constraints than the use of remuneration and this was markedly higher  than  the  other
companies in the sample, perhaps reflecting the sensitivity of the issue to risk  averse  investors  at
the product development stage and the differing backgrounds of  many  of  the  relevant  directors.
CS companies placed far greater reliance upon insurance solutions  than  the  other  sectors.  CH/T
companies noted that it was their technical edge  that  assisted  in  the  attraction  and  retention  of
employees. However, it was CH/T  companies,  in  contrast,  which  were  the  most  likely  not  to
expressly  identify  their  strategy  in  the  investment  risk  factors.  When  the  reasons  given   by
companies for entering the transaction were analysed, it was clear that human capital  issues  were
a far more important factor in relation to CS companies (60%), than to the others (20% in  relation
to both).
Remuneration
The most striking aspect of the results was that  in  HR  companies,  the  average  remuneration  of
founders,  directors  with  academic  distinction  and  chief  technology  officers  all  exceeded  the
average of all executive directors whereas in CH/T companies and  CS  companies  all  fell  below
the average. However, the results for insider directors were patchier with remuneration  exceeding
the average executive remuneration in both HR and CH/T companies but being  slightly  below  in
CS companies.
In theoretical terms, the results might  imply  a  number  of  possibilities.  The  most  likely  would
appear that founders, directors with academic distinction and chief  technology  officers  generally
possess firm specific skills which receive lower remuneration as expected but that there was  some
factor unique to the HR companies to reverse this. It is submitted that the most likely explanations
are either that such directors in fact possess industry-specific skills or alternatively  that  there  are
specific valuation or agency problems in such companies which  merit  attention.  However,  there
was another possibility, given that some companies were subject  to  the  Bioindustry  Association
Code of Best Practice, that the requirement for a  balance  of  business  and  product  development
expertise among non-executive directors  ensured  a  more  accurate  valuation  of  these  directors
services.
Share options
Share options were found to be a universally significant part of overall  remuneration  strategy  for
quoted high-growth companies. Despite this, take-up  of  tax-advantaged  schemes  appears  to  be
relatively low.  The low level of options permitted under such schemes does not appear  to  be  the
primary reason for this low use, and further research (perhaps in the  form  of  interviews)  on  this
point could be beneficial.
When examining the types of share option scheme  adopted  by  each  of  the  business  operations
sectors in the study, the percentage of  companies  adopting  the  standard  approved  scheme  was
roughly comparable across all three sectors.  However with the other schemes there was a  notable
difference, with CH/T companies far more likely to adopt an all-employee plan (67% compared to
36% for health and 25% for CS), but with no  CH/T  companies  adopting  an  EMI  scheme.  This
may be partially explained by the different size  of  companies  in  the  three  sectors  (in  terms  of
gross assets the average size of CH/T company in the sample was  £18  billion,  against  only  £46
million for Health and £210 million for CS).  Larger companies are of course unable  to  adopt  an
EMI scheme and may also be more likely to adopt an all-employee scheme. However the  average
company size masks wide variations, and on further investigation it appeared that despite the  high
average gross assets approximately one third of CH/T companies in  the  sample  were  still  small
enough to qualify to adopt an EMI scheme (the proportion for CS  companies  was  similar).   The
percentage of qualifying companies in Health was slightly higher (54%), but not sufficiently so  to
account for the far greater level of adoption.  Accounts do  not  disclose  sufficient  information  to
discover the reasons for these differences so further research, possibly in the form of interviews or
a questionnaire, would be needed.
The Enterprise Management Incentive (EMI) scheme is, despite its intentions,  not  significant  for
the quoted high-growth sector.  This is primarily due to over half (58%)  of  the  companies  being
excluded from the scheme by the low maximum  permitted  gross  assets  (£30  million),  however
some companies (10% of the sample) that  met  the  gross  asset  test  were  still  excluded  by  the
requirement for the majority of its business to be in the UK; consideration should be  given  to  the
adverse impact of this requirement on international growth by UK companies; and  even  amongst
apparently qualifying companies the take-up rate is low, and further research may be beneficial  to
establish the reasons for this in order to inform potential reform of the scheme.
Too many companies have allowed their options for key  directors  to  fall  severely  under  water,
without granting replacements from a lower  base.   This  casts  serious  doubt  on  the  efficacy  of
share option plans as motivational tools for such  companies.  The  government  could  assist  with
this problem by permitting under-water  options  to  be  transferred  out  of  the  approved  scheme
without being cancelled, freeing up capacity for new worthwhile approved options to be granted.
Use of contractual constraints
Existing  academic  studies  demonstrated  a  degree  of  uncertainty  as  to  the   extent   to   which
contractual mechanisms were likely to be effective  or  were  overridden  in  practice  by  business
norms. Accordingly, the results of this aspect of the survey must be interpreted cautiously.
Information as to restrictive covenants was  disclosed  by  approximately  40%  of  the  companies
surveyed.  The  most  common  type  of  restrictive  covenant  used  in  executive  director  service
agreements was against competition (96.4%),  followed  by  conventional  restrictions  relating  to
employees and customers (42.2% and 67.5% respectively). Perhaps surprising in  the  light  of  the
high technology nature of the companies, a relatively low proportion sought to  impose  a  specific
covenant restricting competing research  and  development  activity  (15.7%):  indeed  the  highest
proportion of those which did were CS companies, rather than HR  companies  (32.3%  as  against
12.5%).
The  common  law  regulation  of  restrictive  covenants  through  contract  law  was   seen   to   be
surrounded by a number of serious uncertainties, which  potentially  pose  problems  for  both  the
company and the director. Since the seniority of an employee subject to  a  restrictive  covenant  is
taken into account by a court, this increases the likelihood of a court being willing to enforce  such
a covenant against a director. However, there is some doubt as  to  the  precise  boundaries  of  the
interests which the courts will protect, especially with regard to confidential information,  a  doubt
which must pose a serious concern to new  economy  companies  where  confidential  information
may be of considerable importance and value and which may not be  susceptible  to  protection  as
an intellectual property right. Another source of doubt relates to the reasonableness of a restrictive
covenant being determined by reference to its scope, length and area, not least in terms of  the  test
as to whether a restraint has been imposed in relation to a  business  different  from  the  one,  say,
where  trade  secrets  exist  –   determination   of   what   is   a   different   business   may   not   be
straightforward in highly technical fields. A further problem relates to the possibility  that  a  court
might  be  unwilling  to  enforce  a  restrictive  covenant  in  the  public   interest,   a   considerable
possibility where innovation generally and specifically in relation to health related  matters  might
be concerned.
The use of restrictive covenants was seen to pose a dilemma in  terms  of  economic  theory  as  to
whether  the  principle  of  voluntary  contracting  or   freedom   of   competition   should   prevail.
Generally, it seemed that it would be inefficient to seek to restrict an employee from moving  to  a
new job with  higher  prospects  of  value-creation.  In  the  case  of  restrictions  upon  the  use  of
confidential information the position was more  complex,  given  the  debate  as  to  whether  such
information should be recognised as property, which would normally be efficiency enhancing.
The data on  notice  periods  was  regrettably  patchy  because  of  the  limited  information  in  the
sample. It is difficult, therefore, to be confident in the interpretation  of  the  results,  especially  in
the case of non-executive directors where, as  a  consequence,  there  may  be  no  notice  required.
Subject to this, it would appear that many companies have negotiated fairly lengthy notice periods
which would enable them to rely on the provision of directors’ services for a reasonable length  of
time, typically 12 months  minimum  followed  by  perhaps  a  further  12  months.  A  number  of
companies in the sample also  disclosed  details  of  the  use  of  garden  leave  clauses  of  varying
degrees of sophistication. There  is  a  close  relationship  between  the  use  and  enforceability  of
garden leave clauses and restrictive covenants discussed above. The use of  such  clauses  must  be
questionable given their  purpose  is  to  attempt  to  sterilise  an  employee’s  knowledge  prior  to
leaving a company.
The typical modal lock-in agreement period was 12  months.  This  was  consistent  with  both  the
typical length observed for restrictive covenants and  to  general  notice  periods.  The  purpose  of
such clauses would appear to be valuable for corporate governance since their purpose  is  to  seek
to minimise share price volatility – already identified  in  this  paper  as  a  significant  risk  factor.
Whilst further research might be conducted into the nature of the exceptions  to  these  agreements
and whether they operate equitably, there appears to be no reason to question their use.
Insurance was identified as a means of dealing with human capital risk  by  relatively  few  HR  or
CH/T companies (11.1% and 10.5% respectively) but it was the most significant strategy  adopted
by CS companies (29.2%), perhaps because  the  highest  proportion  of  companies  with  founder
directors fell into this category  and  it  is  possible  that  in  such  companies  there  was  a  greater
perceived need to reassure investors as to the risk.
Role of governance
Good  corporate  governance  was,  perhaps,  surprisingly,  not  identified  by  companies  in  their
prospectuses  as  a  means  of  addressing  human  capital  risks.  This  is  disappointing  given  the
potential for good corporate governance to make a difference in this area and it may  be  that  with
the recent reforms to the Combined Code, companies might have responded differently.
The legal and regulatory framework for the governance of board level  human  capital  issues  was
seen  to  be  extremely  fragmented  and  confusing   with   superficially   similar   or   overlapping
requirements  being  imposed  in  different  contexts  with  divergent  sanctions  for  breach.   New
economy companies may be affected by  not  only  general  provisions  of  company  law  and  the
Listing Rules and the Combined Code on Corporate Governance but also  the  specific  provisions
of Chapter 20  or  25  of  the  Listing  Rules  and  the  Code  of  Best  Practice  of  the  Bioindustry
Association. Whilst each of these was seen to make valuable contributions, a  joined  up  approach
might serve to reduce compliance costs and foster innovation as a result.
It was found  that,  on  average,  directors  in  the  sample  of  prospectuses  had  3.7  other  current
directorships. This would appear rather high and possibly interfere with  some  directors’  abilities
to perform their duties effectively.
The proportion of directors possessing some academic distinction revealed the sharpest distinction
in these measures of human  capital,  with  a  much  higher  proportion  (21%)  in  relation  to  HR
companies than in CS companies (5%). This may well be explained by the  presence  of  scientific
research based companies in the sample as well as some computer entertainment companies in the
CS sample where there were a number of examples of self-trained technical  experts  as  directors.
Such a distinction might also have been reflected in the comparatively disproportionate number of
founder directors identified in CS companies.
It was found that HR companies were the best served by board level access to  technical  expertise
with 53.8% having a chief technology  officer  or  equivalent  and  15.4%  having  a  research  and
development director. Generally, the CH/T companies were poorest  served  with  none  identified
having either a research and development director or a development director.
A surprisingly high proportion of directors had  been  a  director  of  a  company  which  had  been
involved in a formal insolvency procedure, such as administration, administrative  receivership  or
a compulsory winding up (8.9%  overall).  The  highest  proportion  came  from  the  CH/T  sector
(13.8%).  However,  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  weight  to  place  on  such   information.   One
interpretation would be to see this as a sign of incompetence; another  as  the  gaining  of  valuable
experience; perhaps both.
The common law rules on directors’ duties were seen to pose risks for directors  of  new  economy
companies because the subjective standard of care – usually criticised for its laxity – could act as a
deterrent  to  highly  qualified  or  experienced  persons  being  appointed  or  retained.   This   was
combined with the uncertainty as to the effect of recent case law which stated  that  directors  have
both collectively and individually  a  duty  to  acquire  and  maintain  a  sufficient  knowledge  and
understanding of  the  company’s  business,  which  though  seemingly  innocuous,  could  present
difficulty when applied on an individual basis in a highly technical new economy context.
The Combined Code  on  Corporate  Governance  appeared  to  lack  a  joined-up  approach  when
dealing with human capital, with differing responsibilities being  spread  between  the  board  as  a
whole, the remuneration committee, the audit  committee  and  the  nomination  committee.  There
was poorer compliance with the requirement to possess a nomination committee which appears  to
be a serious weakness given the pivotal role this is expected to play in board  level  human  capital
issues. A few companies in the sample had  established  scientific  advisory  boards  which  would
appear to be a valuable way of ensuring access to appropriate additional human capital.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
The overall impression of the impact of law and regulation upon issues of governance,  innovation
and human capital was a picture of fragmentation of policy efforts.  This  was  unsurprising  given
the very broad range of fields that require  consideration,  including  competition  law,  intellectual
property law, tax law, company law, contract  law,  employment  law  and  corporate  governance.
Yet given the undoubted importance of governance, innovation  and  human  capital  to  economic
performance, the need for a “joined-up” approach to law and regulation is strongly desirable.  It  is
probable, given the existing role of European law in certain of these fields, that such a review  can
only be conducted effectively at a European level.
The use of restrictive covenants was seen to pose risks for both companies and  for  their  directors
in terms of the uncertainty of the circumstances in which they would  be  enforced  by  the  courts.
Given the hazards of litigation, which can have a chilling and economically detrimental  effect  on
both parties, it is  recommended  that  the  law  be  reformed  so  as  to  clarify  when  a  restrictive
covenant may be enforceable. Whilst  further  research  would  be  necessary  on  the  point,  there
might be  merit  in  investigating  both  the  existing  use  and  possibilities  of  alternative  dispute
resolution in relation to such disputes.
The growing practice of companies of requiring  garden  leave  clauses,  in  addition  to  restrictive
covenants, would appear questionable  in  terms  of  economic  efficiency  and  the  facilitation  of
innovation and human capital, even if consistent with good governance. There may be some  merit
in their use being prohibited.
The quality  of  information  provided  on  human  capital  measures  of  the  board  was  generally
patchy, though much better in the sample of prospectuses than in annual reports  and  accounts;  in
particular, the  quality  of  biographical  information  provided  in  both  prospectuses  and  annual
reports and accounts was poor: insofar as human capital factors are significant  to  investors  much
could be done to improve the quality, clarity and  consistency  of  disclosure.  It  is  recommended
that consideration be given to extending some of the disclosure requirements  for  prospectuses  to
annual reports and  accounts  and  in  any  event  establishing  minimum  criteria  for  biographical
information.
The requirement under the Bioindustry Association Code  of  Best  Practice  that  companies  with
publicly traded shares should see to achieve  a  balance  among  non-executive  directors  between
those with relevant business expertise and relevant product development expertise appeared  to  be
valuable (although further research would be needed to evaluate this  further)  and  might  usefully
be made applicable to other new economy companies.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper focused on company law, tax  and  contract  law  issues.  However,  it  has  shown  that
competition  law  and  intellectual  property  law  also  have  a   significant   potential   impact   on
innovation at a theoretical level. This was supported by the survey of risk factors identified, where
regulation, competition and intellectual property were identified as  being  particularly  significant
(28% of average number of lines of text). It  is  recommended  that  further  research  evaluate  the
impact of competition law and intellectual property  law  upon  innovation  and  human  capital  in
new economy companies.
There was evidence that research and development  activities  posed  particular  problems  for  the
governance of new economy companies. This was supported by the  attempts  of  the  Bioindustry
Association Code of Best Practice to address such issues relevant to its sector and the evidence  of
a link to performance. Whilst  falling  outside  the  scope  of  this  paper,  it  is  recommended  that
further research seek  to  identify  and  evaluate  the  particular  problems  posed  by  research  and
development activity and how corporate governance in this area might be made more effective.
There was evidence of some  very  high  levels  of  board  shareholdings  in  the  sample  which  is
significant in terms of corporate governance. Further  research  is  recommended  into  the  human
capital and other consequences of this and how such high levels of shareholding are  addressed  by
regulators  with  a  view  to  ascertaining   whether   there   is   evidence   of   improved   corporate
performance through enhanced commitment  or  reduced  corporate  performance  through  greater
entrenchment.
Human capital risks were relatively unimportant compared with some other risks identified as part
of the analysis of investment  risk  factors.  A  wide  range  of  specific  risks  were  identified,  for
example, the financial risks arising from share price volatility or the risks associated with  product
development or the management of growth. This is especially rich and valuable  research  data  on
issues where empirical evidence is relatively sparse and further research is recommended into  this
data to evaluate the non-human capital risk factors  and  their  significance  in  terms  of  corporate
governance.
This paper has concentrated on strategies for addressing the risks  associated  with  human  capital
which  are  readily  identifiable  either  through  companies  identifying   them   as   part   of   their
investment risk factors or through requirements  in  relevant  regulation.  It  is  quite  possible  that
these present an incomplete picture and that further research, for example, into the  detailed  terms
of share option schemes might reveal further attempts by companies to constrain the  departure  of
directors  and  others.  This  would  be  consistent  with   economic   theory   and   it   is   therefore
recommended  that  further   research   seek   to   identify   such   constraints   and   evaluate   their
significance.
The use of insurance as a means of protecting against the  loss  of  a  director  or  senior  employee
was disappointing given that from an economic perspective this would  appear  to  be  an  efficient
solution. It is recommended that further research be carried out of what insurance is available, and
upon what terms, and why companies are reluctant to take it up.
The research showed that the average number of current other directorships  held  by  directors  of
companies within the sample was quite high (3.7). Further research  is  recommended  to  evaluate
the true significance of this in terms of  director  availability  to  perform  their  duties  adequately.
One possible means of doing so might be to correlate these with the figures now  being  published
for director attendance at board meetings.
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